Wednesday, April 6, 2011

Why Rabbis cannot agree on Halachah [sometimes]

[Post I’m reading: On Halakhic Integrity: A Reaction to Gordon and Levy at My Obiter Dicta]

This past Sunday night, I participated in a panel discussion on the topic of “Determining Death: The Brain Death Controversy and Organ Donation in the Jewish Community”. My primary goal, in my allotted 20 minutes, was to explain why this is such an intractable issue; there was no way I could actually go through the sources and debates in anything like that time, but I felt this was a good goal as well. [You can listen to my audio here.]

I identified four elements which I believe are necessary, in order to establish halachic consensus in any matter of law:
1. A clear understanding of our traditional sources
2. A clear understanding of physical reality
3. A culture that encourages healthy debate
4. A compelling argument

A clear understanding of our traditional sources
We need a clear understanding of the traditional sources, in order to develop an approach which is consistent with those sources.

A clear understanding of physical reality
We need a clear understanding of physical reality, in order to understand the circumstances in which halachah is operating, and to be able to apply halachic considerations to the specific cases involved.

A culture that encourages healthy debate
We need a culture that encourages healthy debate so that rabbis will be able to take positions or change positions, challenge ideas and receive serious replies.

A compelling argument
And we need a compelling argument that says, “We need to go this route,” when matters are not entirely clear or unanimous. Halachah is inherently conservative [ ברי ושמא ברי עדיף, שב ואל תעשה עדיף and so on], and quite comfortable saying, “I don’t know.” In order to move from “I don’t know” or “Better not” to a practical verdict of action in a case of uncertainty, there must be a compelling reason to do so – pikuach nefesh, for example.

In the Brain Death issue, we have none of the above.
1. The primary sources themselves are complex, and certainly appear contradictory.
2. Most of the responsa with which today's rabbis wrestle were written at a time when the scientific data on the state of the brain during "brain death" was still evolving - indeed, many argue it is still evolving today.
3. The discussion is taking place against a backdrop of acrimonious accusations and a resulting defensiveness.
4. The compelling arguments on each side balance each other out - Pikuach Nefesh is used on both sides. And the cases themselves are rare enough that the issue isn't coming up daily, to demand resolution.

I believe this Set of 4 applies beyond the Brain Death issue; we can apply this to any number of on-going debates in the Jewish community, from Conversion to Use of Electricity on Shabbat to the Role of Women in the Synagogue.

If we have these four elements present, we’ll see a conclusion. Otherwise, we’re likely to be left with a תיקו [“Let the debate stand”]. {Which isn’t always a bad thing.}

29 comments:

  1. 5- Common values.

    Deciding halakhah, at least in the cases that would yeild machloqes, is more about weighing the pros and cons than finding the one right compelling answer.

    I would suggest that the area of the concerns to be weighed is triangular.

    a- Formal process -- valuing compliance to sefarim, and to which sevara is the most compelling (in the opinion of the particular poseiq). Think of the Gra or Briskers. Or, in a different way, of the Mishnah Berurah.

    b- Accepted norms -- the Arukh haShulchan or Yekkish poseqim would allow more leeway in accepting a position that textually looks supportable but inferior if that's the common practice. (Of the minhagim of the poseiq's particular community.)

    c- Aggadic concerns -- pasqening based on Zohar, an aggadita, or some other way of saying "this is more meaningful to our avodas Hashem" (according to the poseiq's hashkafah). Chassidim tend toward this corner.

    So, AISI, you have three general areas of concern, each of which have different traditions about how much weight should be given. Then you have the fact that one poseiq could find shitas Rashi more compelling (or more binding on Ashkenazim) than shitas Rambam). And another might come from a community with one set of norms, and another is dealing with a different one. And hashkafos vary widely.

    In short, even with total clarity, there would and should still be machloqes. Finding "a compelling argument" is a subjective thing.

    -micha

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  2. as an amateur systems analyst, I would guess that the system you set up would rapidly over time converge to "I don't know" on all new issues (failing other "rules" - e.g. what will the tzibbur accept-think of R' Moshe's psak on time clocks)
    KT
    Joel Rich

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  3. In this state of controversy, indecision and ambiguity, how exactly are correct life and death decisions to be made as actual cases arise?

