I’m still on a funeral kick this week (see previous posts here and here), so here’s a morbid item from the introduction to Rabbi Yisroel Reisman’s excellent book, “Laws of Ribbis.” [Note: ריבית, Ribbis, or Ribbit, refers to interest charged on a loan. It is defined in Jewish law as אגר נטר ליה, charging someone a fee for the right to hold your money.]
A moneylender passed away. He had made his fortune by collecting interest from the poor of the town. In vengeance, the Chevra Kadisha (burial society) demanded a large sum of money for the grave, angering the heirs.
The matter came to R' Akiva Eiger. "How appropriate," he responded. "The normal price of a grave assumes that the purchaser will use it for a limited time, until the resurrection of the dead. We are taught that one who takes interest, though, does not get resurrected. As such, he will remain in the grave for eternity, and he should therefore pay a higher price for use of the grave!"
I love that story, both for R’ Akiva Eiger’s characteristically sharp humor and for the community’s vengeance against the money-hungry lender. But after some thought, you realize that there is an impropriety here: The revenge is actually against the moneylender's heirs! Certainly, his greedy soul will be aggrieved by the price of the grave, but how did his heirs deserve to lose that money?
In truth, though, the heirs won’t lose anything; they'll probably just take the fee out of the money they would have used to build a monument for him.
But, beyond that, Judaism does believe in collective responsibility, and particularly within a family.
Remember the story of Lemech and his wives? (Nah, I knew you didn’t – no one pays any attention to that blip in Bereishit, thanks to all of the other events overshadowing it, and thanks to Rashi’s difficult midrashic explanation. It’s in Bereishit 4:19-24. Go look it up, I’ll wait.)
As Ibn Ezra deciphers Lemech’s odd poetry there, Lemech’s wives separate from him because he is the 6th generation after Kayin, and Gd had sort of indicated (4:15, per Ibn Ezra’s read there) that Kayin would be punished for murdering Hevel after 7 generations. Lemech’s wives did not want to produce children who would suffer that punishment.
And so Lemech complains to his wives, “Kayin was a murderer, and so he deserves to be punished – but I have not killed anyone! Why should I suffer?”
To which the Torah’s unwritten answer is that when a person is punished, his family does suffer with him. Kayin’s family suffers with his punishment – and so the moneylender’s heirs suffer when his estate is reduced.
We see this throughout the Torah, and throughout life. A family suffers when its wage-earner goes to prison. Children learn bad traits from their parents, children grow up in poverty because of their parents’ spending habits, children acquire diseases because of their parents’ behavior.
It’s not a pleasant thing – it’s just the result of a world which is designed with אחריות and ערבות, with interlocking relationships and responsibilities. We just rely on Gd to balance out a person’s just desserts in the end.
I hate to end on a sad note, though, so here’s a story which qualifies as both morbid and funny (at least, I think it’s funny):
Construction signs warn of zombies
Hackers change public safety message
AUSTIN (KXAN) - Austin drivers making their morning commute were in for a surprise when two road signs on a busy stretch of road were taken over by hackers. The signs near the intersection of Lamar and Martin Luther King boulevards usually warn drivers about upcoming construction, but Monday morning they warned of "zombies ahead."
Anyone know Ex-President Bush’s whereabouts when this happened? This seems like his sense of humor, and he was in Texas...
[Oh, and speaking of zombies returning from the dead - RenReb has decided to add a post to her long-dormant blog. Check it out here. I miss that blog.]
Showing posts with label Judaism: Reward/punishment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judaism: Reward/punishment. Show all posts
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Monday, December 1, 2008
Reward, Punishment and Pirkei Avot Part II
In Part I, we saw that Pirkei Avot, which teaches us so much about Jewish ethics, spends a lot of time on our anticipation of reward and punishment, as incentives to Jewish practice.
Why does Pirkei Avot spend so much time on emphasizing incentives, instead of the innate morality of Jewish ethics?
I see five possible reasons, which may be operating in tandem here (since none of them explain all of the emphasis):
1) Reward and punishment is key to the whole concept of mitzvot and aveirot, commandments and transgressions. Gd says that right off the bat in Bereishit 4:7, in addressing Kayin (Cain) and admonishing him to improve his deeds.
2) Divine justice shows that ethical behavior is not only a social need, it is also a religious, bein adam laMakom need, very much part of being a good Jew as well as a good citizen. Think Bereishit 18:19 where Gd describes "the path of Gd" as being the practice of righteousness and justice. Think of the first mishnah in Avot, which anchors ethics in Jewish tradition and Torah.
3) Insistence on Divine reward and punishment, and particularly on life in the next world, is a major response to theodicy, the problem of seeing apparently good people who suffer and apparently evil people who thrive. This problem is a major disincentive to ethical behavior (see Kohelet 3:19-22), and so it must be addressed (as it is explicitly in Avot 4:15).
4) Reward and punishment work as an incentive for good behavior, as noted by Therapydoc in a comment here.
5) And, finally, if we present Gd as just and fair, then we have a role model for our own behavior. The Torah repeatedly tells us to imitate Gd, and it even gives us specific examples (Bereishit 18:21) to show how Gd judges carefully and fairly; we are meant to do the same.
There is much more to say, but I'm on the run today...
Why does Pirkei Avot spend so much time on emphasizing incentives, instead of the innate morality of Jewish ethics?
I see five possible reasons, which may be operating in tandem here (since none of them explain all of the emphasis):
1) Reward and punishment is key to the whole concept of mitzvot and aveirot, commandments and transgressions. Gd says that right off the bat in Bereishit 4:7, in addressing Kayin (Cain) and admonishing him to improve his deeds.
2) Divine justice shows that ethical behavior is not only a social need, it is also a religious, bein adam laMakom need, very much part of being a good Jew as well as a good citizen. Think Bereishit 18:19 where Gd describes "the path of Gd" as being the practice of righteousness and justice. Think of the first mishnah in Avot, which anchors ethics in Jewish tradition and Torah.
3) Insistence on Divine reward and punishment, and particularly on life in the next world, is a major response to theodicy, the problem of seeing apparently good people who suffer and apparently evil people who thrive. This problem is a major disincentive to ethical behavior (see Kohelet 3:19-22), and so it must be addressed (as it is explicitly in Avot 4:15).
4) Reward and punishment work as an incentive for good behavior, as noted by Therapydoc in a comment here.
5) And, finally, if we present Gd as just and fair, then we have a role model for our own behavior. The Torah repeatedly tells us to imitate Gd, and it even gives us specific examples (Bereishit 18:21) to show how Gd judges carefully and fairly; we are meant to do the same.
There is much more to say, but I'm on the run today...
Friday, July 25, 2008
Gittin 7-9 Accidental sin, helping an eved marry, and illiterate witnesses
As always, read with a gemara in front of you. Or, you could just skip it, of course.
7a
The gemara’s contention that Gd protects the righteous from accidental sin has its roots in various sources, such as the promise that HaShem will protect a Sanhedrin from accidentally killing an innocent victim. This is problematic, though, for we find cases of rabbinic error; whole segments of gemara deal, for example, with judicial error. Tosafot השתא tackles the problem by distinguishing between eating non-kosher and other sins; see his comments there.
