[Mi Yodeia, the Jewish Q&A website, is having a Launch Party on Sunday; mazal tov!]
Over the past week, I've been mulling three different models for creativity in Judaism:
Keep it Inside
This was the approach of the Nesiim, the heads of each tribe, in the offerings they brought for the dedication of the Mishkan (Bamidbar 7). Each brought the same material gifts, from the vessels made of precious metals to the flour to the incense to the animals – but Ramban (Bamidbar 7:2) wrote that each personalized it with his intent in bringing the various aspects of the gift.
The outward mitzvot were all the same, but each person's intent was creative and unique.
Make it Your Own
Rambam (Hilchot Avel 14:1) writes that the various ways we help each other (visiting the sick, comforting mourners, gladdening a bride and groom and so on) are all manifestations of the biblical "Love your neighbour" command, but the Torah did not include them as specific biblical instructions. The biblical mitzvah is simply to engage in actions which manifest love for each other, and then the Sages outlined various ways to do it - a list to which we still add.
It seems that chesed, the act of helping others, is a case in which the internal intent is the same, and the outward manifestations are creative and unique.
Hybrid
And then we have a third model: Tzitzit. The strings have a pre-determined length and [to a certain extent] colour and set of knots and wrappings, and the garment must have a certain number of corners. On the other hand, the garment may be any colour, almost any size, any pattern, and any type of woven material (although there seems to be a biblical preference for wool or linen). And the meaning is the somewhat specific awareness of Gd and the Torah, but that, too, leaves considerable room for personalization.
There is room for variety in the execution, and in the intent.
Which is it? Can we define an ideal level of creativity in Judaism? All of them, presumably, apply at different times. The trick is in figuring out which to apply, and when.
No?
Showing posts with label Judaism: Creative Torah. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judaism: Creative Torah. Show all posts
Sunday, June 3, 2012
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
The "Seventy Faces of the Torah" Fallacy
I was surprised to receive no comments on yesterday's Rabbinic Search Committee post, despite well north of 100 visitors. Odd.
Well, today we have a new topic: The "Seventy Faces of Torah" fallacy.
You know what I mean: The argument that our understanding of the Torah's text should not be limited to traditional approaches, but we can (and should) invent our own interpretations.
As I heard it applied the other day: We should be able to ordain women as rabbis today, because although millenia of halachic writing contain only 2 active references to women deciding law, still, we have the right to find more of the Seventy Faces.
Without entering the discussion about women’s ordination here – the topic requires more depth than this post – I believe that this argument stumbles in the “Seventy Faces” fallacy, the idea that there are שבעים פנים, seventy faces, to the Torah.
In itself, the idea of Seventy Faces is robust and well-cited in post-talmudic Judaism, found in the Zohar and cited by Ibn Ezra, Ramban and others in their classic commentaries to the Torah. Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch, despite his staunch opposition to Reform, embraced the flexible concept in his introduction to Horeb:
"Because in the sphere of knowledge of the law everything rests on traditional principles peculiar to this sphere, and no individual view on the significance of or reason for a law can have any binding force, a greater measure of freedom has therefore been given to every individual mind to work out and form such views according to the thinker's own will.
"As a result, we possess a collection of the most diverse views of men of the highest gifts from the earliest times down to our own day. Nevertheless, the cautious thinker will find guidance for himself in the legal tradition itself.”
Indeed, Ibn Ezra (in his introduction to Chumash) even applied the idea to the means by which halachah is derived from pesukim.
But the doctrine of “Seventy Faces” is about finding personal messages and meaning in the Torah. The fallacy is in applying "Seventy Faces of Torah" to practical halachah, as in, “You think that driving on Shabbat is prohibited, but there are seventy faces to the Torah.”
Such an approach is fallacious because it logically contradicts the authority of any halachic precedent or system, and so renders the Torah's entire system of courts, adjudication, penalization and redress meaningless.
Imagine the Jew who lights a fire on Shabbat, apparently violating, “You shall not kindle a flame in any of your dwellings on the Sabbath,” but claims that “kindling a flame” refers to creating domestic strife.
Imagine the Jew who grabs someone ‘s wallet and runs away, apparently violating, “You shall not steal,” but claims that “steal” refers specifically to deception.
