The Pun and The Primordial

A thought for Parshat Chukat:

At the start of the Jewish nation’s fortieth year in the wilderness, they again protested their desert predicament. “The nation’s spirit became short, due to their travels,” we are told, and they rejected the Divine gift of manna. The Divine reaction was harsh; G-d sent poisonous serpents, which began to bite and kill the wayward Jews. The nation admitted their sin, and called upon Moshe to pray to G-d on their behalf. Moshe interceded, and G-d told him, “Make a serpent, and place it atop a pole. All those who are bitten should look upon it, and live.” Moshe formed a snake of nechoshet [a copper alloy, either brass or bronze] and brought the plague to an end. (Bamidbar 21:4-9)

This story introduces obvious problems of theology, but a midrash (Bereishit Rabbah 31:8) seizes upon an apparently minor detail to make a major theological statement.

Our midrash cites four cases in which G-d instructs a human being “Aseh lecha,” “Make for yourself.” In three out of the four – Noach’s boat of gopher wood; Joshua’s circumcision knives of stone; Moshe’s trumpets of silver – G-d specifies the material to use. In our case, though, no material is specified. [Our midrash omits Aseh lecha instructions that appear in Yirmiyahu 27:2 and Yechezkel 12:3. Perhaps this is because those items are not truly “for yourself”; they are only prophetic props, and have no further function.] And so our midrash asks: How did Moshe know to use nechoshet?

Medieval commentators noted the same problem, and offered a range of solutions:

• Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra suggests that G-d told Moshe to use nechoshet, but the text did not record it.
• Ramban offers that nechoshet would be a particularly good material for simulating a serpent.
• Rabbi Chizkiyah ben Manoach (Chizkuni) contends that nechoshet was a practical choice, due to its visibility from afar.

Our midrash provides a different approach, though: A pun.

Rabbi Yudin explains in our midrash, citing Rabbi Eivo: “[Moshe] said: If I would make it of gold, the term for one [nachash] would not flow into the term for the other [zahav]. If I would make it of silver, the term for one [nachash] would not flow into the term for the other [kesef]. I will make it of nechoshet, language flowing into language.”

In other words: Moshe used a pun to determine that he should use nechoshet to form the serpent.

Of course, the use of the nachash in this story is itself a pun. The Hebrew word nachash refers not only to a serpent, but also to secret knowledge (see Bereishit 44:5 and Vayikra 19:26) – as seen in the Garden of Eden, and as seen with this serpent which conveyed the Divine cure. Moshe, then, layered pun upon pun.

While the midrash’s acknowledgement of a biblical pun is interesting, its next step is profound. Rabbi Eivo adds, “From here we see that the Torah was given in the sacred tongue.” Rabbi Pinchas and Rabbi Chizkiyah then cite Rabbi Simon, “Just as the Torah was given in the sacred tongue, so the world was created with the sacred tongue.” The association between serpent and copper alloy is fundamental to their natures, and it is expressed in the Torah’s Hebrew words for both of them, because Hebrew is the language of Torah and of Creation. [See, too, Bereishit Rabbah 17:4 and 18:4, and Shabbat 104a.] In other words: The Pentateuchal pun is pre-ordained, primordial.

What is the point of linking Hebrew with Creation? Rabbi Yehudah HaLevi (Kuzari II 67-68) explains that this is evidence of the elevated character of the Hebrew language. However, one might also suggest that this link teaches the importance of the Jew, speaker of Hebrew, in the plan of Divine Creation.

Reading the Torah plainly, I could have assumed that Jews were the beneficiaries of a handful of superlative ancestors and serendipitous incidents. If not for the daring of Avraham and Sarah, we might have remained in Aram; if not for Eliezer’s prayer at the well, we might have been a one-generation wonder. This midrash argues for Jewish exceptionalism, claiming that Jews are no product of fortune; rather, the Jew is hardwired into the universe, his language the code of Creation, her destiny the primordial plan.

This perspective on the role of the Jew is at once daunting and inspiring. It demands that we view our next move as more than the expression of personal whim, and as necessary for the success of the Divine will. The universe, crafted with our tongue, is playing our song. Moshe’s decision to fashion the nachash of nechoshet teaches us that not only is Hebrew a tool of G-d – but so are we.

Gittin 37-40 - Prozbul, Aliyah laRegel, Jurisprudence, and davening with a minyan

I am way behind on publishing these notes; sorry to take so long. If they are of interest to anyone, great. If they bore you to tears, go read my Elul Panic Attack below.

Gittin 37a
The gemara talks about possible origins for the word Prozbul, and offers some interesting reads. It seems clear that this of non-Semitic origin, though, like Sanhedrin and Parhedrin.

We say here that the borrower must have some minimal amount of land in order for Prozbul to work, and the gemara talks about the lender licensing land to the borrower if the borrower does not own land.
This would seem to pose a problem for the Torah Temimah’s explanation for a nuance of the mitzvah of aliyah laregel. The gemara (Pesachim 8b) says that one is obligated in that mitzvah only if he owns land - but the Rambam omits that point. The Torah Temimah suggests that the Rambam omits it because he believes that all Jews automatically have a right to four amot in Israel - but then there should be no need for this law of Prozbul requiring land ownership! (Unless it needs to be more concrete for the sake of a lien?)


Gittin 37b
The gemara here allows a judge to help a litigant make his claim, arguing that this is “opening one’s mouth on behalf of the mute פתח פיך לאלם.” We find a similar view expressed by Rav Huna in Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 3:8.
There is much we could say regarding this, but for now we’ll just note that this is justified in two ways: (1) Hashavat Aveidah in restoring the (potential) loss of the litigant, or (2) Part of the judges’ requirement of achieving truth (Rashba in Shut Rashba 2:404).
The problem, of course, is that this might contradict the judge’s need to maintain neutrality and not appear to aid any one side! For more on this point see Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Sanhedrin 21:8-11, Tashbetz to Pirkei Avot 1:8, Rashbash 288, Tur Choshen Mishpat 17, Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 17:9, Shut Chaim b’Yad 45, Shut Yachel Yisrael 102.


Gittin 38a
See Tosafot אבל on how one ‘acquires’ right to an עבד.

The term אמה as used here for a non-Jewish עבד seems odd; I was under the impression that we usually used אמה for a Jew and שפחה for a non-Jew.