דום may be taken as “be silent” or as “hope for.” But see Rosh haShanah 16b, as well as teshuvah #6 of the Tzemach Tzedek (the first, not the Lubavitcher Tzemach Tzedek), on the issue of liability for the causing the downfall of others.
Note that our gemara mis-cites Hosheia 9:1; the word there is כעמים, not בעמים. This may be a typo, but it may also be an אל תקרי approach, since the adjusted meaning of the sentence more closely fits our gemara’s point.
See Tosafot זמרא on the permissibility of listening to music in our own day. Ashkenazi poskim, like Tosafot, seem to be more lenient than Sephardic poskim in this issue.
8b
See Tosafot אף על גב on the point that settling Israel justifies אמירה לעכו"מ, but other mitzvot do not.
See Tosafot הדר.
9a
Tosafot שוו raises a very interesting question: We want to aid proper verification of a get in order to help a woman re-marry, but where is our incentive to make it easier to verify a document freeing an עבד? In the Torah’s version of עבדות, which is primarily long-term economic commitment, where is the harm? If he cannot marry a בת חורין, he can marry a שפחה - and the gemara later, on 13a, will contend that he prefers this! Tosafot offers a suggestion which runs counter to 13a, and an additional suggestion that the עבד wishes to fulfill mitzvot. Ramban and Ritva, though, will say that the עבד who is in limbo can marry no one, and so our expedited verification will help him a great deal.
9b
Rashi חוץ מגיטי נשים takes the view of the Chachmei Provence (2:48) that the reason secular governments have judicial authority recognized by Jewish law (dina d’malchuta dina) is because Gd instructed them to carry out such laws, in the mitzvot of Bnei Noach. For more on this see my post here.
Rashi בגיטי נשים does not seem to recognize any עיגון situation for an eved - contrary to the remarks of Tosafot שוו on 9a.
If we are to etch in signatures for illiterate witnesses and have them fill the signatures with ink, or if we will use stencils (per Rabbeinu Chananel cited in Tosafot here), how will we recognize their signatures as their own?! Some fifteen years ago, my friend Tzvi Hebel suggested that we don’t have to recognize their signatures at all, just that the delivery agent has to see them “sign” the document, and this is indeed fulfilled.
7a
The gemara’s contention that Gd protects the righteous from accidental sin has its roots in various sources, such as the promise that HaShem will protect a Sanhedrin from accidentally killing an innocent victim. This is problematic, though, for we find cases of rabbinic error; whole segments of gemara deal, for example, with judicial error. Tosafot השתא tackles the problem by distinguishing between eating non-kosher and other sins; see his comments there.
דום may be taken as “be silent” or as “hope for.” But see Rosh haShanah 16b, as well as teshuvah #6 of the Tzemach Tzedek (the first, not the Lubavitcher Tzemach Tzedek), on the issue of liability for the causing the downfall of others.
Note that our gemara mis-cites Hosheia 9:1; the word there is כעמים, not בעמים. This may be a typo, but it may also be an אל תקרי approach, since the adjusted meaning of the sentence more closely fits our gemara’s point.
See Tosafot זמרא on the permissibility of listening to music in our own day. Ashkenazi poskim, like Tosafot, seem to be more lenient than Sephardic poskim in this issue.
8b
See Tosafot אף על גב on the point that settling Israel justifies אמירה לעכו"מ, but other mitzvot do not.
See Tosafot הדר.
9a
Tosafot שוו raises a very interesting question: We want to aid proper verification of a get in order to help a woman re-marry, but where is our incentive to make it easier to verify a document freeing an עבד? In the Torah’s version of עבדות, which is primarily long-term economic commitment, where is the harm? If he cannot marry a בת חורין, he can marry a שפחה - and the gemara later, on 13a, will contend that he prefers this! Tosafot offers a suggestion which runs counter to 13a, and an additional suggestion that the עבד wishes to fulfill mitzvot. Ramban and Ritva, though, will say that the עבד who is in limbo can marry no one, and so our expedited verification will help him a great deal.
9b
Rashi חוץ מגיטי נשים takes the view of the Chachmei Provence (2:48) that the reason secular governments have judicial authority recognized by Jewish law (dina d’malchuta dina) is because Gd instructed them to carry out such laws, in the mitzvot of Bnei Noach. For more on this see my post here.
Rashi בגיטי נשים does not seem to recognize any עיגון situation for an eved - contrary to the remarks of Tosafot שוו on 9a.
If we are to etch in signatures for illiterate witnesses and have them fill the signatures with ink, or if we will use stencils (per Rabbeinu Chananel cited in Tosafot here), how will we recognize their signatures as their own?! Some fifteen years ago, my friend Tzvi Hebel suggested that we don’t have to recognize their signatures at all, just that the delivery agent has to see them “sign” the document, and this is indeed fulfilled.
Friday, June 27, 2008
Daf: Sotah 33-35 - lots happening here
There's a lot going on in these pages; I've just added some notes on a few of the many issues. As always, read with a gemara in front of you, but I have taken a few extra minutes to try to make some of these items comprehensible for those without a gemara.
33a
The gemara says that the entire Torah is supposed to be read in the original Hebrew. Rashi and Tosafot Shantz disagree on the application of that statement, as far as whether it refers to the weekly Torah reading or only to the biblically required Torah readings. Of particular note is the marginal comment on the Tosafot Shantz, suggesting that Parshat Parah is biblical.
Do the angels only speak Hebrew, or do they speak all non-Aramaic languages? See the Maharsha. (And boy is that topic odd – especially as it has halachic ramifications!)
33b
Tosafot and the Maharsha seem to have different explanations of the question of והלא לא ראו את הגלגל – Tosafot מול understands it to be asking that one cannot see Gilgal from Mount Gerizim and Mount Eval, but the Maharsha seems to think it is asking that the Jews cannot see Gilgal from their desert location.
The gemara lists times when Kohanim carried the Aron. See the Gilyon haShas on other times the Aron was carried by Kohanim. The Radak he cites asks and answers as Tosafot וכשהחזירוהו does here.
34a
I would have assumed the “300 mil” number was just an exaggeration, as is the gemara’s evaluation of the distance from earth to the clouds (in other discussions), but Tosafot יותר does not think so.
34b
See Tosafot כחנייתן on the matter of how the Jews crossed the Yarden.
The idea that a person could walk faster than water travels downstream is odd, to say the least. Rashi רבה and Tosafot מר both wrestle with this issue, and develop different solutions.
Regarding the issue of naming someone for an event that has not yet happened (as in the case of נחבי בן ופסי and סתור), see the Maharsha in Berachot on naming Ruth רות for the deeds of her descendant Dovid haMelech. Naming has elements of prophecy associated with it. See also our earlier discussion on Leah naming Yehudah for what he would do in the future.
The gemara here famously describes Moshe re-naming Yehoshua before his espionage mission; the Maharsha says that Yehoshua’s earlier labelling of “Yehoshua” in the Torah is only because his name would be changed later.