“Seventy faces of the Torah” is, as Rav Hirsch noted, an attractive concept for explaining the “significance of or reason for a law.” But when it comes to applying the law, or determining the law, then as Rav Hirsch himself noted, our freedom of personal interpretation ends and we are bound not to say anything that contradicts standing law. (See Dayyan Grunfeld translation from the German, 3rd edition, it’s on page clviii)
One who would innovate in halachah, whether to be lenient or to be strict, must find a way to do so that is consistent with the existing halachic canon. Breaking from it, under the banner of personal innovation, renders the halachic system meaningless.
Well, today we have a new topic: The "Seventy Faces of Torah" fallacy.
You know what I mean: The argument that our understanding of the Torah's text should not be limited to traditional approaches, but we can (and should) invent our own interpretations.
As I heard it applied the other day: We should be able to ordain women as rabbis today, because although millenia of halachic writing contain only 2 active references to women deciding law, still, we have the right to find more of the Seventy Faces.
Without entering the discussion about women’s ordination here – the topic requires more depth than this post – I believe that this argument stumbles in the “Seventy Faces” fallacy, the idea that there are שבעים פנים, seventy faces, to the Torah.
In itself, the idea of Seventy Faces is robust and well-cited in post-talmudic Judaism, found in the Zohar and cited by Ibn Ezra, Ramban and others in their classic commentaries to the Torah. Rav Shimshon Raphael Hirsch, despite his staunch opposition to Reform, embraced the flexible concept in his introduction to Horeb:
"Because in the sphere of knowledge of the law everything rests on traditional principles peculiar to this sphere, and no individual view on the significance of or reason for a law can have any binding force, a greater measure of freedom has therefore been given to every individual mind to work out and form such views according to the thinker's own will.
"As a result, we possess a collection of the most diverse views of men of the highest gifts from the earliest times down to our own day. Nevertheless, the cautious thinker will find guidance for himself in the legal tradition itself.”
Indeed, Ibn Ezra (in his introduction to Chumash) even applied the idea to the means by which halachah is derived from pesukim.
But the doctrine of “Seventy Faces” is about finding personal messages and meaning in the Torah. The fallacy is in applying "Seventy Faces of Torah" to practical halachah, as in, “You think that driving on Shabbat is prohibited, but there are seventy faces to the Torah.”
Such an approach is fallacious because it logically contradicts the authority of any halachic precedent or system, and so renders the Torah's entire system of courts, adjudication, penalization and redress meaningless.
Imagine the Jew who lights a fire on Shabbat, apparently violating, “You shall not kindle a flame in any of your dwellings on the Sabbath,” but claims that “kindling a flame” refers to creating domestic strife.
Imagine the Jew who grabs someone ‘s wallet and runs away, apparently violating, “You shall not steal,” but claims that “steal” refers specifically to deception.
“Seventy faces of the Torah” is, as Rav Hirsch noted, an attractive concept for explaining the “significance of or reason for a law.” But when it comes to applying the law, or determining the law, then as Rav Hirsch himself noted, our freedom of personal interpretation ends and we are bound not to say anything that contradicts standing law. (See Dayyan Grunfeld translation from the German, 3rd edition, it’s on page clviii)
One who would innovate in halachah, whether to be lenient or to be strict, must find a way to do so that is consistent with the existing halachic canon. Breaking from it, under the banner of personal innovation, renders the halachic system meaningless.
Saturday, May 10, 2008
Teaching our children the positives of Judaism
First: After Shabbos, with all of its various strains and drains, I really need to read something like this: Top ten reasons to get punched in the face.
Second:
Tzipporah the Midianite has an interesting analysis here of a perceived difference between liberal and conservative approaches to Judaism and its mitzvot. She observes that liberal Judaism tends to emphasize extra מצוות עשה (active commandments) and traditional Judaism tends to emphasize and expand מצוות לא תעשה (prohibitions). Tzipporah contends (if I understand her correctly) that the more traditional approaches take a יראה approach of awe and respect, and the more liberal approach emphasis אהבה, love of Gd.
I would agree that Orthodoxy emphasizes מצוות לא תעשה - although we don’t see it as creating anything. Rather, we are fulfilling the biblical mandate of ושמרו את משמרתי, guarding HaShem’s “preserve,” the Torah, with a no-fly zone around its prohibitions.