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  4. To have a clear understanding of the classical texts might require understanding what view the authors of such a text (whether we are talking about Chazal or the later halachic literature)held about the physical reality. Unfortunately the authors of our religious texts did not leave behind explicit descriptions in most cases, and the type of scholarship that might elucidate their views is both somewhat speculative and, in any case, anathema to a large fraction of current rabbonim.

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  5. This sounds good, but it seems to me that an understanding of physical reality is no longer halachicly acceptable. Rather, we are required to accept the descriptions of reality as described in the gemora as the facts of physical reality.

    See for example the halachic discussion in the last issue of Mishpacha's Kolmanus on whether anakis worms in fish are permitted or not. A serious discussion of spontaneous generation of worms in fish flesh is part of the discussion on BOTH sides of the issue!

    Disagreeing with even a discussion of an understanding of physical reality in the gemora is unacceptable nowadays.

    So how can we possibly expect rulings to come to a proper result when they must rely on ancient world science understandings?

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  6. R' Micha-
    Definitely a thought-provoking addition. Thank you.

    Bob-
    As I understand it, you pick a posek and follow down the line. And that posek does the same.

    Mike S-
    Agreed. And it really is too speculative.

    Akiva-
    Didn't see the Mishpachah discussion, so I can't speak about that, but what I have read on the anasakis puts the issue of spontaneous generation in its appropriate place in the discussion.

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  7. I already posted one way in which my mental image of what pesaq is doesn't match the assumptions here. Summarizing: Pesaq doesn't follow an algorithm, such that if we only did it right, we would all reach the right answer.

    Adding other issues with which I disagree, in reply to subsequent comments:

    2- Halakhah is a legal process, not a system of determining truth. Therefore, I would answer RBM's question by suggestion that as long as the process was correctly followed, both life and death decisions are authoritative. Neither is more "correct" (eilu va'eilu divrei Elokim Chaim"), and neither is wrong, as long as both have legal authority.

    2- Similarly, the legal meaning of Chazal's or a rishon's opinion is how it evolved within the legal process since. Their actual historical intent, as they meant it, is of interest, but has no halachic weight -- as I see halakhah.

    3- The purpose of that legal process is the refinement of man. Be that in terms of Hirschian derekh Eretz, Litvishe sheleimus, Chassidic deveiqus, etc... the common theme is the focus on halakhah's impact on the one performing it. When the Chinukh repeatedly says "a person is acted upon according to his actions", it is the experience of those actions which do the refinement.

    In Aristotilian natural philosophy, there was little gap between "scientific" theory and how the event was experienced. Today, it's far greater. But the impact of the mitzvah is how it is experienced, not the objective "how" as determined by science.

    So, just as I disagree with RMS's assumption that historical analysis of halakhah is important to pesaq, I also disagree with R' Akiva's assumption that science should be.

    -micha

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  8. "Bob-
    As I understand it, you pick a posek and follow down the line. And that posek does the same."

    What should be the criteria for the first pick, if made by someone without deep knowledge of the topic---
    1. Quality of one's own relationship to the posek (thru shul, kollel, community, family...)?
    2. Posek's reputation for expertise in the subject area?
    3. Posek's accessibility?
    4. Posek's hashkafic leanings in the Orthodox spectrum?
    5. Other?

    Time pressure or lack of information, as well as personal bias, could make it hard to weigh these properly. There could be a temptation to predetermine a course of action and then seek out the posek most likely to support that.

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  9. Our host writes, "As I understand it, you pick a posek and follow down the line. And that posek does the same."

    This isn't what R' SZ Aurbach writes in Aleihu Lo Yibol YD 40. See this recent Revach posting where they summarize:

    Rav Shlomo Zalman answered that you are not required to stick to a single Rav and may ask each question to a different Rav. However you are not allowed to ask each question to the Rav who is lenient in that case. With regard to matters of Hashkafa, he says locking in one Rav is not feasible.

    When choosing a Rav to answer Niddah questions, Rav Shlomo Zalman seemed to imply that although it is permissible to choose a Rav with a reputation of being lenient, nevertheless it is more praiseworthy not to choose such a Rav.


    -micha

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  10. Thought-provoking. I like Micha's addition of common values, since that is, after all, what binds communities in their practical relations to each other.