See Tosafot אבותי on the question of whether the deceased actually know what is happening in this world – and follow up in that gemara in Berachot 18-19 on this issue, particularly given the comment in the margin here. Based on our liturgy, such as some of the Tisha b’Av kinot, we certainly believe that the deceased do find out what is happening in this world.
See the Aruch on ענק; he renders it as neck.
35a
The Torah Temimah, commenting on the story of the spies, explains why the spies should have suffered particularly from wounds to their tongue and belly, and from the dreaded askerah death. The tongue was for lashon hara. The belly was for slandering Israel, which is seen in the gemara as the navel of the world. Askera is considered an appropriate punishment for lashon hara [but see also Pesachim 105a, where it is also a punishment for eating before havdalah…]
The idea of Dovid being blamed for Uzza’s death, when Uzza acted independently, is reminiscent of an issue discussed in many halachic authorities, of one’s liability for the death of a person who is doing a job for you. The Mahari Weil ruled that one is spiritually liable for the death of a person who is doing a job in his employ, and the issue has been greatly debated since. See Sanhedrin 95, Mahari Weil 125, Maharshal 96, Maharam Lublin 44, Beis Yosef at the end of Choshen Mishpat 188 (on financial liability), Tzemach Tzedek (the earlier) 6, Chasam Sofer 177, Avnei Nezer Yoreh Deah 478.
35b
Rashi’s explanation of בעבר הירדן is interesting; see also Rashbam to Devarim 1:1. There are others who are more troubled by this phrase.
If the Jews are not supposed to accept peace with the Canaanites they encounter, how do we understand Rachav’s survival? Tosafot לרבות gives one answer here, and this approach is seen in Malbim to Yehoshua 2:12 as well. Radak to Yehoshua 6:25 gives a similar answer, saying she converted. On the other hand, Ibn Ezra to Shemot 20:7 says that the oath bound the Jews, despite their mitzvah regarding her.
33a
The gemara says that the entire Torah is supposed to be read in the original Hebrew. Rashi and Tosafot Shantz disagree on the application of that statement, as far as whether it refers to the weekly Torah reading or only to the biblically required Torah readings. Of particular note is the marginal comment on the Tosafot Shantz, suggesting that Parshat Parah is biblical.
Do the angels only speak Hebrew, or do they speak all non-Aramaic languages? See the Maharsha. (And boy is that topic odd – especially as it has halachic ramifications!)
33b
Tosafot and the Maharsha seem to have different explanations of the question of והלא לא ראו את הגלגל – Tosafot מול understands it to be asking that one cannot see Gilgal from Mount Gerizim and Mount Eval, but the Maharsha seems to think it is asking that the Jews cannot see Gilgal from their desert location.
The gemara lists times when Kohanim carried the Aron. See the Gilyon haShas on other times the Aron was carried by Kohanim. The Radak he cites asks and answers as Tosafot וכשהחזירוהו does here.
34a
I would have assumed the “300 mil” number was just an exaggeration, as is the gemara’s evaluation of the distance from earth to the clouds (in other discussions), but Tosafot יותר does not think so.
34b
See Tosafot כחנייתן on the matter of how the Jews crossed the Yarden.
The idea that a person could walk faster than water travels downstream is odd, to say the least. Rashi רבה and Tosafot מר both wrestle with this issue, and develop different solutions.
Regarding the issue of naming someone for an event that has not yet happened (as in the case of נחבי בן ופסי and סתור), see the Maharsha in Berachot on naming Ruth רות for the deeds of her descendant Dovid haMelech. Naming has elements of prophecy associated with it. See also our earlier discussion on Leah naming Yehudah for what he would do in the future.
The gemara here famously describes Moshe re-naming Yehoshua before his espionage mission; the Maharsha says that Yehoshua’s earlier labelling of “Yehoshua” in the Torah is only because his name would be changed later.
See Tosafot אבותי on the question of whether the deceased actually know what is happening in this world – and follow up in that gemara in Berachot 18-19 on this issue, particularly given the comment in the margin here. Based on our liturgy, such as some of the Tisha b’Av kinot, we certainly believe that the deceased do find out what is happening in this world.
See the Aruch on ענק; he renders it as neck.
35a
The Torah Temimah, commenting on the story of the spies, explains why the spies should have suffered particularly from wounds to their tongue and belly, and from the dreaded askerah death. The tongue was for lashon hara. The belly was for slandering Israel, which is seen in the gemara as the navel of the world. Askera is considered an appropriate punishment for lashon hara [but see also Pesachim 105a, where it is also a punishment for eating before havdalah…]
The idea of Dovid being blamed for Uzza’s death, when Uzza acted independently, is reminiscent of an issue discussed in many halachic authorities, of one’s liability for the death of a person who is doing a job for you. The Mahari Weil ruled that one is spiritually liable for the death of a person who is doing a job in his employ, and the issue has been greatly debated since. See Sanhedrin 95, Mahari Weil 125, Maharshal 96, Maharam Lublin 44, Beis Yosef at the end of Choshen Mishpat 188 (on financial liability), Tzemach Tzedek (the earlier) 6, Chasam Sofer 177, Avnei Nezer Yoreh Deah 478.
35b
Rashi’s explanation of בעבר הירדן is interesting; see also Rashbam to Devarim 1:1. There are others who are more troubled by this phrase.
If the Jews are not supposed to accept peace with the Canaanites they encounter, how do we understand Rachav’s survival? Tosafot לרבות gives one answer here, and this approach is seen in Malbim to Yehoshua 2:12 as well. Radak to Yehoshua 6:25 gives a similar answer, saying she converted. On the other hand, Ibn Ezra to Shemot 20:7 says that the oath bound the Jews, despite their mitzvah regarding her.
Thursday, June 12, 2008
Daf: Sotah 12-14
Sorry to take so long before posting another installment. There is so much to say on these pages, and so little time to type it up. As always, you'll really need a gemara in front of you to see what I am discussing.
12a
See Tosafot Acheirim
Tosafot cheimar suggests that Moshe's boat was camoflagued in the reeds because the tar and pitch linings were on the inside. This is interesting, b/c it magnifies the miracle that Bat Paroh saw the boat at all!
12b
How can Moshe say that the Jewish babies were saved because he was cast into the water – the whole decree to throw the kids in the water was because of him! See Tosafot and Maharsha, who both address the issue.
The question of “How could Moshe get hurt on the water if he will sing to Gd on the water one day” is odd; what is the connection? Especially as this may not be yam suf! (It is reminiscent of a gemara in Taanit, though, regarding a ditch-digger whose daughter fell in a ditch and was protected by his merit.)
How could you have had a 'leap month' in those days? They haven't even learned HaChodesh haZeh Lachem! Reminiscent of Seder Olam that the sod haibbur was passed down from Adam and Chavah.
The issue of nursing from an eater of treif is interesting - see Rav Schachter's noteworthy comment in this issue, cited in my post here.
13a
The gemara here, per Rashi on the 36 crowns, assumes that the two Korachs mentioned in the lineage of Esav in Bereishit 36 are different people – but see Rashi to Bereishit 36:5, where he says that they are the same person.
Did the children of Keturah come for Yaakov’s funeral? Rashi does not think so, but Tosafot Shantz does.