Gittin 38b
The gemara here justifies overriding a biblical prohibition for the sake of davening with a minyan, saying, “a mitzvah is different מצוה שאני.” This is odd - although Rav Moshe Feinstein does (in a teshuvah) seem to say one cannot fulfill the core mitzvah of davening if he davens alone, that is a landmark statement!

It appears that one reason we specify one should eat his larger Shabbos meal as the second meal is because in their day one’s major meal was the midday meal, as it is continues in Europe today?


Gittin 39b
Rashi feels the need to translate בית תפילה, informing us this is a בית כנסת, probably because the gemara’s usual term for synagogue is בית כנסת (Hebrew) or בי כנישתא (Aramaic).


Gittin 40a
Tosafot כשרבו here stands by his view, more famously expressed at the end of Rosh haShanah, that one may perform a mitzvah from which he is exempt, and recite the berachah upon it - even if that mitzvah is tefillin.


Gittin 40b
See Tosafot וכתב as far as who freed the עבד here.

See Rashi’s two views on וכולן בשטר.

If one party acknowledges having given his property to another, and that other denies it, why don’t we say that whoever takes it first, gets it - it should be Hefker (ownerless)?
Perhaps this is because Hefker applies where one has no right to it. Here, one has a right and is simply unaware of it.

Gittin 28-32 – Aging, Agunot, Reductio ad absurdum and the Negev’s Hadley Cell

This week we have a bat mitzvah in shul, and the derashah is really centered on that bat mitzvah, so I won’t be posting it for at-large reading. Here are some notes from recent Daf Yomi topics, though. For those learning Daf Yomi this may be of interest.

For all others – Haveil Havalim is located here on Sunday; see you then!

Gittin 28a
Why am I confident that if I find a Get among a man’s own personal effects, I can be sure it is his? Rashi says it’s because the Get is in his house, but Tosafot או seems to disagree; he says the issue is not the house, since many people may pass through the house, but rather it’s the fact that the Get is among his personal effects.

Statistically, people who reach a certain age without developing key diseases are likely to reach a very old age. The gemara noted this here in its כיון דאיפליג איפליג comment - "once a person has reached a certain age in good health, we expect him to reach an unusually great age."

The gemara says that a proxy sent to deliver a Get need not be concerned that the sender may have died before the delivery, because “it would be impossible” to worry about this. Rashi explains this in light of his definition of Agunah. Rashi takes “Agunah” to refer to a woman who is married but unable to live with her husband, even just because of physical distance, and so he understands that the gemara is concerned with providing a mechanism through which a Get may be delivered long-distance, to prevent this Agunah circumstance.


Gittin 28b
One view in our gemara says that even if we were concerned that a Get-sender might die before delivery, one could still drink from a barrel with the expectation of tithing at the end, and not be concerned lest the barrel break in the interim, since one could appoint someone to guard the barrel. The gemara then asks, “But who will watch the watchman?”
In other circumstances, such as the beginning of Yoma, the gemara answers such reductio ad absurdum questions by saying, “אין לדבר סוף, There is a limit to what we can do.” The gemara here does not give that answer.
I think the reason we do not give that answer here is that here we have a real, practical concern about an existing problem, and we cannot answer that by saying, “Oh, well, we can’t worry about that.” In the other cases, though (like in the beginning of Yoma regarding setting up a backup wife for a Kohen Gadol before Yom Kippur), the idea is a positive enactment to forestall a problem later, and there is a limit to how much forestalling we can do.
In other words: In our case, if the barrel breaks then he drank untithed produce. This is a pressing problem, and it’s right here. In the other cases, if the Kohen Gadol’s wife dies then we simply need to appoint a new Kohen Gadol for Yom Kippur.

Rashi קומנטריסין seems to have a typo – it should be להרוג, not ליהרג. A rather significant difference!

The gemara here talks about believing a secular court when it declares,מסיח לפי תומו, that it has executed someone. The gemara in Bava Kama 114b limits such declarations, saying they apply only to permit a woman to remarry or remain with her husband, or for a rabbinic issue.


Gittin 29a
We know that a court may well find merit for the defendant after the verdict is in; when the gemara says that doesn’t happen, it means that this is not common. (Rashi, Tosafot)


Gittin 30a
See Tosafot מי.


Gittin 30b
The third answer on the page seems to rely on changing the braita, reversing the חוששין and the אין חוששין.


Gittin 31a
Rashi brings two explanations of “when the water gathers in the בוסר”, in the former talking about unripe grapes filling with fluid as they ripen, and in the latter talking about water being added to the pressing of terminally underripe grapes, to produce vinegar. The latter fits our general use of בוסר, as grapes which will never ripen. See Tosafot ובשעת, though.


Gittin 31b
The gemara here spends quite a bit of time on the importance of the winds for the survival of the world. The gemara does this elsewhere, as well.
Certainly, in Israel the winds are of grave importance. The “Hadley cell” formed by hot air rising at the equator, flowing to the 30-degree latitude and then cooling and descending in the Negev causes the Negev air to soak up moisture, which is what dries out that area and prevents rainfall. Changes in wind strength and direction could affect the resulting dryness and temperature.


Gittin 32a
Tosafot מהו points out that a Get may be annulled without witnesses, but that we require clearcut knowledge of his intentions before the Get is delivered.


Gittin 32b
A husband wrote a Get, hired a delivery agent, and then cancelled the Get. The gemara asks if he may then re-start the mission, using the same Get document.
On the face of it, there should be no problem doing this; why is this a question? I heard in the name of Rav Herschel Schachter that the problem might be the interruption between writing (וכתב) and delivering (ונתן) the Get.

Gittin 19-23 - Innocent testimony, wounding an eved and the blind discussing the blind

As always, please read this with a gemara in front of you; it won't make much sense without it. Or you could skip to the less technical posts below, I suppose. There's a good post, just after this one, about shul dues and membership requirements.

Gittin 19b
The gemara records Rav Pappa’s practice of accepting non-Jewish Persian translators for Persian-language legal documents, meisiach l’fi tumo - speaking innocently, apparently without knowing their statements would have legal ramifications.
It is not entirely clear that these pseudo-witnesses need to be unaware of the legal ramifications. See, for example, Aruch haShulchan Yoreh Deah 69:58 on this. This has major ramifications for the credibility of a housekeeper in a kosher kitchen; see the Beit Yosef to Yoreh Deah 69 on this.
We may also require corroboration of his statements from outside sources (kishur devarim) - see an interesting analysis in Yad haMelech to Mishneh Torah Hilchot Geirushin 12:16.