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  11. Micha,
    Very thought-provoking comments. I would like to disagree, though, regarding your view that history does not influence halakha. You seem to be basing yourself on the Ashkenazi experience; Sephardic posekim, however, do use history - even, at times, to determine halakha - and do care very much about original intent. In fact, some of the major critiques of Brisk being heard from Sephardic rabbanim such as R. Meir Mazuz (Yeshivat Kisse Rahamim), R. Eliyahu ben-Hayyim (of YU)and others is that Brisk is "pilpulim" and does not reflect the original intent of the Gemara and rishonim; R. Mazuz's method of 'iyyun, which grew out of 15th century Spain, is directed at figuring out such intent. Unlike Hazon Ish, both R. Ovadiah and R. Eliyahu Zinni have overrode practices, (in the case of R. Zinni,sometimes well-established ones) based on manuscripts. And even some Ashkenazi posekim, such as the Seridei Aish, likewise justified the use of manuscripts as part of the process of pesak.

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  12. R' Joseph: I think we're talking about different kinds of history. Those who object to using Brisker lomdus -- or lomdus in general -- to pesaq are doing so because they think that these reasons are a discontinuity in the mesorah. IOW, the halakhah is supposed to evolve in a particular way as it's passed down the generations. Inventing clever explanations that we have no indication anyone really ever considered may or may not be normal evolution, depending on your stance.

    I was thinking more of studying R' Meir in historical context in order to get as his true intent. Or splitting up the gemara by the levels of accretion over time, and using that to obtain true intent. In the examples I was trying to reject, people weren't using new ideas to introduce discontinuity, but trying to recover the old ideas rather than maintain continuity.

    I hope that was clear; I'm not sure I succeeded in explaining myself well.

    -micha

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  13. R. Berger,

    Under certain circumstances one can argue like the Chazon Ish that, irrespective of what the author's intent was what matters is how a statement has been used. But sometimes the statement wasn't used extensively one way or another until a change in circumstance arose and one wishes to understand how a posek;'s reasoning might pply to a case at hand, but can't sensibly do so without understanding the metziut he was facing, or thought he was. And sometimes even if the reasoning has been used by many authors following, changes in circumstance force a closer analysis of underlying principle that none of the subsequent authors had to explicitly examine. Thus, although the gemara about the fellow under a collapsed building and the early tshuvot have been cited many times over the centuries, until the invention of the heart lung machine no one had to address the question of whether externally forced respiration and circulation count as being alive.

    For an example that might not excite too much emotion there is a t'shuvah of the Beit Meir about a new variety of etrog that was introduced in his day. It was somewhat different in appearance than the then customary etrog in that it had smaller blitot and was somewhat less elongated than the etrogim that had been in use, althogh it was apparently not close to spherical. Part of the tshuvah has to do with whether the change in appearance was evidence that they had been grafted, and part with the laws concerning grafted etrogim and etrogim about which there is doubt over whether they have been grafted. The second part is perfectly comprehensible to anyone familiar with the posekim on the topic. However, if one wanted to know how big a change in the appearance of an etrog (or other species) should lead one to suspect grafting or cross breading one would be out of luck if he didn't understand either how different these etrogim looked than the prior ones or perhaps (since he makes such a comparison) with the variety of pears that he might have been familiar with in 18th century Poznan. And of course the tshuvah assumes familiarity with the appearance of both types of etrogim and of the variety of pears without providing any data on them other than the brief qualitative description of the etrogim.

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  14. R' Micha wrote "Similarly, the legal meaning of Chazal's or a rishon's opinion is how it evolved within the legal process since. Their actual historical intent, as they meant it, is of interest, but has no halachic weight -- as I see halakhah."

    I have a hard time with this; I am thinking along the lines of what Joseph wrote in response to you. Or the arguments of R' Slifkin re: the olive and Ashkenazi poskim (although I believe he is factually incorrect in the assertion itself). Where do we draw the line re: intent/history that matters, and that does not?

    Bob-
    These are all good questions. As I see it, one major problem is that the concept of choosing a posek is, itself, modern. Historically, your posek was the Rav of the community. You could write to a specific Rav somewhere regarding an issue - but quite often (and I don't have statistics) that Rav would write back that you should check with your local Rav. See, for example, Maharashdam Even haEzer 120.