See the Maharsha on the mourning of the horses and donkeys (which, of course, is reminiscent of the city of Nineveh).
I have difficulty understanding why the Gemara here seems to criticize the Jews for being involved in taking the spoils of Egypt, when Berachot 9a, based on דבר נא in Shmot 11, indicates that HaShem had to plead with them to take spoils! (Unless the plea is from before the actual departure, and then they “got into it” afterward, while Moshe was getting Yosef’s body?)
13b
Note that the line קיים זה כל מה שכתוב בזה is the source for burying a Torah scroll with a righteous person.
Interesting transition in the line about Yosef being returned to Shechem. Yosef is “stolen” from Shechem, and returned to Shechem as a “lost object” – removing the human agency and blame from the picture. And is he Yaakov’s lost object?
Of course, the Torah seems to indicate that Yosef was removed from Dotan, not Shechem, but see Rashi here.
The gemara here seems to pin the death of Er and Onan on Yehudah, instead of on their own famous sins. Perhaps it’s that Yehudah’s problem made them vulnerable to punishment?
Interesting: Yaakov’s degradation comes from others (who call him Yosef’s servant), but Yosef’s degradation, which is a punishment of sorts for him, comes from himself (when he calls himself ‘bones’). Recall the gemara in Taanit regarding placing ash on the heads of the sages on a public fast – degradation is worse when it comes from others.
Note that although Moshe dies at 120, that is not a source for saying that 120 is a maximum on people’s lives. I hope to post on this issue soon, but for now see Tosafot Bava Batra 113a ומטו.
14a
Rashi renders גסטרא here as a ruler, but note the usual translation of a split or broken receptacle.
Regarding the Bach’s note א, recall that there is a midrash in which Moshe does attempt to bring the Jews back to Israel after their exile.
We see here the idea of a grave being a significant place for prayer.
Here our patriarchs are called עצומים, mighty ones; this is parallel to the term איתנים used for them in the gemara toward the beginning of Rosh HaShanah on ירח האיתנים.
Tosafot כדי on “דורשין טעמא דקרא” makes the important distinction between analyzing the deeper meaning of pesukim for ethical lessons and analyzing the deeper meaning of pesukim for lessons which may affect the way we fulfill a mitzvah. See also Hirsch’s introduction to Horeb.
14b
Regarding the “face of the altar” see Tosafot Shantz as well as Rashi Zevachim 62a.
12a
See Tosafot Acheirim
Tosafot cheimar suggests that Moshe's boat was camoflagued in the reeds because the tar and pitch linings were on the inside. This is interesting, b/c it magnifies the miracle that Bat Paroh saw the boat at all!
12b
How can Moshe say that the Jewish babies were saved because he was cast into the water – the whole decree to throw the kids in the water was because of him! See Tosafot and Maharsha, who both address the issue.
The question of “How could Moshe get hurt on the water if he will sing to Gd on the water one day” is odd; what is the connection? Especially as this may not be yam suf! (It is reminiscent of a gemara in Taanit, though, regarding a ditch-digger whose daughter fell in a ditch and was protected by his merit.)
How could you have had a 'leap month' in those days? They haven't even learned HaChodesh haZeh Lachem! Reminiscent of Seder Olam that the sod haibbur was passed down from Adam and Chavah.
The issue of nursing from an eater of treif is interesting - see Rav Schachter's noteworthy comment in this issue, cited in my post here.
13a
The gemara here, per Rashi on the 36 crowns, assumes that the two Korachs mentioned in the lineage of Esav in Bereishit 36 are different people – but see Rashi to Bereishit 36:5, where he says that they are the same person.
Did the children of Keturah come for Yaakov’s funeral? Rashi does not think so, but Tosafot Shantz does.
See the Maharsha on the mourning of the horses and donkeys (which, of course, is reminiscent of the city of Nineveh).
I have difficulty understanding why the Gemara here seems to criticize the Jews for being involved in taking the spoils of Egypt, when Berachot 9a, based on דבר נא in Shmot 11, indicates that HaShem had to plead with them to take spoils! (Unless the plea is from before the actual departure, and then they “got into it” afterward, while Moshe was getting Yosef’s body?)
13b
Note that the line קיים זה כל מה שכתוב בזה is the source for burying a Torah scroll with a righteous person.
Interesting transition in the line about Yosef being returned to Shechem. Yosef is “stolen” from Shechem, and returned to Shechem as a “lost object” – removing the human agency and blame from the picture. And is he Yaakov’s lost object?
Of course, the Torah seems to indicate that Yosef was removed from Dotan, not Shechem, but see Rashi here.
The gemara here seems to pin the death of Er and Onan on Yehudah, instead of on their own famous sins. Perhaps it’s that Yehudah’s problem made them vulnerable to punishment?
Interesting: Yaakov’s degradation comes from others (who call him Yosef’s servant), but Yosef’s degradation, which is a punishment of sorts for him, comes from himself (when he calls himself ‘bones’). Recall the gemara in Taanit regarding placing ash on the heads of the sages on a public fast – degradation is worse when it comes from others.
Note that although Moshe dies at 120, that is not a source for saying that 120 is a maximum on people’s lives. I hope to post on this issue soon, but for now see Tosafot Bava Batra 113a ומטו.
14a
Rashi renders גסטרא here as a ruler, but note the usual translation of a split or broken receptacle.
Regarding the Bach’s note א, recall that there is a midrash in which Moshe does attempt to bring the Jews back to Israel after their exile.
We see here the idea of a grave being a significant place for prayer.
Here our patriarchs are called עצומים, mighty ones; this is parallel to the term איתנים used for them in the gemara toward the beginning of Rosh HaShanah on ירח האיתנים.
Tosafot כדי on “דורשין טעמא דקרא” makes the important distinction between analyzing the deeper meaning of pesukim for ethical lessons and analyzing the deeper meaning of pesukim for lessons which may affect the way we fulfill a mitzvah. See also Hirsch’s introduction to Horeb.
14b
Regarding the “face of the altar” see Tosafot Shantz as well as Rashi Zevachim 62a.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Daf: Sotah 6-7
There is a ton here on these pages; see Rashi and Maharsha on pretty much everything.
In my notes here, see especially the note on how we respond to suffering, the significance of clothing color, and the stories of Reuven and Yehudah. As always, having a gemara with you will help.
6a
Abayye is seen responding to Rava here, which is unusual. In general our edition rejects having Abayye, the mentor, question Rava, the student, and Rava’s name רבא is consequently changed frequently to Rabbah רבה – since Rabbah was Abayye’s mentor.
See Tosafot אם; this is an important point regarding the way we handle problems in life. Rather than observe idiosyncratic situations and ask ourselves why they are happening, we tend to explain away idiosyncrasies with pat answers, ignoring warning signals.
6b
It’s odd, to me, that we would destroy a valid korban due to a rabbinic concern. I recall that in Zevachim we specifically say not to do that?
The word כפרה (kapparah) is not specific to atonement for sin; Rashi notes that here, on the gemara’s use of כיפרה.
7a
Rashi’s version of a technical התראה warning, in "דידעי", does not fit the normal format of התראה.