Gittin 20a
The gemara here indicates that having letters traced (written over existing writing) in a Sefer Torah would be aesthetically unpleasing; it is not clear to me why this is so.

Rashi thinks that we accept the statement Levi cited because he worked so hard to get it accepted. That has interesting ramifications for styles of argumentation… (But see also Tosafot משמיה there.)

The gemara here uses the term ירך yerech to mean “back” or “outside.” This is reminscent of the term ירך המשכן, used, for example, in Bamidbar 3:29.


Gittin 20b
See Tosafot אשה on why a woman would not realize that she needs to give her husband the Get-materials.


Gittin 21b
Rashi at the top of the page (לא אפשר) is difficult for me to understand; why does the eved’s mitzvah obligation have anything to do with the prohibition against wounding him? First, we prohibit wounding anyone. Second, everyone has at least the mitzvot bnei Noach! I lump this together with Rashi from the bottom of 12a, as discussed here.


Gittin 22b
See Tosafot והא on the question of how one might use a person to write a Get even if he is not, personally, eligible to be one’s שליח proxy. The idea that וכתב is not an imperative for the husband to write it, but rather that it should be written by someone [and not necessarily the husband’s proxy], is interesting.


Gittin 23a
See Tosafot ממי on whether the Get-deliverer must be able to identify the husband and wife - and if so, why our problem is limited to blind delivery agents, specifically.

Of particular interest: The two Amoraim (sages of the later Talmudic era) who debate the issue of a blind delivery agent are Rav Yosef and Rav Sheshet - who were both blind, themselves.

Sotah 45-46

We are now a bit behind the pace here in Allentown, slowing me down in getting these out to you. Not that much here in any case; mostly technical notes, other than some interesting references on Yerushalayim and on the gemara's own discussions.

First, one last note on 44b – The court for eglah arufah must have an odd number of judges, per our mishnah, but I am not clear on why that should be so. The requirement for an odd-numbered court is practical (to prevent a tie in voting) rather than ritual, as is proved by the fact that if an even-numbered court renders a ruling, the ruling is valid. So why do we need an odd-numbered court for this purely ritual activity of measurement?

45a
Note that בית פאגי is the origin of the place-name “Bethpage.”

Technically, if the מזג-dilution reference teaches that we require that the Sanhedrin seat no fewer than 1/3 of its members, the minimum number should be 24, not 23!
However, one could take the approach brought at the end of Tosafot Sanhedrin 14b אל, in which he understands the מזג reference as Gematria – the Sanhedrin should not be lacking 50, the gematria value of the word מזג. In that case, the threshold is 22, and we add one more because of the desire for an odd-numbered court. I know I’ve seen another elsewhere, perhaps on the mishnah printed on Sanhedrin 37a, but I don’t recall it at the moment.

Of course, the separate problem with the above passage is that the gemara’s wine-dilution is traditionally 1-3, not 1-2; see Tosafot Shabbat 77a דאמר רבא on this point.


45b
Our gemara here relies on the view that Yerushalayim was not divided among the tribes. This is a fascinating topic; see Rashi and Radak to Shoftim on the trade-off of the ruins of Jericho for the tribe who would surrender land for the building of the Beit haMikdash, taking the view that it did come from tribal land.

It’s interesting to see the debate on how embryonic cells begin to differentiate; we know from other gemara passages that despite the historic cultural (aside from halachic) aversion to autopsy, the sages of the gemara did have autopsy knowledge of embryonic development.


46a
The word איכא about ¾ of the way down should be ואיכא.

Note that Rashi and our gemara have different editions regarding the calf, at the bottom. Our gemara has שלא עשה פירות, Rashi has שאינו עושה פירות. These clearly mean different things – but Rashi translates his edition as though it matched ours.


46b
Language point: On the changed-edition about ten lines down, note that אמר רבא means Rava is making a new statement, but רבא אמר means that Rava is disagreeing with the preceding comment.

On the third of the widest lines - What will R’ Yoshiyah do with the lesson we are drawing from אשר?

Why does pointing to the city entrance count as “escorting” someone? Maharsha explains that this is because the essential purpose of the escort is to show the traveler the best path, where he will not encounter harm. Personal escorting may not be necessary. (But how much greater the reward if one does escort personally!

On the term קץ, used here to refer to disgust (disgust with life, in this context) – see Rashbam on Bamidbar 21:5, ונפשנו קצה בלחם הקלוקל. It seems to me that his explanation, that the Jews were disgusted because of 39 years of the same dry, round food, fits the word קצה better than the explanations of other commentaries fit that word.

How do we know Paroh took 4 steps, in particular? Perhaps by counting the word ויצו עליו פרעה אנשים, but perhaps because we assume this was a 4-cubit trip, by default explanation of how one escorts. Of course, his reward ended up harming himself and his country, but no one forced him to spend his reward that way…

Daf: Sotah 27-30

Most of this is pretty technical and will appeal only to people who are already learning Sotah. Still, there are more general comments here and there.


27b
Our mishnah lists chiddushim (novel lessons) introduced on the day R’ Elazar ben Azaryah took over from Rabban Gamliel in the beit midrash. It is not coincidental that R’ Yehoshua figures strongly in this mishnah – he was squelched at times by Rabban Gamliel, and one of those incidents was what led to R’ Elazar ben Azaryah taking over.

It’s interesting to see R’ Akiva involved in aggadata, non-legalistic gemara; at times (such as Sanhedrin 38b), sages rebuke him saying that he would be better off in legal analysis, saying כלך אצל נגעים ואהלות!

The use of לאמר on this page as “To repeat” is interesting. We have 3 other definitions for לאמר:
1) Tell this to others;
2) “Saying” (as in, “This was the message, saying…)
3) בדרך דרש, the gemara in Yoma 4b parses לאמר as לאו אמור, meaning, “Don’t repeat what you are told, unless you are told explicitly, ‘אמור Say it’.”

At the end of the mishnah, it appears that ירא אלקים is used to refer to fearing punishment rather than being in awe of Gd. [We’ll discuss this more, Gd-willing, on 31a when the gemara returns to the topic.]