    Sara-
    Thank you.

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  15. Very interesting and thought provoking post and comments. My experience is mostly with this topic and not the other similar ones mentioned. I and others have pointed out the problems with defining death using the 'traditional' criteria of cessation of cardiac/respiratory function. (see here for a summary of some logical problems http://text.rcarabbis.org/problems-with-defining-death-as-the-irreversible-cessation-of-circulation-what-would-we-measure-and-why-by-noam-stadlan-md/, and Rabbi Reifman's series on problems with halachic approaches). The most frequent response is to ignore the new data/analysis, and claim that the information is only relevent if a 'major' posek feels it is relevent. I think this points to the idea that many of us are indifferent to the cognitive dissonance that some halachic positions. engender. This is not to say that we automatically jettison opinions, but it seems that many in modern era care less about the quality of a halachic argument, and care more about the people who have espoused it.

    Noam Stadlan

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  16. imho there is still an issue of relative weight of halacha as a process vs. halacha as a method to uncover Truth (original ratzon Hashem).

    Thought experiment - we invent a method of time "travel" which let's us observe actual events of the past. We eavesdrop on HKB"H's conversation with Moshe on har sinai - would it impact halacha today?

    KT
    Joel Rich

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  17. R' Noam writes (R' Dr Noam, if it's the Noam I think it is): The
    most frequent response is to ignore the new data/analysis, and claim that the information is only relevent if a 'major' posek feels it is relevent.


    Well, if you have confidence in those posqim knowing what they're doing, then you should be assuming they have experts they consulted, drilled down to find out what they said, and found reasons that you or I may not know to find the data irrelevant. (I am not claiming I personally have such confidence; I am trying to more accurately describe the mindset of the people R' Noam's referring to.)

    Given the idea that halakhah is only partly about truth -- the idea must accurately come out of the system, and the pesaq must refer to the situation as perceived -- and partly about authority, this attitude has some justification. The "'major' poseiq" holds authority, and thus his opinion matters more, even if I continue to believe his justification is weaker than mine. Again, as long we're talking stronger vs. weaker, and not valid vs altogether unsupportable. (Which gets us back to the confidence issue: How much do I assume they have more support than I was told about?)

    RMS conflates my position with that of the Chazon Ish. There are strong differences; including the obvious one that my gut "what seems right to me" isn't nearly as well informed.

    Both of us are emphasizing halakhah being about authority. In the case of a new situation, like the discovery of a new breed of esrog, there is no established pesaq to hold authority.

    Which brings me to our host's comment on my line: Similarly, the legal meaning ... is how it evolved within the legal process since. Their actual
    historical intent, as they meant it, is of interest, but has no
    halachic weight.


    To which he writes: I have a hard time with this; I am thinking along the lines of what Joseph wrote in response to you. Or the arguments of R' Slifkin re: the olive and Ashkenazi poskim

    AFAIK, the current range of shiurim are far larger than historically. I wrote about the sign at the entrance to Chizqiyahu's Tunnel, as well as marks on Har haBayis, which imply an amma whose margin of uncertainty falls just short of R' Chaim Naeh's amma.

    Still, I consider the current range binding lehalakhah. (Maybe, if I were a poseiq, I would use this as a senif lehaqeil for someone who has such a severe celiac disease that he has problems even with spelt matzos. But if I were a poseiq and yet still of the same mindset, not more than just one factor for qulah among many.)

    Our host also mentions R' Joseph's objections, but I thought I addressed them already. Sepharadim have problems using lomdus to reinterpret accepted understandings. I would add: so do Yekkes. That's consistent with my underlying point that halakhah is about authority, and thus ideas that evolve are still binding even after evolution.

    One can't roll back the clock based on what one deduces was original intent. East Europeans (of most of our stripes) would exclude deductions based on lomdus, saying that it's part of the halachic discussion and it falls within normal halachic evolution.

    Related is the triangle I mentioned earlier -- how much authority does accepted practice have vs textual proof. If lomdus provides what the poseiq believes is compelling textual proof, he might hold it reaches greater weight than the accepted precedent.