In the first mishnah: If they are going to Yerushalayim anyway, why does the local court get involved at all? Just to provide escorts?! Perhaps this is why the Rambam writes (Hilchot Sotah 3:1 – note that this is mislabeled in the עין משפט on the daf) that the local hears and evaluates the testimony before sending them on.
The black clothing as a sign of mourning is interesting; see Pesachim 109a on colored clothing being joyous, and see Shabbos 114a especially, and see Yoma 19a (Kohanim ineligible for wearing black), Bava Metzia 59b (black for a solemn, sad occasion), Moed Katan 17a (black clothes for the person who wants to sin), and Maharsha to Sotah 22b (black clothes as a sign of mourning), Maharsha to Kiddushin 40a (black clothes against the yetzer hara), and more. Of course, also see Yeshayah 1:18 and Kohelet 9:8 on white and innocence and joy, and Shulchan Orach Chaim 610:4 on white clothing for Yom Kippur.
7b
See the Rambam on the mishnah regarding לבה גס בה – the concern is that being with familiar people bucks up one’s spirit.
What was Yehudah’s sin? Being with a zonah was permitted, and punishing Tamar for apparent extramarital involvement (because the גאולה bond to Shelah and his family was quasi-marital) was legitimate! Note that Rashi and Ibn Ezra to Bereishit 38 both say the embarrassment for Yehudah actually came from giving over such expensive and personal items for the sake of a liaison.
How could we tell her Reuven sinned, of the gemara in Shabbos says explicitly that Reuven did not sin? Rashi here seems to say it’s just moving the bed that is the sin. Rama (in his Responsum 11) has a different view, though – he says we lie about Reuven, giving him a bad reputation, for the sake of restroing shalom in general and avoiding erasing Gd’s Name.
See Rashi on להם לבדם נתנה הארץ.
See Rashi vs Tosafot on לא עבר זר
The idea of reward for Teshuvah fits nicely with the gemara in Yoma on proper teshuvah converting sins to זכויות, merits.
Rashi gives you the very interesting backstory on why Yehudah’s bones rolled in his casket.
The gemara’s idea of the person feeling posthumous pain when his body is harmed is reminiscent of the big discussion in Berachot 18b on whether a person experiences pain while the body deteriorates.
In my notes here, see especially the note on how we respond to suffering, the significance of clothing color, and the stories of Reuven and Yehudah. As always, having a gemara with you will help.
6a
Abayye is seen responding to Rava here, which is unusual. In general our edition rejects having Abayye, the mentor, question Rava, the student, and Rava’s name רבא is consequently changed frequently to Rabbah רבה – since Rabbah was Abayye’s mentor.
See Tosafot אם; this is an important point regarding the way we handle problems in life. Rather than observe idiosyncratic situations and ask ourselves why they are happening, we tend to explain away idiosyncrasies with pat answers, ignoring warning signals.
6b
It’s odd, to me, that we would destroy a valid korban due to a rabbinic concern. I recall that in Zevachim we specifically say not to do that?
The word כפרה (kapparah) is not specific to atonement for sin; Rashi notes that here, on the gemara’s use of כיפרה.
7a
Rashi’s version of a technical התראה warning, in "דידעי", does not fit the normal format of התראה.
In the first mishnah: If they are going to Yerushalayim anyway, why does the local court get involved at all? Just to provide escorts?! Perhaps this is why the Rambam writes (Hilchot Sotah 3:1 – note that this is mislabeled in the עין משפט on the daf) that the local hears and evaluates the testimony before sending them on.
The black clothing as a sign of mourning is interesting; see Pesachim 109a on colored clothing being joyous, and see Shabbos 114a especially, and see Yoma 19a (Kohanim ineligible for wearing black), Bava Metzia 59b (black for a solemn, sad occasion), Moed Katan 17a (black clothes for the person who wants to sin), and Maharsha to Sotah 22b (black clothes as a sign of mourning), Maharsha to Kiddushin 40a (black clothes against the yetzer hara), and more. Of course, also see Yeshayah 1:18 and Kohelet 9:8 on white and innocence and joy, and Shulchan Orach Chaim 610:4 on white clothing for Yom Kippur.
7b
See the Rambam on the mishnah regarding לבה גס בה – the concern is that being with familiar people bucks up one’s spirit.
What was Yehudah’s sin? Being with a zonah was permitted, and punishing Tamar for apparent extramarital involvement (because the גאולה bond to Shelah and his family was quasi-marital) was legitimate! Note that Rashi and Ibn Ezra to Bereishit 38 both say the embarrassment for Yehudah actually came from giving over such expensive and personal items for the sake of a liaison.
How could we tell her Reuven sinned, of the gemara in Shabbos says explicitly that Reuven did not sin? Rashi here seems to say it’s just moving the bed that is the sin. Rama (in his Responsum 11) has a different view, though – he says we lie about Reuven, giving him a bad reputation, for the sake of restroing shalom in general and avoiding erasing Gd’s Name.
See Rashi on להם לבדם נתנה הארץ.
See Rashi vs Tosafot on לא עבר זר
The idea of reward for Teshuvah fits nicely with the gemara in Yoma on proper teshuvah converting sins to זכויות, merits.
Rashi gives you the very interesting backstory on why Yehudah’s bones rolled in his casket.
The gemara’s idea of the person feeling posthumous pain when his body is harmed is reminiscent of the big discussion in Berachot 18b on whether a person experiences pain while the body deteriorates.
Friday, April 4, 2008
Daf: Nazir 23, a fascinating page
Yes, an entire post for this daf; there is a ton to see here, and we are just touching the tip of a very large iceberg!
23a
Nazir 23a-b is very interesting, for its discussion of the role of intention in both mitzvah and transgression. Some surprising concepts surface here, most prominently the idea of עבירה לשמה, a sin performed for the sake of Heaven. The concept itself is not surprising – it’s with us pretty much from childhood – but its validation in the gemara is not what one might have expected. The ‘system’ does not normally sanction its abrogation.
Rabbi Akiva cries here, regarding the extent to which a person is held liable for his intent. It’s interesting on two levels:
1. Rabbi Akiva is the one who usually laughs when the sages cry (end of Talmud Makkot), and even shuns tears upon his own martyring. Nonetheless, I find it consistent – Rabbi Akiva is always focussed on the Divine plan, and confidence in HaShem. Here, he cries because HaShem is so strict in judgment.
2. Various sages cry, in the gemara, when they reach specific pesukim or lessons of great import for our spiritual accounting. Think of Rebbe in Avodah Zarah 17 or 18, crying because a person can acquire his ‘olam’ in an instant יש קונה עולמו בשעה אחת.
Look at Tosafos על דבר, using the ראשי תיבות (acronym) approach.
I was troubled by the use of אכילה גסה here to connote simple over-eating – until I saw Tosafos “pesach”.
23b
The midrash is troubled, at the start of Parshat Balak, regarding the interplay between Midian and Moav in hiring Bilam. The midrash’s conclusion is that Midian and Moav teamed up. Here, though (top of the page), it appears that they are considered the same nation?