I would also agree that Orthodoxy does not encourage creation of מצוות עשה - we don’t generally create blessings, let alone rituals - but I’m not sure I’d agree with her reasoning. Off-hand (and it’s motzaei shabbat, when you won’t get anything other than “off-hand” from me), I see three reasons why Orthodoxy has trouble with the idea of creative Torah:
• On a technical level, Orthodoxy will have to oppose ritual-creation because of בל תוסיף, the prohibition against adding to the Torah.
• On a historical level, Orthodoxy must oppose ritual-creation because we believe that Torah is Divine in origin; how, then, could we add new rituals (other than through the classic, Torah-sanctioned methods)?
• On a philosophical level, Orthodoxy finds ritual-creation problematic because Torah in itself is supposed to offer relevant ritual for all of us, through the generations. If I can’t find meaning in the Torah’s mitzvot, I view that as a lacking in me, not in the Torah.
I am not bothered by this lack of creativity; we have plenty of creativity in other ways, such as in our minhagim. But I am troubled by the way this often impacts our children’s education. In my opinion, too many parents spend time inculcating children in the negatives, which are relatively easy to implement and enforce, and miss out on teaching them the more challenging positives.
Example: Parents who teach their young children all about muktzeh prohibitions, but don’t sit down to learn the meaning and significance of kiddush and havdalah with them.
Example: Parents who teach their children the prohibitions of kashrut, but don’t review with them the more complex positives of eating, such as the meaning and message of berachot.
This is understandable, but troublesome. Our children need to see the positives and understand the “Do” aspects of Judaism, from a very young age. Without the positives, Judaism is a very restraining, constraining religion. The positives will help them grow as Jews, and find themselves in the Torah.
Second:
Tzipporah the Midianite has an interesting analysis here of a perceived difference between liberal and conservative approaches to Judaism and its mitzvot. She observes that liberal Judaism tends to emphasize extra מצוות עשה (active commandments) and traditional Judaism tends to emphasize and expand מצוות לא תעשה (prohibitions). Tzipporah contends (if I understand her correctly) that the more traditional approaches take a יראה approach of awe and respect, and the more liberal approach emphasis אהבה, love of Gd.
I would agree that Orthodoxy emphasizes מצוות לא תעשה - although we don’t see it as creating anything. Rather, we are fulfilling the biblical mandate of ושמרו את משמרתי, guarding HaShem’s “preserve,” the Torah, with a no-fly zone around its prohibitions.
I would also agree that Orthodoxy does not encourage creation of מצוות עשה - we don’t generally create blessings, let alone rituals - but I’m not sure I’d agree with her reasoning. Off-hand (and it’s motzaei shabbat, when you won’t get anything other than “off-hand” from me), I see three reasons why Orthodoxy has trouble with the idea of creative Torah:
• On a technical level, Orthodoxy will have to oppose ritual-creation because of בל תוסיף, the prohibition against adding to the Torah.
• On a historical level, Orthodoxy must oppose ritual-creation because we believe that Torah is Divine in origin; how, then, could we add new rituals (other than through the classic, Torah-sanctioned methods)?
• On a philosophical level, Orthodoxy finds ritual-creation problematic because Torah in itself is supposed to offer relevant ritual for all of us, through the generations. If I can’t find meaning in the Torah’s mitzvot, I view that as a lacking in me, not in the Torah.
I am not bothered by this lack of creativity; we have plenty of creativity in other ways, such as in our minhagim. But I am troubled by the way this often impacts our children’s education. In my opinion, too many parents spend time inculcating children in the negatives, which are relatively easy to implement and enforce, and miss out on teaching them the more challenging positives.
Example: Parents who teach their young children all about muktzeh prohibitions, but don’t sit down to learn the meaning and significance of kiddush and havdalah with them.
Example: Parents who teach their children the prohibitions of kashrut, but don’t review with them the more complex positives of eating, such as the meaning and message of berachot.
This is understandable, but troublesome. Our children need to see the positives and understand the “Do” aspects of Judaism, from a very young age. Without the positives, Judaism is a very restraining, constraining religion. The positives will help them grow as Jews, and find themselves in the Torah.
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