    But still, that's a question of what's evolution (chidush) and what's leaving the process (shinui) -- even to recreate the old. It's in the "to recreate the old" sense that I don't think historical research has halachic gravitas. (And why Breslauer Historical School thought not only happened to lead to Conservative Jewish legal thought, but was bound to.)

    -micha

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  18. R' Noam writes (R' Dr Noam, if it's the Noam I think it is): The
    most frequent response is to ignore the new data/analysis, and claim that the information is only relevent if a 'major' posek feels it is relevent.


    Well, if you have confidence in those posqim knowing what they're doing, then you should be assuming they have experts they consulted, drilled down to find out what they said, and found reasons that you or I may not know to find the data irrelevant. (I am not claiming I personally have such confidence; I am trying to more accurately describe the mindset of the people R' Noam's referring to.)

    Given the idea that halakhah is only partly about truth -- the idea must accurately come out of the system, and the pesaq must refer to the situation as perceived -- and partly about authority, this attitude has some justification. The "'major' poseiq" holds authority, and thus his opinion matters more, even if I continue to believe his justification is weaker than mine. Again, as long we're talking stronger vs. weaker, and not valid vs altogether unsupportable. (Which gets us back to the confidence issue: How much do I assume they have more support than I was told about?)

    RMS conflates my position with that of the Chazon Ish. There are strong differences; including the obvious one that my gut "what seems right to me" isn't nearly as well informed.

    Both of us are emphasizing halakhah being about authority. In the case of a new situation, like the discovery of a new breed of esrog, there is no established pesaq to hold authority.

    Which brings me to our host's comment on my line: Similarly, the legal meaning ... is how it evolved within the legal process since. Their actual
    historical intent, as they meant it, is of interest, but has no
    halachic weight.


    To which he writes: I have a hard time with this; I am thinking along the lines of what Joseph wrote in response to you. Or the arguments of R' Slifkin re: the olive and Ashkenazi poskim.

    AFAIK, the current range of shiurim are far larger than historically. I wrote about the sign at the entrance to Chizqiyahu's Tunnel, as well as marks on Har haBayis, which imply an amma whose margin of uncertainty falls just short of R' Chaim Naeh's amma.

    Still, I consider the current range binding lehalakhah. (Maybe, if I were a poseiq, I would use this as a senif lehaqeil for someone who has such a severe celiac disease that he has problems even with spelt matzos. But if I were a poseiq and yet still of the same mindset, not more than just one factor for qulah among many.)

    Our host also mentions R' Joseph's objections, but I thought I addressed them already. Sepharadim have problems using lomdus to reinterpret accepted understandings. So do Yekkes. That's consistent with my underlying point that halakhah is about authority, and thus ideas that evolve are still binding even after evolution.

    One can't roll back the clock based on what one deduces was original intent. East Europeans (of most of our stripes) would exclude deductions based on lomdus, saying that it's part of the halachic discussion and it falls within normal halachic evolution.

    Related is the triangle I mentioned earlier -- how much authority does accepted practice have vs textual proof. If lomdus provides what the poseiq believes is compelling textual proof, he might hold it reaches greater weight than the accepted precedent.

    But still, that's a question of what's evolution (chidush) and what's leaving the process (shinui) -- even to recreate the old. It's in the "to recreate the old" sense that I don't think historical research has halachic gravitas. (And why Breslauer Historical School thought not only happened to lead to Conservative Jewish legal thought, but was bound to.)

    cont...

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  19. ... cont.:


    RJR mentions the "issue of relative weight of halacha as a process vs. halacha as a method to uncover Truth (original ratzon Hashem)." I would argue that the original Ratzon was that there be a process, and since handing us the process -- "lo bashamayim hi". As I understand the sources, as long as the ruling isn't in violation of the process, "eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim."

    A miracle like being transferred back in time to attend Moshe Rabbeinu's initial shiur (*) is no more authoritative than those that occurred in support of Rabbi Eliezer's ruling that a tannur shel akhnai doesn't become tamei.

    (* I didn't give the example of overhearing the initial transmission, since that raises issues of the 7th iqar emunah.)

    -micha

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  20. I am going to have to bow out here - not because of any lack of interest, and I really should respond to R' Micha's thoughtful comments here, but because I can't do the topic justice right now.