The reason presented here (ancestral behavior) for the prohibition of marrying an Amonite/Moabite is not the same as the reason given in the Torah itself (behavior of those nations when the Jews arrived to enter Israel)! Perhaps the idea is that the actions of the ancestors dictated the character of their descendants, a sort of ersatz מעשה אבות סימן לבנים concept. It fits the traditional concept of mamzerut, too – that the descendant is influenced by the traits of his parents.
Our gemara speaks positively about a person who learns Torah or performs mitzvos with ulterior motives. Tosafos here, and in four other places, points out that Berachos 17a strongly condemns a person who acts with ulterior motives! In all of those sites, Tosafos explains that there is a difference between acting positively for personal gain (approved), and acting positively in order to harm others (not approved).
Ruth is identified here as the descendant of kings. This fits a general talmudic pattern of associating outsiders who joined the family of Avraham, or who wanted to join, with royal heritage; we do this for Hagar, identifying her as the daughter of a Pharoah, and for Timna (see Rashi to Bereishis 36:12).
Note also Tosafos בת בנו on the chronology of Ruth’s connection to Eglon. We don’t assume that Ruth’s mother was exceptionally long-lived. (As opposed to Ruth’s descendants, between her and Dovid haMelech.)
23a
Nazir 23a-b is very interesting, for its discussion of the role of intention in both mitzvah and transgression. Some surprising concepts surface here, most prominently the idea of עבירה לשמה, a sin performed for the sake of Heaven. The concept itself is not surprising – it’s with us pretty much from childhood – but its validation in the gemara is not what one might have expected. The ‘system’ does not normally sanction its abrogation.
Rabbi Akiva cries here, regarding the extent to which a person is held liable for his intent. It’s interesting on two levels:
1. Rabbi Akiva is the one who usually laughs when the sages cry (end of Talmud Makkot), and even shuns tears upon his own martyring. Nonetheless, I find it consistent – Rabbi Akiva is always focussed on the Divine plan, and confidence in HaShem. Here, he cries because HaShem is so strict in judgment.
2. Various sages cry, in the gemara, when they reach specific pesukim or lessons of great import for our spiritual accounting. Think of Rebbe in Avodah Zarah 17 or 18, crying because a person can acquire his ‘olam’ in an instant יש קונה עולמו בשעה אחת.
Look at Tosafos על דבר, using the ראשי תיבות (acronym) approach.
I was troubled by the use of אכילה גסה here to connote simple over-eating – until I saw Tosafos “pesach”.
23b
The midrash is troubled, at the start of Parshat Balak, regarding the interplay between Midian and Moav in hiring Bilam. The midrash’s conclusion is that Midian and Moav teamed up. Here, though (top of the page), it appears that they are considered the same nation?
The reason presented here (ancestral behavior) for the prohibition of marrying an Amonite/Moabite is not the same as the reason given in the Torah itself (behavior of those nations when the Jews arrived to enter Israel)! Perhaps the idea is that the actions of the ancestors dictated the character of their descendants, a sort of ersatz מעשה אבות סימן לבנים concept. It fits the traditional concept of mamzerut, too – that the descendant is influenced by the traits of his parents.
Our gemara speaks positively about a person who learns Torah or performs mitzvos with ulterior motives. Tosafos here, and in four other places, points out that Berachos 17a strongly condemns a person who acts with ulterior motives! In all of those sites, Tosafos explains that there is a difference between acting positively for personal gain (approved), and acting positively in order to harm others (not approved).
Ruth is identified here as the descendant of kings. This fits a general talmudic pattern of associating outsiders who joined the family of Avraham, or who wanted to join, with royal heritage; we do this for Hagar, identifying her as the daughter of a Pharoah, and for Timna (see Rashi to Bereishis 36:12).
Note also Tosafos בת בנו on the chronology of Ruth’s connection to Eglon. We don’t assume that Ruth’s mother was exceptionally long-lived. (As opposed to Ruth’s descendants, between her and Dovid haMelech.)
Thursday, February 7, 2008
Daf: Nedarim 50-51
50b
On 50b Shemuel is put down for his large stomach, which is odd; Rabbi Yochanan is described elsewhere (such as Berachos 5b and 20a) as being of surpassing beauty, and yet the gemara calls him a Baal Basar (Rubenesque) (such as Berachos 13b and Niddah 14a)!
Those who complain about expensive weddings should wonder at Rebbe's son's wedding on 50b. Of course, Rebbe was the Nasi, with political responsibilities involving the Romans as well as the Jews, but the idea of spending such a sum - and inscribing it on the chuppah! - is still remarkable.
50b also introduces the concept of an individual's suffering saving others from Divine punishment. We also see this elsewhere in the gemara, regarding misas tzaddikim mechaperes and Miriam's death. This is also the likely basis for the Christian concept of vicarious atonement. We have a different take, though. As I understand it, an individual will always have to answer for his sins, no matter how much someone else (such as Rebbe) sufffers. The tzibbur, though, may be saved from tzibbur-wide punishments, due to an individual's suffering - because when an individual suffers, the tzibbur is said to have suffered as well. There is much more to say on this, of course.
51
On 51b we get the word "tefel" as bland; some some use this to explain "tiflut" on Sotah 20a, in the position of Rabbi Eliezer on women's talmud torah.
On 50b Shemuel is put down for his large stomach, which is odd; Rabbi Yochanan is described elsewhere (such as Berachos 5b and 20a) as being of surpassing beauty, and yet the gemara calls him a Baal Basar (Rubenesque) (such as Berachos 13b and Niddah 14a)!
Those who complain about expensive weddings should wonder at Rebbe's son's wedding on 50b. Of course, Rebbe was the Nasi, with political responsibilities involving the Romans as well as the Jews, but the idea of spending such a sum - and inscribing it on the chuppah! - is still remarkable.
50b also introduces the concept of an individual's suffering saving others from Divine punishment. We also see this elsewhere in the gemara, regarding misas tzaddikim mechaperes and Miriam's death. This is also the likely basis for the Christian concept of vicarious atonement. We have a different take, though. As I understand it, an individual will always have to answer for his sins, no matter how much someone else (such as Rebbe) sufffers. The tzibbur, though, may be saved from tzibbur-wide punishments, due to an individual's suffering - because when an individual suffers, the tzibbur is said to have suffered as well. There is much more to say on this, of course.
51
On 51b we get the word "tefel" as bland; some some use this to explain "tiflut" on Sotah 20a, in the position of Rabbi Eliezer on women's talmud torah.
Wednesday, February 6, 2008
Daf Notes on Nedarim - III
39-40 are so packed it feels absurd to say anything at all. Here are a few notes, but there is a lot more to say:
1. Regarding the sitting/standing debate - Assuming no nedarim are involved, I always recommend that people sit down, unless they feel their prolonged presence would be a burden for the choleh. Sitting tells the choleh he has your full attention, and you aren't racing out the door ASAP.
2. Why is there no gezeirah of "don't visit, lest you sit inappropriately?" I suspect it's because chazal don't want to create a gezeirah limiting bikur cholim. (Alternatively, perhaps we don't have a gezeirah because this is a milsa d'lo shchicha, but then why do we have a gezeirah not to sit, lest one remain?)
3. These laws re: neder pertain to private home visits, but should not apply to hospital visits, other than in an area where we pay people (such as social workers) to visit cholim.