28a
At the top of the page: The gemara suggests that the Sotah water will not affect a woman unless her husband is innocent of sin. Rashi takes this as a sin related to her Sotah process – his having lived with her after the סתירה. Ramban, though, is broader, taking it as any sin of sexual impropriety.


29a-b
The attempts at a קל וחומר logical argument are quite difficult here, from the perspective of logic. We compare food, which is a שני or שלישי or touched by a טבול יום and is therefore, itself, disqualified from use, with a person who is a טבול יום or מחוסר כפרה and there he disqualifies items he touches. The two are not really comparable. Further, in the argument on 29b to deduce from מחוסר כפרה to שלישי food, the fact that a מחוסר כפרה cannot eat from a קרבן is not because of טומאה, but rather it is from his ritual ineligibility due to the fact that he has not brought his קרבן!


30a
It appears that they never answer R’ Yochanan’s question in this discussion.

Note that in the middle of the page our gemara plays an interesting switch, changing the way we define the numbers of ראשון, שני, שלישי. Instead of looking at them the normal way, as counting the distance from the original טמא entity, we now look at them by what they can generate – how many layers of טומאה can emanate from them.


30b
The word לא at the start of the third line should be לאו to be Aramaically consistent.

See Tosafot מר on whether the law of Techum Shabbat is biblical, and what might be the source פסוק.

On the last line, the word עוברים should be עוברין to be Aramaically consistent.

Daf: Sotah 22-26

Most of the notes on these pages are technical in nature. The casual reader may find some of the notes on 22b and 26a interesting, though.

As always: Best read with a gemara in front of you.


22a
The term צליינית seems to me to come from the same Aramaic root as leads to צלותא, meaning “prayer.”

In the line בתולה דנפלה it should say either בתולה שנפלה or בתולתא דנפלה. It’s either Hebrew or Aramaic, not a mix.


22b
When people say one does not understand his rebbe “until 40 years,” they usually take that as the age of 40 – but see Tosafot, who says it’s 40 years from the time one begins learning. This is important because in the 17th century (starting with the Shach to Yoreh Deah 246:6, I believe) the age of 40 was given as the earliest age to study Kabbalah. If the source is our gemara, then it should be from forty years after one begins learning Torah.

The gemara here is quite concerned about the appearance of self-righteousness. In general, we call this יוהרא; it is brought in halachah in terms of such practices as bowing very low for Modim and taking on extra fasts.

Tosafot לעולם has his famous discussion here (and in four other places) regarding the value of engaging in Torah and mitzvot for the sake of personal gain [good], as opposed to doing so for the sake of gaining power over others [very, very bad].


23a
See Tosafot כל. The initial assumption is that Rashi is referring to a husband’s obligation to fulfill his wife’s korban obligation, but he concludes that Rashi was actually referring to the husband’s rike in ownership of the korban.


24a
See Rashi vs. Tosafot on the difference between the titles of איילונית, עקרה and אינה ראויה לילד. Tosafot assumes that Rashi defines עקרה as a woman who consumed a potion meant to keep her from bearing children, but this is difficult – Rashi on 25b אבל איילונית says that עקרה is the result of a physical wound!


26a
This is strange – Rav Nachman on 25b presented a דברי הכל universal view regarding איילונית, but on 26a (middle of the page) he acknowledges that this is actually a debate among the Tannaim. I haven’t seen anyone comment on this here, but see Tosafot Sanhedrin 2b where Rabbi Avahu does this and Tosafot discusses it.

Don’t be surprised about the preference for male children; as the gemara elsewhere explains, this was an economic preference – the males were the ones who would be the primary wage-earners, and parents expected their children to support them in their old age.

Re: the skin color preference, it is clear in various sources that the Jews of that period, like people of any period, preferred their own appearance as the ideal aesthetic. See, of course, Rashi, Ibn Ezra and Rashbam on Bamidbar 12 regarding the אשה כושית. See also Abarbanel on Bereishit 10 and Amos 9:7, and Ibn Ezra and Radak to Amos 9:7. See also Midrash Tanchuma to Noach, 13.

There is a lot of discussion re: the סריס at the bottom of the page here; Rashi on our Mishnah contradicts Rashi in the Gemara. See Tosafot. See the Rashash, who seems to go with Rashi on our mishnah as opposed to Rashi on our Gemara.


26b
Note the different views in Rashi and Tosafot on שחוף.

I was troubled by the fact that here it seems the husband’s קינוי warning must specify a sexual act, but since the beginning of Sotah we have defined קינוי as “אל תסתרי עם איש פלוני,” “Don’t be alone with that man!” I sent this question to R’ Mordechai Kornfeld’s Kollel l’Iyun haDaf, and they pointed me to Rashi Yevamot 55b, where he writes that “Don’t be alone” is presumed, by default, to refer to “being alone for the sake of a sexual act.” That is valid – as opposed to a warning which specifies a non-sexual act.

Daf: Sotah 20-21

[Haveil Havalim is out here!]


Some interesting items here - in particular the note from the Maharatz Chajes on 20a and the comments on 21b on women's learning. As always: Please read with a gemara.

20a
The word תפלות does not lend itself to easy translation. One could read it as a form of תפל, meaning bland, as in רוק תפל which is mentioned in the gemara for certain laws. The standard translations are “cunning” or “sexual immorality,’ but their etymologies are not clear to me.

Rabbi Yishmael’s warning to Rabbi Meir about taking care with each letter in writing a Torah is hard to undersand. The Maharsha on Tosafot in Eruvin 13a seems to say that this is either about causing heretical misunderstandings of Torah by making a mistake with a letter, or about making a mistake in one of the Divine Names. However, from Rabbi Meir’s response it appears that Rabbi Yishmael’s comment was not about about the Divine Name, specifically. This is also clear in Rashi ומשוי ליה רי"ש.
The Maharatz Chajes, on the other hand, takes this story entirely differently – it’s not about writing a Torah, but about writing explanatory references in the margins of the Torah. See his comments inside.


20b
See Tosafot יש from the Yerushalmi.


21a
Rashi on the whole page here is a must-read.

Rashi לכבות את האהבה connects wine, Torah and סוד (secrets). For a similar connection see the title of Rav Pappa on Niddah 12a-b – he is called סודני, either because he is a talmid chacham or because he is a beer-maker.