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  21. TRH: I am pretty much giving a superficial reprise of posts from my blog's Halachic Process section. But I agree with you that we've exhausted what can be done with this format...

    -micha

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  22. New cutting edge questions of today may have limited or no sources to base their answer on.
    What do we do then?
    One answer is whar Rav Asher Weiss says is "libi omer".I trust his lev,but I can't say I can trust all others "libi omer."

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  23. A miracle like being transferred back in time
    ====================

    I posited a new technology that allows us to see the past, not a time transfer miracle (e.g. we discover a wormhole ttechnology and a dispersed wave collector technology)
    KT
    Joel Rich

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  24. R. Micha,

    As you (and R. Torczyner) write, we can't get into too many details here. Just to clarify: 1) it is true that much of Sephardic lomdut rejects Brisk as anti-originalist because it is innovative, but this is only on the superficial level; Sephardi me'ayyenim make it their business to go back to what they consider to be original intent by using strict grammatical and linguistic analysis in which the necessity of every word and sentence must be explained. Because they assume that there is no extra word in the gemara and some of the classical mefarshim, only when an explanation can account for the necessity of every word is the explanation deemed correct and indicative of the intent of the author, who was considered to have chosen his words carefully. In some cases, even historians have been convinced by this method. Because Brisk is speculative, it cannot be original intent for the me'ayyen; 2) some North African schools do use a method of interpretation similar to academics; I'd recommend flipping through R. Eliyahu Zinni's book "Rabbanan Sabora'i u-kelalei ha-hahalakhah" to see how not only R. Zinni but early Sephardi rishonim did "splice up" the gemara in order to determine pesak. In either case, the point is that the dominant forms of Sephardic lomdut do care about original intent, though they may differ on how to arrive at it.

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  25. A scientific theory could be both new, and inherent in the experimental data.

    I would say the same about lomdus. Perhaps R' Chaim Brisker found ideas inherent in the Rambam's shitah that the Rambam didn't. But if the shitah is emes, there is no conceptual problem explaining the "object" before us to a level beyond the existing knowns.

    If you don't think lomdus is comparable to explanatory theories in science, then yes, you would be forced to conclude that revisions of existing practice that are based on lomdus is a break from the stream of mesorah rather than a continuation of its textual side.

    OTOH, Rav Ovadia Yosef doesn't roll back the clock either to hold like the rishon as he believes the rishon intended. His teshuvos tend to include exhaustive surveys of contemporary pesaqim, and will only buck the trend when he believes we got totally off track. In general, R' Ovadia tries to restore the pre-naqba (speaking of the expulsion of Sepharadi Jewry, which was a "tragedy") minhag Sepharad. (Favoring Iraqi pisqa, like the Ben Ish Hai's, but that's a different topic.)

    As I wrote, I really only see scientific search for original intent in the Rambam and modern-day Rambamists. By the latter I do not mean Darda'i Teimanim, but more like talmidim of R' Moshe Chait (moreso than their rebbe), certain elements in the Left-Wing Mod O / Union for Traditional Judaism crowd, etc...

    I truly believe that pesaq based on original intent is bound to evolve into Conservative Judaism, just as the Breslauer Historical School did.