4. The group of 7 is interestingly divisible into 3 complementary pairs, and Mashiach.
5. Note the angelic titling of Moshe as "Ben Amram." This is standard in Malach dialogue regarding Moshe, such as the gemara in Shabbos in which the malachim challenge Moshe's right to the Torah. We find in midrashim that "Ben Amram" is used as a pejorative, such as when Kalev gives his "bait and switch" attack on Moshe, and when Dasan and Aviram attack Moshe. Here, though, that doesn't seem to be the case. Perhaps it's because the malachim recognize Amram's great rank (as one of the four who never sinned). Alternatively, perhaps it's because Moshe was great in his youth, when he was known by his father's name - we have a similar explanation for the names of Ben Zoma and Ben Azai, in some rishonim.
6. Rav Yosef discuss the schar for bikkur cholim here. I haven't had a chance to do a CD-ROM search, but recall that Rav Yosef discuss schar mitzvah in other places as well - re: his own schar mitzvah as a blind man, and the question of the schar for an eino metzuveh v'oseh. Perhaps there are other places as well; I don't recall at the moment. See also his comment on Makkos 23b regarding HaShem's punishments and Chagigah 4b on dying early (I admit I looked at my own webshas notes for those last two).
7. A MUST see - The Ran at the top of 40a on praying for a person to die.
On 40, the issue of reward for bikkur cholim comes up. One of my Daffies here asked about the gemara at the end of Chullin, which says Schar mitzvah b'hai alma leca. I would respond with two points:
1. Specific to this issue - Here, the schar is explicitly stated in a pasuk;
2. In general - It seems to me that the nature of HaShem's schar/onesh is subject to machlokes in the gemara; views are expressed which are mutually exclusive. This isn't a big deal; as the Rambam noted in his comments to the end of Sanhedrin, we don't need to pasken on these issues.
40 is also very interesting for the tangent into the laws of Mikvah vs. Maayan. I highly recommend an article by Rabbi Howard Jachter on the differences between the two, and the issue of Zochlin.
You might take a look at Tosafos in Bava Basra 141a "l'didi", when you see Rav Chisda's note on the importance of a wife, on 41a. I'm not sure what to do with Tosafos's second answer, in relation to Rav Chisda's emphasis on marriage. There might be no connection, but it seems to me that there is one...
On 41 we find Rav Yosef's tragic story, which is particularly ironic given his role as "Sinai" in the classic "Sinai vs. Oker Harim" debate at the end of Berachos.
We also find a similar story involving Rebbe and R' Chiyya, and here the number 13 appears again. If you recall my comment on 13 and exaggeration, see my reference there to Bava Basra, but also see Rashi in Shabbos 119a on the ilisa d'dinri (towards the bottom of the page), and the Maharsha there. Of course, 13 here does seem to be a specific number - unless the point is that the launderer knew the lesser half.
Re: miracles of refuah, see the Ramban's approach to nisim, that the purpose of a nes nigleh (open miracle) is to make sure we notice the nes nistar (hidden miracle). We also talk about this regarding the nes of waking up in the morning.
Note also the Rosh on eating milk at the same table where someone eats dairy, and the difference between that and the neder case.
In general: See the Ran and the Rosh all through this daf; interesting conflicting views here, such as on the issue of the tamchui hachozeir l'baal habayis, and on the question of whether healing the animal is a mitzvah of hashavas aveidah.
1. Regarding the sitting/standing debate - Assuming no nedarim are involved, I always recommend that people sit down, unless they feel their prolonged presence would be a burden for the choleh. Sitting tells the choleh he has your full attention, and you aren't racing out the door ASAP.
2. Why is there no gezeirah of "don't visit, lest you sit inappropriately?" I suspect it's because chazal don't want to create a gezeirah limiting bikur cholim. (Alternatively, perhaps we don't have a gezeirah because this is a milsa d'lo shchicha, but then why do we have a gezeirah not to sit, lest one remain?)
3. These laws re: neder pertain to private home visits, but should not apply to hospital visits, other than in an area where we pay people (such as social workers) to visit cholim.
4. The group of 7 is interestingly divisible into 3 complementary pairs, and Mashiach.
5. Note the angelic titling of Moshe as "Ben Amram." This is standard in Malach dialogue regarding Moshe, such as the gemara in Shabbos in which the malachim challenge Moshe's right to the Torah. We find in midrashim that "Ben Amram" is used as a pejorative, such as when Kalev gives his "bait and switch" attack on Moshe, and when Dasan and Aviram attack Moshe. Here, though, that doesn't seem to be the case. Perhaps it's because the malachim recognize Amram's great rank (as one of the four who never sinned). Alternatively, perhaps it's because Moshe was great in his youth, when he was known by his father's name - we have a similar explanation for the names of Ben Zoma and Ben Azai, in some rishonim.
6. Rav Yosef discuss the schar for bikkur cholim here. I haven't had a chance to do a CD-ROM search, but recall that Rav Yosef discuss schar mitzvah in other places as well - re: his own schar mitzvah as a blind man, and the question of the schar for an eino metzuveh v'oseh. Perhaps there are other places as well; I don't recall at the moment. See also his comment on Makkos 23b regarding HaShem's punishments and Chagigah 4b on dying early (I admit I looked at my own webshas notes for those last two).
7. A MUST see - The Ran at the top of 40a on praying for a person to die.
On 40, the issue of reward for bikkur cholim comes up. One of my Daffies here asked about the gemara at the end of Chullin, which says Schar mitzvah b'hai alma leca. I would respond with two points:
1. Specific to this issue - Here, the schar is explicitly stated in a pasuk;
2. In general - It seems to me that the nature of HaShem's schar/onesh is subject to machlokes in the gemara; views are expressed which are mutually exclusive. This isn't a big deal; as the Rambam noted in his comments to the end of Sanhedrin, we don't need to pasken on these issues.
40 is also very interesting for the tangent into the laws of Mikvah vs. Maayan. I highly recommend an article by Rabbi Howard Jachter on the differences between the two, and the issue of Zochlin.
You might take a look at Tosafos in Bava Basra 141a "l'didi", when you see Rav Chisda's note on the importance of a wife, on 41a. I'm not sure what to do with Tosafos's second answer, in relation to Rav Chisda's emphasis on marriage. There might be no connection, but it seems to me that there is one...
On 41 we find Rav Yosef's tragic story, which is particularly ironic given his role as "Sinai" in the classic "Sinai vs. Oker Harim" debate at the end of Berachos.
We also find a similar story involving Rebbe and R' Chiyya, and here the number 13 appears again. If you recall my comment on 13 and exaggeration, see my reference there to Bava Basra, but also see Rashi in Shabbos 119a on the ilisa d'dinri (towards the bottom of the page), and the Maharsha there. Of course, 13 here does seem to be a specific number - unless the point is that the launderer knew the lesser half.
Re: miracles of refuah, see the Ramban's approach to nisim, that the purpose of a nes nigleh (open miracle) is to make sure we notice the nes nistar (hidden miracle). We also talk about this regarding the nes of waking up in the morning.
Note also the Rosh on eating milk at the same table where someone eats dairy, and the difference between that and the neder case.