See Tosafot זה.

The word מככה eight lines up from the bottom ought to be מכבה, obviously.

It’s funny to see Rav Yosef say that R’ Menachem bar Yosi explained a pasuk “like Sinai” – Rav Yosef himself is termed “Sinai” (for his encyclopedic knowledge) in Berachot 64a.

See the Maharsha on בוז יבוזו לו.


21b
See Tosafot רוצה. This is an observation on basic human nature – people would prefer to have their family home together more, and make less money.

Of course, the concern that learning will be misappropriated applies for both genders (hence the law that one may not teach a תלמיד שאינו הגון, a student who displays poor character). However, with a male there is a basic obligation for him to learn the whole Torah, whereas she “only” is required to learn practical law and everything related to Jewish thought.

The Rabbanan here (seven lines down) seem to follow Ben Azzai, so it’s not clear why all of the ספרי הלכה cite R’ Eliezer as the law?

Daf: Sotah 10-11

There is so much to see and say here, and no time to write it all down in a clear form. Here is some of it, anyway:

10b
On the line, “Better to throw one’s self into an oven than to embarrass another person publicly,” Rashi takes our gemara simply: We see that one should let himself be put in an oven rather than embarrass someone else, since Tamar was willing to suffer this fate. Tosafos in Bava Metzia 59a points out that this is seen in the Torah’s pasuk itself, in which the word מוצאת does not have any vowels on the א, so that the word is actually מוצת, to be kindled (a la ויצת אש בציון – Eichah 4).

The gemara notes the recurrence of הכר נא in the book of Bereishit linking the sale of Yosef with Yehudah/Tamar, but there are many more borrowed phrases and images unifying Bereishit (as well as the Torah itself), and giving the lie to the Documentary Hypothesis. A few quick examples: The young goats (Yaakov’s meal for Yitzchak, the goat’s blood for Yosef’s tunic, Tamar’s fee), the link of עלי קללתך and עלי היו כלנה, the numerous references to walking in the דרך ה', and the cross-biblical theme of צדקה ומשפט which carries us from Bereishit 18:19 all the way through Devarim 33:21 and then into the neviim.

The gemara talks about Yehudah being named for his future admission/הודאה, but the Torah gives a reason for his name – it’s הפעם אודה את ה', Leah’s thanks to Gd! Maharsha says she would have named him אודה under her original reason; HaShem inspired her to call him יהודה.

I am puzzled by the gemara’s declaration that Yehudah sanctified the Name of HaShem by publicly admitting his wrong; we are taught אשרי נשוי פשע כסוי חטאה (and see the Rambam in the beginning of Hilchot Teshuvah on this point) that one should not divulge private sin to the masses, lest it actually cause a desecration and desensitization!

11a
See the Maharsha on the gemara's analysis of the pasuk describing Miriam's wait for Moshe.

Why do we bring a pasuk from Yeshayah מי נח זאת לי as proof that won’t destroy the world with water, instead of bringing the post-Flood biblical pledge, לא אוסיף להכות את כל חי?! Perhaps because that earlier pasuk isn't water-specific?

The gemara here regarding Yisro's reward for refusing to participate in Paroh’s persecution indicates that Yisro's descendants, or at least some of them, did become Jewish. (See our discussion on Yael.) But then why did they live next to Amalek, per Shemuel I on Shaul’s war with Amalek?

Some have the minhag of blowing a Teruah Gedolah at the end of Yom Kippur. This mirrors Rashi here, that the Jews heard a Teruah at Har Sinai, since the shofar blast at the end of the Revelation at Har Sinai (במשוך היובל המה יעלו בהר) is one of the sources for the shofar blast at the end of Yom Kippur.

Rashi's two approaches to translating the gemara on ערי מסכנות take the Gemara’s line in opposite directions – one is that it's about the building in Egypt, the other is that it's about construction in general.

On “resembling thorns in their eyes,” the Maharsha's approach (the Egyptians resembled thorns in their own eyes) seems to fit the wording more accurately than Rashi (the Egyptians felt punctured by thorns).

11b
The pasuk brought here, תחת התפוח עוררתיך שמה חבלתך אמך שמה חבלה יולדתך, is one source for the myth that the fruit in the garden was the apple, from a mis-reading of the Hebrew root ח-ב-ל as corruption – “Under the apple tree, your mother corrupted you.” It should be read like חבלי לידה, “your mother birthed you.” (There is also a second source, the Latin “mal” which is associated with the apple/malus.)

The Maharsha explains why I might be more or less likely to identify Miriam or Elisheva as the second of the meyaldot.

The Gemara’s derash readings of חיות depend on reading it with a patach under the ח, instead of the actual kamatz.

The gemara that says Miriam gave birth to Chur after her illness must not be referring to her illness with tzaraat, but rather to a childhood illness, for Chur was dead (per midrash) by the time she experienced her tzaraat. This also fits 12a; see Rashi on 12a עזובה.

Daf: Sotah 6-7

There is a ton here on these pages; see Rashi and Maharsha on pretty much everything.

In my notes here, see especially the note on how we respond to suffering, the significance of clothing color, and the stories of Reuven and Yehudah. As always, having a gemara with you will help.

6a
Abayye is seen responding to Rava here, which is unusual. In general our edition rejects having Abayye, the mentor, question Rava, the student, and Rava’s name רבא is consequently changed frequently to Rabbah רבה – since Rabbah was Abayye’s mentor.

See Tosafot אם; this is an important point regarding the way we handle problems in life. Rather than observe idiosyncratic situations and ask ourselves why they are happening, we tend to explain away idiosyncrasies with pat answers, ignoring warning signals.

6b
It’s odd, to me, that we would destroy a valid korban due to a rabbinic concern. I recall that in Zevachim we specifically say not to do that?

The word כפרה (kapparah) is not specific to atonement for sin; Rashi notes that here, on the gemara’s use of כיפרה.

7a
Rashi’s version of a technical התראה warning, in "דידעי", does not fit the normal format of התראה.

In the first mishnah: If they are going to Yerushalayim anyway, why does the local court get involved at all? Just to provide escorts?! Perhaps this is why the Rambam writes (Hilchot Sotah 3:1 – note that this is mislabeled in the עין משפט on the daf) that the local hears and evaluates the testimony before sending them on.