    -micha

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  26. R. Micha,

    Re: Lomdus, I would agree, but I think you're positing what you consider to be two opposing viewpoints that are linked in the minds of many interpreters. There is a difference between re-interpretation and misinterpretation. Re-interpretation would be re-reading rules stated in one situation to a new situation, or in teasing out ideas inherent in a pesaq. Misinterpretation/distortion would be stating an idea that violates the very value behind the idea. What Sephardi me'ayynim are against is not any form of re-interpretation but against those Briskers who actually believe that their lomdus, which is often based on "hilluqim that are daq ad daq ad ein nivdaq" is the original intent, without any proof that this is what the statement actually means, and actually applying that lomdus to real life. (Incidentally, I believe that R. Chaim knew that he was not elucidating Rambam's original intent.) But to make the sweeping claim that "we don't care about original intent" is demonstrably incorrect as a general statement, since this leaves the Sephardi pashtanim (and the Teimani Dar Da'im out). The point is not that original intent is the only meaning, but that it comes into play as a factor.
    Over-focus on a speculative "original intent" of a legal system can lead to disastrous consequences for the halakhic system (see Jose Faur's critique of Paul), since the projected "intent" of the law can override the law itself -- the same way Shelomo ha-Melech, Ztz"L, erred in using the rationale against intermarriage to exempt himself from observing it. But this is different than trying to understand the meaning of the words as understood at the time (original meaning), or how the author was using those words to express an idea in the context of a discussion at the time.
    I would disagree that the Conservative movement actually uses original intent (Reform was really the movement to project an original intent of the Torah and to understand it as overriding the halakhic system and many mitzvot); the Conservative movement has similarly globalized certain kelalei halakhah in ways that were never intended to begin with. I have yet to see how North Africans using a more academic method have become conservative.
    Re: R. Ovadiah - actually, he is not trying to go back to a "pre-naqba" Spanish custom; R. Ovadiah tries to go back to the pisaqim of R. Yosef Karo, who lived after that time,and in doing so, has actually up-ended some of those long-standing "pre-naqab" customs. Jews in Spain followed a variety of poseqim (Rambam, Ramban, Rosh) depending on where they came from. The most you can say is that R. Ovadiah views Maran as a culmination of the pesaqim and methods of poseqim from Spain, but this is not the original Spanish-Jewish halakhic culture, which had considerable variation.

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  27. Reb Joseph,

    I find your citation of Faur ironic, since he makes the Rambam into a final authority based on his being better connected to the Sanhedrin's (which according to the Rambam is including Chazal as recorded in Talmud Bavli) original intent!

    I wasn't trying to say that C uses original intent. My theory is that C is an evolution from Historical School -- which by definition is an attempt to find the original speaker and his mileau, and thus restore original context and intent.

    R' Yosef Caro lived well before the Sepharadim were forced out of their countries and their major convergence on Israel (and to a lesser extent the US). The Palestinians left their homes during what they call a "naqba", I was using the same term to refer to what Syria, Egypt, Iran, etc... did to the Jews who until then had large vibrant communities there during the same two decades.

    Now, back to the primary point -- lomdus. I see R' Chaim in the same role as Einstein... Someone who collected the data and came up with unifying explanations to already existing material. Those pieces that didn't quite fit Newtonian Physics led the way to Relativity and Quantum Mechanics -- which sure enough also explain the data Newton did.

    Similarly, R' Chaim took the data that didn't fit existing models and found new theories that cover things we already had sevaros for as well as these cases that were until now "shver". So, while the Rambam may not -- and I agree the probability is in most cases he actuall did not -- think in R' Chaim's terms, R' Chaim gives a unifying logic to the reality the Rambam explored. The Rambam provided the "experimental data", lomdus (to generalize now from our example of R' Chaim Brisker) provides the theory inherent in it.

    The thing about describing a truth, or at least a valid paneh laTorah (which is "law" not "Truth") is that what is being described includes more than the description. The Rambam defined a paneh laTorah. That approach has a reality and a logic even if the Rambam didn't know what it was.

    -micha

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  28. Mo'adim Le-Simhah, R. Micha,

    I had thought you were referring to Spain with you comment on "Naqba," but my main argument would still be legitimate, and that is, that while R. Ovadiah may feel he is restoring an ancient Sephardic value, even he would admit that practically, pre-Naqba Sephardic Jews living in the Middle East had a wide range of customs. In actual fact, R. Ovadiah has upended many of these, many of which pre-dated R. Caro.
    Re: lomdus, I pretty much agree. My only gripe is that many Sephardic rabbis profess to care about original intent (however it is determined), and that this, too, is a paneh la-Torah; your original comment implied that it is not and therefore read out entire traditions from the halakhic system. (Incidentally, R. Yitzhak Campanton's iyyun, like R. Chaim's, also used the "scientific method" of the current time to interpret halakhah). I am also very unconvinced by those who would try to create an artificial distinction between "Torah" and "truth" - if HKB"H's seal is truth, how can anyone make such a facile distinction?

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  29. Halakhah is a behavioral system designed to refine souls, structured as a legal process. It doesn't posit facts, because it doesn't posit statements about what is. A halachic statement is about what you should do to become holy. Thus, I think true vs false is simply irrelevant to the topic.

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