Mussar [rebuke] for rabbis, teachers and parents

[This week's Haveil Havalim is here]

During mussar seder, I've been learning Chazon Ish's Emunah uBitachon for the past several weeks. I did it almost twenty years ago, but (a) I didn't complete it, and (b) I had no clue what I was reading. [I hope and expect I will feel (b) when I read it again next time...]

Here's a potent rebuke from the book for all educators. [It's my own translation, and I went for a linear read rather than re-structure the sentences to suit English. Compare with the Hebrew I appended at the end.]

One of the most basic agents of destruction is a public teacher whose character is incomplete. The destruction which occurs with an incomplete teacher is twofold:

• He does not know the principles of ethics and he does not know in what areas he should be exacting, and he inattentively directs his students into behaviors which are repugnant according to ethical principles.

• Even if his Torah is good and accurate, his words do not enter the heart of the student because his inside is not like his outside.

Further, his student will learn more from his actions than from his lessons. The mentor-student relationship requires a generous character and refined traits, and one who rebukes his student coarsely and with outraged screams for some impropriety mixes bad and good; even if there is some benefit in this rebuke and the student is awakened to his sin and decides never to repeat it, there is still harm in that the student becomes accustomed to coarseness and anger, as he has received from his mentor by seeing him utilize these repugnant methods in his rebuke. We are taught that serving a scholar is more effective than studying with him, and this student will always emulate his mentors. And, generally, the rebuke itself will be defective for it will be accompanied by negative traits.

Also: When this student continues to stand before an incomplete mentor, he continually inherits bad traits from the mentor. And because the mentor considers himself complete and full of all good traits, and he performs repugnant acts in arrogance and in a derogatory way, his student also becomes accustomed to practice repulsive things with ‘the purity of terumah.’ This mentor will bear fruit and multiply others in his form and image.

And because this mentor is empty of the Torah wisdom that comes from struggling in halachah, he stumbles into the depths of opposing others who have struggled in halachah, and he bequeaths the fruit of this sin to his students as well.

And the Hebrew:

מן המפסידים היותר עיקריים היות מלמד לרבים בלתי שלם במדותיו, המחנך הבלתי שלם הפסדותיו כפולים, בצד אחד אינו יודע תורת המוסר ואינו יודע על מה להקפיד, ומשגרם בהנהגות מגואלות על פי תורת המדות בלי משים, ואף אם לקחו טוב ונכון, אחרי שאין תוכו כברו, אין דבריו נכנסין אל לב החניך, ולא עוד אלא שלומד ממעשיו יותר משיעוריו, והתיחסות הרב לתלמידיו דורשת תכונות תרומיות ומצוי המדות, וכאשר מיסר את תלמידו בביטוי גס וזעקת רוגז על העול אשר עשה, מתערב כאן רע וטוב, אם יש כאן תועלת תוכחה והחניך מתעורר על חטאו וגומר בלבו שלא לשנות חטא זה, יש כאן ענין רע שהחניך מתרגל בגסות ובקפדנות המקבל מרבו שרואהו משמש במגונות אלו בשעת תוכחתו, וגדול שמושה יותר מלימודה, והתלמיד מחקה תמיד את רבותיו, ועל הרוב גם התוכחה לקויה כשמתלוה עמה ממדות הלא טובות, וכאשר חתמיד החניך לעמוד לפני מחנך בלתי שלם יתמיד לנחול מדות הרעות מן המחנך, ובהיות המחנך מחזיק עצמו לאיש השלם, כליל מדות הטובות, וכל גנותות שעושה הן נעשות בגאוה ובוז, גם חניכו מתרגל בתעתועיו לעשות תועבות על טהרת תרומה, והמחנך הזה יפרה וירבה תולדותיו כדמותו וכצלמו, ובהיות המחנך ריק מחכמת התורה בעמל ההלכה ונכשל על ידי זה בצללי התנגדות לבעל ההלכה נוחל ומנחיל גם לחניכיו פרי עונו.

How Jewish Law defines the application of Jewish Ethics

Jewish law and Jewish ethics are intertwined, with one defining how the other is implemented. An ethical mandate must still be fulfilled only within the letter of the law; a law must be followed with ethical behavior.

Here is an example, from a book I’ve been reviewing recently, the Chazon Ish’s Emunah uBitachon (Perek 3 – translation and any errors are my own):

At times, ethical obligations and halachic rulings are a single unit, with the law determining what the ethical system will prohibit or permit.

For example: Bava Batra 21b says regarding competition between schools that there is no legal standing for an argument [against a new competitor] of, ‘You are interrupting my livelihood.’

Therefore, we have the following situation: A city has schoolteachers who are supported by their work, and then new teachers suddenly arrive from elsewhere. Naturally, people are not satisfied with the old teachers and jump to the newcomers, harming the established teachers of that city. The injured parties develop hatred in their own hearts against their new assailants, and out of this heartfelt hatred they seek complaints, blemishes and claims against them. They teach their tongues to speak evil about them, and they go from evil to evil to produce empty charges and awaken the community’s mercy against the cruelty of the newcomers. They increase quarrels and fights, and sometimes even take revenge, as they are capable.

All of these deeds would be innocent of sin if the law agreed that they could block the newcomers. Then the newcomers would be the ones sinning with their lives, rebelling against the law which was stated to Moshe Rabbeinu at Sinai. There would be no prohibition against strife, harmful speech or baseless hatred. Indeed, there would be a mitzvah of battling in order to establish proper religious conduct.

But the law has determined that jealousy between scribes increases knowledge, and that this basic principle is of greater importance than the life of individuals. Therefore, the newcomers are acting within the law and those who stand against them are spilling innocent blood. When they hate the newcomers they are transgressing, ‘You shall not hate your brother.’ When they speak evil against them they violate the prohibition against harmful speech. When they gather groups to quarrel they violate, ‘There shall not be one like Korach.’ When they take revenge by preventing the newcomers from succeeding, they violate, ‘Do not take revenge.’

So when Bava Batra 21b says, “Rav Huna agrees regarding schoolteachers, that they cannot prevent [competition],” that law includes many resulting ethical obligations….

When the city’s established schoolteacher cries out before Gd, ‘Save me from my pursuers, for they are stronger,’ a voice replies from the heavens, ‘Woe to those who act like Zimri and ask for reward like Pinchas! You are the pursuer! You are the one who does not honor the Torah! I wrote in My Torah that a schoolteacher cannot block [competition].’

The upshot: Ethical obligations and expectations are about more than my own moral compass. Within Judaism, my moral compass must be linked with and informed by, my awareness of the law, and must function within that law.

And then, of course, we must add the flipside: Ethics provide boundaries for our actions just as the law does. The fact that one is legally justified in an action does not mean that he must take it; there is a concept of לפנים משורת הדין lifnim mishurat hadin, transcending the law, such that we consider a person praiseworthy if he forgives his rights.

Therefore: The new teachers are praiseworthy if they avoid competing. And those who live in the town are praiseworthy if they do not block the newcomers, even where they have the right to do so.