The black clothing as a sign of mourning is interesting; see Pesachim 109a on colored clothing being joyous, and see Shabbos 114a especially, and see Yoma 19a (Kohanim ineligible for wearing black), Bava Metzia 59b (black for a solemn, sad occasion), Moed Katan 17a (black clothes for the person who wants to sin), and Maharsha to Sotah 22b (black clothes as a sign of mourning), Maharsha to Kiddushin 40a (black clothes against the yetzer hara), and more. Of course, also see Yeshayah 1:18 and Kohelet 9:8 on white and innocence and joy, and Shulchan Orach Chaim 610:4 on white clothing for Yom Kippur.


7b
See the Rambam on the mishnah regarding לבה גס בה – the concern is that being with familiar people bucks up one’s spirit.

What was Yehudah’s sin? Being with a zonah was permitted, and punishing Tamar for apparent extramarital involvement (because the גאולה bond to Shelah and his family was quasi-marital) was legitimate! Note that Rashi and Ibn Ezra to Bereishit 38 both say the embarrassment for Yehudah actually came from giving over such expensive and personal items for the sake of a liaison.

How could we tell her Reuven sinned, of the gemara in Shabbos says explicitly that Reuven did not sin? Rashi here seems to say it’s just moving the bed that is the sin. Rama (in his Responsum 11) has a different view, though – he says we lie about Reuven, giving him a bad reputation, for the sake of restroing shalom in general and avoiding erasing Gd’s Name.

See Rashi on להם לבדם נתנה הארץ.

See Rashi vs Tosafot on לא עבר זר

The idea of reward for Teshuvah fits nicely with the gemara in Yoma on proper teshuvah converting sins to זכויות, merits.

Rashi gives you the very interesting backstory on why Yehudah’s bones rolled in his casket.

The gemara’s idea of the person feeling posthumous pain when his body is harmed is reminiscent of the big discussion in Berachot 18b on whether a person experiences pain while the body deteriorates.

Daf: Sotah 4-5

In general, it’s important to keep one eye on Rashi and the other on Maharsha all through Sotah. As we move into the latter two-thirds of the first perek, though, it’s extra-important.

Lots of interesting material in these pages; I have noted a few items here. As always, best to have a gemara in front of you for this.

4b
The gemara connects one who eats bread without first washing נטילת ידים with one who lives with a זונה – a rather remarkable comparison! The Maharsha explains that they are related in that both result in poverty.

See Tosafot נעקר.

The gemara here translates the biblical term יקרה as “valued.” This is reminiscent of Sanhedrin 38b, in which the use of the word יקר is brought as proof that Adam haRishon spoke Aramaic; it seems that this word means slightly different things in Hebrew and Aramaic – valued vs. heavy. Of course, the two meanings are related, directly as well as in slang.

Rava says that learning Torah will not save a person from Gehennom if he sins. See the mishnah later on 20a about learning Torah to delay – but not eliminate - the effect of the Sotah water.

5a
See Tosafot כל, who is bothered by the fact that the mishnah in Perek Chelek in Sanhedrin, which lists those who do not merit olam haba, doesn’t include the arrogant person mentioned here.

The gemara recommends an eighth of an eighth of arrogance. The Vilna Gaon famously pointed out that the eighth pasuk in the eighth parshah in the Torah begins with קטנתי מכל החסדים, Yaakov’s humble declaration that he does not deserve all that HaShem has done for him.

I also wonder about the eighth of an eighth being 1/64 – marginally less than 1/60, the shiur for nullification in a mixture… (for a similar idea, see the gemara in berachos about dreams having 1/60 of prophecy, and of Shabbos being 1/60 of olam haba, etc.)

5b
The gemara says that one who evaluates his path, calculating his actions, will merit great things. But what if he were to calculate and decide that it would be better for him not to do a mitzvah? The same question may be asked of Pirkei Avot 2:1, which encourages calculating a cost/benefit analysis of mitzvot and aveirot!

Some of the commentaries to Avot 2:1 don’t take it as a literal recommendation; further, the game is fixed, since the reward for mitzvot and for avoiding aveirot is always supposed to be greater than any earthly benefit. For another view, though, see Terumat haDeshen 5 regarding a man who elected to skip minyan in order to claim a debt owed to him. Terumat haDeshen justifies the calculation (although he disagrees with its conclusion).

Daf: Sotah 2-3

First: I am so glad to have Rashi back.

Second: I'm not going to note every time Maharsha has something to say in his חידושי אגדות, but it's a good idea to make it a habit of reading his notes for Sotah. He has a ton to say on these דברי אגדה.

As always, these notes will make a lot more sense if you have a gemara in front of you. The issues of shidduchim/bashert, as well as the meaning of קנאה, are interesting.

2a
Tosafot Shantz challenges the gemara’s interpretation of המקנא as בדיעבד language, based on other cases of similar language in the gemara, which is not read as בדיעבד. He offers two approaches: (1) The assumption here is that this is בדיעבד because there is logical reason to think it ought to be בדיעבד, and (2) The gemara asks the question only where it has an answer available.

See the Bach, note ה, on the word בכושרות

The comparison of shidduchim to Yam Suf is fascinating; see the discussion in Tosafot Shantz. In particular, his explanation addresses the question that splitting the Yam Suf was not at all קשה (difficult) for Gd in the first place!

Tosafot הא points out that in Moed Katan 18b we say that one may do kiddushin on Chol haMoed, lest someone else beat him to it, and the gemara there asks that if all is bashert, one shouldn’t have any such concern. Tosafot asks why the answer there isn’t simply that the gemara there is talking about a second marriage. However, I am not clear on why any of this is a problem – HaShem leaves us room to make mistakes, and so a person might yet miss out on his bashert! Tosafot appears not to agree with this idea.

2b
If the husband were believed on his own say-so to say he did קינוי, he could always claim falsely that he had done קינוי!

Rashi איכא עיקר is very important – he indicates that legitimate קינוי is not done in rage, but rather is a rational declaration.

Rashi also notes that קנאה means anger here. It also fits better than “jealousy” when we see terms like א—ל קנא. (HaShem doesn’t get angry, of course, but He shows signs of anger.)

I didn’t do a CD-ROM search, but I believe it’s usually רב יימר בר שלמיא, not רב יימר בר ר' שלמיא.