In general: See the Ran and the Rosh all through this daf; interesting conflicting views here, such as on the issue of the tamchui hachozeir l'baal habayis, and on the question of whether healing the animal is a mitzvah of hashavas aveidah.
Sunday, December 16, 2007
Derashah: Vayyigash 5768: My trip to the White House Chanukah Party
Trip to the White House
The White House Chanukah celebration was fantastic.
Among other highlights:
Caren and I toured the White House “Shell Room,” a remarkable tribute to the First Lady’s interest in the National Parks, featuring four large cones coated with seashells, seashell wreaths and a seashell display table;
We took not one, but two photographs with the President, because he blinked on the first one;
We heard the Marine Band play “I had a little dreidel” and saw Malcolm Hoenlein and Senator Lieberman, among other celebrities.
The highlight, for me, was the moment when we entered the room where the president was, and I looked up and saw him, standing just a few feet from us. I’m a native New Yorker, I lived in Manhattan and went to school there for more than a decade, I think I don’t lose my breath easily - but I have to admit that I just gasped when I saw him.
And there was another highlight - I have to admit, I came away with pockets full of napkins bearing the Presidential Seal.
Seudaso shel Achashverosh?
But all through the preparation for our trip, and all through our train ride to Washington, and all through the party itself, I was dogged by one concern, the message of a brief passage of Gemara (Megilah 12a):
Rabban Shimon bar Yochai was asked by his students, regarding Purim, “Why did the Jews of that generation deserve destruction?” Even though tragedy is not always a result of sin, the first response of a Jew is to ask whether he deserves whatever trouble he is experiencing, and so the students wanted to know if some sin was the cause of our vulnerability to Haman.
In reply, Rabban Shimon bar Yochai pointed to the beginning of Megilat Esther, and Achashverosh’s party. He said that the Jews were punished for attending Achashverosh’s feast. Even though the Jews attended out of fear of looking unpatriotic if they didn’t go, they should not have attended.
So I rode down to Washington wondering whether this was the equivalent of attending Achashverosh’s celebration. I was certainly surrendering certain mitzvah opportunities in order to go - I davened Minchah and Maariv privately instead of with a minyan (there was a maariv minyan in the White House, but I didn’t know that until later). I lit Menorah very late at night. I spent significant money on train tickets, money that might have gone for tzedakah. Was I doing all of this just to go to an Achashverosh party?
I especially wondered about this as I looked around the rooms at the celebration and saw Satmar and Lubavitcher Chassidim, and a few black-hatted gentlemen who were from various Yeshivos. What were we doing there, in a White House dominated by evergreen trees and tinsel?
But upon further reflection I saw two key differences between our event and Achashverosh’s meal.
Achashverosh’s party marked our downfall; the White House party marked our ascendancy
First, the two parties sent opposite messages about the future of the Jewish people.
The Gemara explains why Achashverosh held his big party: It was to celebrate the exile of the Jews from Israel.
A little bit of history - our neviim predicted that after the destruction of the first Beis haMikdash by the Babylonians, we were to be exiled for 70 years, and then return to Israel. There were at least three different ways to count the seventy years, and based on Achashverosh’s count, the seventy years were now up, and we had not returned to Israel. To him, this was a sign that we were exiled for good, and Gd had abandoned us - and so he made a party, and so the Jews attended a party marking their own downfall.
To me, that’s one difference between Achashverosh’s feast and the White House Chanukah celebration: Achashverosh was marking the demise of the Jews, the White House was marking the strength of the Jews.
For all of our concern about Jewish assimilation, intermarriage, and loss of identity;
For all of our concern about rising Arab power and declining Jewish influence, and Condoleezza Rice’s newfound Palestinian heritage;
Here we were in the center of power of the nation that is still the world’s only superpower, celebrating Chanukah.
As I said in The Allentown Morning Call this past Thursday, America is a remarkable country and its democracy an incredible system, the way it honors minorities. Even if this honor is a political nod intended to earn votes, it shows that in the American system, everyone matters. We matter - and we have a future.
The White House party marked our identity
Second, the two parties sent opposite messages about the importance of Jewish identity.
Achashverosh’s party marked the downfall of the Jews and of separate Jewish identity, and by participating, the Jews themselves signaled that they had bought into his message.
In contrast, the White House celebration marked the vitality of Jewish identity, and of Torah, for America’s Jews.
The fact that this was a kosher dinner, the fact that the president extended the bulk of his invitations to the Torah-observant community, shows that we matter specifically as Jews, and as standard-bearers for Torah. We were there because we are Jewish, we are popular because we retain our Jewish identity.
It’s really only logical that our identity should matter, and that we should be there as Jews and Torah-observers, specifically. If I were to adopt the label of a political movement, if I were to identify as an Environmentalist or a Progressive or a Free-Marketer or a Globalist, and I didn’t have the name “Jew” in my title and I didn’t include Judaism in my mission statement, then why would I belong at a Chanukah party?
This was a true Kiddush HaShem, a sanctification of Gd’s Name. Our influence as Jews, and our recognition as Jews, has come because we have retained our identity.
Us
These two messages - about the future of the Jewish community and about the importance of Jewish identity - apply far beyond the White House Chanukah celebration and our representation in the corridors of power. This message is for our daily lives.
Our day-to-day existence in this benevolent and wealthy land has the potential to go either way, to be a White House Kiddush HaShem or to be Seudaso shel Achashverosh. Earning a living at work, going to a park or restaurant, taking part in a community initiative, we can choose to bury our Judaism as was done at Achashverosh’s party, or to highlight it in the way that we did at the White House.
If I take off my yarmulka to attend a sporting event, if I hide my Judaism at work, if I deny to the world that I am part of this Jewish nation, then my life in America is attendance at Achashverosh’s seudah - I am enjoying the pleasures of this land, and paying a price by surrendering my Jewish identity.
But if I wear my yarmulka proudly, if I let people know I am Jewish, if I unabashedly support Israel and promote the ideals of my Judaism, then I create Kiddush HaShem, and I earn the right to celebrate Chanukah in the corridors of power.
Closer: The Menorah in the Beis haMikdash
The Gemara asks why Gd told us to light a Menorah in the Beis haMikdash each night, year-round. After all, Gd is the provider of all light - Gd doesn’t need our illumination! To which the Gemara replies that the Menorah’s light teaches us a major lesson: שהשכינה שורה בישראל, that the Shechinah is manifest among us. The light of the Menorah signals that we, as a nation, matter, that there is significance to being a Jew, to living as a Jew.
This light was on display in the White House this past Monday evening, the 7th night of Chanukah; may it be equally displayed in our actions every day and night of our lives.
Further thoughts:
1. Tragedy is not always a result of sin - see the gemara at the end of Chullin, as well as Moed Katan 28a.
2. Achashverosh's party was also kosher. Serving Kosher food can be a temptation for assimilation - See, you can still be Jewish even if you become like us - or it can be a display of respect.
3. Does attendance at this party override minyan, or lighting Menorah on time? Why?
4. Why does the Menorah's light, in particular, show that the Shechinah is among us? Is it to replicate the pillar of fire in the Midbar?
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