Rav Yeimar’s approach explaining קינוי as something which causes strife between her and others fits Nedarim 83a-b in which we say that a man is not able to prohibit his wife from being involved with burying others, because it will cause her pain. (Note that in Nedarim we see other reasons it will cause her pain.)

3a
Rashash says that when Reish Lakish says a person won’t sin unless gripped by a spirit of foolishness (רוח שטות), he is tying that into קינוי, for which the Torah says ועבר עליו רוח קנאה. This fits the view that a husband is not allowed to do קינוי.

The rendering of ועבר as “before” calls to mind the discussions of עבר meaning “before” regarding עובר לעשייתן.

R’ Akiva’s statement that a kohen is obligated to become tamei to bury his wife fits the Rambam, who explains the permission to become tamei for her as an issue of מת מצוה, which is obligatory.

Tosafot לה notes a difference between חובה and מצוה, in that if it’s only a mitzvah, one who is engaged in another mitzvah may be exempt from this one. If it’s a chovah (requirement), though, then he is obligated to drop everything and do this one. This has interesting ramifications for the way the gemara and poskim have classically viewed Shabbat candles as a חובה, over and above its status as a מצוה of honoring Shabbat. (See Teshuvot Rav Natronai Gaon 66, for example, as well as the gemara in the second perek of Shabbos on נר ביתו overriding other mitzvot.)

3b
Tosafot למשרי points out the origin for following patrilineal descent among people who are not Jewish.

Daf: Nazir 54-57

Once again, most of the notes I have on this series are technical and really need to be read in front of a gemara. Of particular interest: The question of tumah for the graves at Me'arat haMachpelah (54a) and Rav Ada's harsh statement to Rav Huna regarding the way Rav Huna's wife, Chovah, shaved her children's heads.

54a
Reish Lakish indicates that pre-Sinai graves do not communicate tumat ohel, which leads to the question of why Rabbi Bena’ah marked the graves of our ancestors in Me’arat haMachpelah (Bava Batra 58a). Marking is only for graves that communicate tumat ohel! Tosafot and the Rosh explain why the ancestors buried in Me’arat haMachpelah have unique status.

Tosafot הגולל records a debate about what constitute גולל and דופק. It’s particularly interesting to note that the debate is only relevant if actual coffins are in use.

The mishnah’s language is tricky here, because it’s out of order: ימי ספרו refers to the end of tzaraat, the seven days after the metzora’s first shave. ימי גמרו actually refers to the middle phase, when he has been declared a מצורע מוחלט (full metzora) and is pre-purification. (And the first stage is ימי הסגרו, the period of quarantine before he is declared a full metzora.)
So the order for a metzora is this: ימי הסגרו, then ימי גמרו, then ימי ספרו.

54b
The Rosh explains the reason for a decree creating tumah for land outside Israel: It was a means of discouraging people from leaving Israel.

55a
Once we discuss a moving ohel, we must ask about the status of a boat. The Rosh mentions it.

The Rosh seems to have an edition that varies from ours, on the question of R’ Yosi b”r Yehudah.

55b
The 120-day case is fascinating. Rosh gives a thorough explanation; you’ll also see it spelled out on 60a. It reminds me of my rebbetzin’s law school hypotheticals; as the gemara says, it’s לחדודי, a complex case brought to sharpen the mind of the student.

56a
The word דין here simply means “logic”. Ditto for אין עונשין מן הדין and דנתי לפני חכמים.

57b
On the odd story of Rav Ada’s response to the whole-head buzz cuts of the children of Rav Huna and his wife Chovah: (And why would anyone name a child Chovah, anyway?! reminiscent of Machlon and Kilyon!)
We find two approaches, which seem to be based in a difference of edition – לדידך vs ודידך:
Pseudo-Rashi has לדידך and says that Rav Ada is saying, “According to you, Chovah shouldn’t cut her kids’ hair that way!”
Tosafos has ודידך and says that Rav Ada is saying, “Chovah shouldn’t cut your kids’ hair that way!”

Daf: Nazir 44-47

More notes, some of which may actually be interesting for non-daffies to read. At any rate, writing these up is good chazarah for me.

44a
An interesting note on exhuming a body – per Tosafos ובאו, R’ Yitzchak wanted to exhume his father’s body in order to bury it with the bodies of the rest of his family. This is, indeed, one of the few justifications for exhuming a body: to unite a family.

The name R’ Yehoshua ben Elisha is unfamiliar; note that the Rosh had it as the much more common R’ Yishmael ben Elisha. (Per Tosafos toward the beginning of Yevamos, there were at least three figures named R’ Yishmael ben Elisha.)

45a
Towards the top of the page, where Abayye says a טבול יום is like a זב, the Rosh has a significant change: A טבול יום is not like a זב.

Here we are told that Moshe carried Yosef’s body with him in the camp of the leviyyim. Note, though, that Yosef was actually transported through the midbar by others, per Succah 25, and that this triggered the need for Pesach Sheni! However, our gemara could be within the view that Pesach Sheni was actually triggered by the kohanim who had carried Nadav and Avihu from the mishkan.

The Zav is called a מחוסר כפרה, but the Nazir is not. Perhaps this is because the nazir’s korbanos are to re-start his nezirus, and not to conclude his tumah. (Although I’m not sure how R’ Eliezer would react to this; he said the Nazir already starts his new count after completing the 7 days of taharah…)

We seem to be conflicted here as to whether shaving at the entrance to the mishkan/mikdash is considered degrading to the sanctity of the place, or not. According to the view that it is degrading, when the Torah said the nazir should shave פתח אהל מועד, it didn’t mean that he must do that. But I don’t really understand that position; if shaving there were degrading, why would it be permitted at all?

45b
The mishnah at the bottom of the page mentions שילוק, a type of cooking which is in a liquid medium but is not the same as normal boiling, which is called בישול. Pseudo-Rashi here renders it as “not well-cooked,” but everyone else, including pseudo-Rashi in Nedarim 49a, renders it as “overdone.” The Bach here comments that perhaps this note of “not well-cooked” means “not cooked well, but rather overdone.”

46b
As the Rosh notes (printed on 46a), the mishnah here does not need to mention the case of one who shaved on the chatas שלא לשמה; it’s brought only to complete the set of chatas, olah and shelamim.

47b
How do you end up with two simultaneous Kohanim Gedolim?!
The Rosh brings one explanation that it is where the first became unable to serve for a limited, defined period of time (such as one day for קרי), and then the second was appointed, and then the first returned to eligibility – but he rejects this view, because in such a case the temporary replacement is no longer eligible to serve once the first returns to eligibility, and so the priority question in the gemara is easy to answer.
The Rosh then brings a second view, from Rabbeinu Moshe, that this is where the first kohen gadol was out for an indefinite period because of illness or exile to a city of refuge. In such a case the replacement would not lose his kohen gadol status when the first returne; they would both be able to serve.

Daf: Nazir 31a-37a

Mostly technical notes in this edition, some linguistic and some on the flow of the Gemara.

31a
Tosafos כיצד offers two ways to understand Beit Shamma’s position – Either that the first one will be kodesh, or that the first black one will be kodesh

31b
In the beginning of the eighth line, it appears to me that the “ק” is a mistake; it should simply be סלקא דעתך.

Aramaic lesson: טיהרא = צהרים – The ט and the צ are interchangeable. Similar Hebrew word: צהר, from the Teivah. And see the beginning of Berachos on טהר יומא. For that matter, I have to wonder about טהור as well…

The Rambam in his comments to the Mishnah explains it very clearly.

32a
איבעית תימא as opposed to איבעית אימא is an interesting quirk of language, consistent with other oddities of Nazir, as per the Rosh’s note from earlier in the masechta.

In the mishnah at the bottom of the page: The Rosh and Tosafot believe that in this case the Nazir has not yet designated the specific animal, but pseudo-Rashi disagrees.

32b
Note the Rosh’s little biography of R’ Eliezer.

Note, as well, the Rosh’s explanation of the pesukim in Daniel regarding the future destruction of the second Beis haMikdash. This is one reason why the count of 70 plus 420 is so important, raising the stakes on the problem of the missing 164-or-so years in the Seder Olam chronology.

33b
See Tosafos.

34a
On the second line, it should be אי rather than ואי.

Hebrew: The word גפן here means “vine,” not “grapevine.” We use גפן like that in other places (most obviously צמר גפן), although there are places where גפן alone is assumed to mean grapevine (like the butler’s dream).

On combining items toward the total prohibition: Tosafos gives the obvious combinations of solids. Pseudo-Rashi asks for trouble by mixing solids and liquids, which is a whole other ballgame.

34b
The whole כלל-פרט vs ריבוי-מיעוט methodology is fascinating. At its core, the question is whether I view any class stated in the Torah as automatically including 100% of its sub-cases (כלל) or as expanding a small set of cases (ריבוי), and whether I view any specified case as representing only itself (פרט) or as an exclusionary-but-not-isolated example (מיעוט).

See the Rosh here on בין הבינים and compare it with his comments on בין הבינים on 38b.

See Tosafos on 35a שני on liability for eating the seeds and skins.

35a
The Rosh presents the fascinating possibility that we could have suggested that R’ Eliezer rejects the entire method of כלל-פרט-כלל, for the entire Torah, and not just here.

37a
The gemara talks about three factors defining the stringency of a prohibition: (1) It cannot become permitted, (2) even benefit is prohibited, and (3) יש היתר לאיסורו Hatarat nedarim cannot affect it. The gemara then says only two of these apply to Arlah. Pseudo-Rashi says this is because Arlah lifts after three years, but that is problematic – the fruit of those first three years is assur forever! What do we mean when we say that Arlah only has two of the factors? Tosafos והוא presents two approaches:
A. Factor (3) יש היתר לאיסורו doesn’t refer to Hatarat Nedarim, but rather it means that the prohibition is not all-encompassing. In the 4th year of Arlah – the year of נטע רבעי – the fruit may be redeemed.
B. Factor (3) יש היתר לאיסורו actually means that we are allowed to create the entity which we will not be allowed to use. As opposed to כלאים , which one is not permitted to create, one is permitted to plant a tree, even though that will generate Arlah.

Daf: Nazir 18a-22b

We're getting into some relatively dry discussions here, but there is quite a bit to note along the way - from a methodological standpoint, a linguistic standpoint, and an interesting-tangent standpoint.

18a
Tosafos ולפטור notes that the Nazir would also be exempt from an Asham.

The gemara further on 18b will discuss what happens if the nazir does not bring his korban on Day 8.

18b
The אם אינו ענין approach to parsing a pasuk has always seemed very strange to me, and proof that the whole system of hermeneutics was based on received tradition rather than ab initio analysis.

The idea of a korban olah as a simple דורון בעלמא, a gift, is interesting. Look at Zevachim 7a-b, where the olah is viewed as an atonement for missed mitzvah opportunities.

19a
R’ Elazar haKappar is here given the title of “berebbi.” This does not mean “son of Rebbe.” Rather, it is explained in Rashi elsewhere as an Aramaic title indicating leadership status.

שנה בחטא – He repeated his sin. How did he “repeat” it? See Tosafos והיינו.

19b
Hilni haMalkah, also known as Helene of Adiabene, comes up here as a woman who vowed to be a nezirah. See also her exploits in the beginning of Succah (her piety) and in Yoma 37a (her generosity to the Beit haMikdash).

The Rosh here notes that the language used in Nazir is different from that used in the gemara in general.

20b
The Rosh at the end of the perek uses “Rami bar Chama” in place of “Rav Chama,” likely a copyist’s error, much like the omission of “Rav” in “Rav Simi” later on 27a.

21a
The use of “acharon אחרון” to mean “later” rather than “last” is very interesting. See also the Rashba’s response to a challenge re: Chaggai 2:9, which says “The honor of this house, the אחרון, will be greater than that of the first.” The Rashba was asked whether this meant the second Beit haMikdash would also be the last! The Rashba explained that the word אחרון can mean “later” rather than “last.”
We see examples of this usage in Bereishit 33:2 and Shemot 4:8.

21b
Regarding Rav Yehudah’s comment at the top of the page, the Rosh has two views as to whether this was implied or stated explicitly.

Daf: Nedarim 82-87

Lots of small notes on these dapim, probably unintelligible to anyone who isn’t actually learning them.

82b
See the Rosh’s two approaches on באחת מתענה ובא' אינו מתענה; the two approaches are interesting in their difference.

R’ Yochanan’s view seems to negate the Rosh’s perplexing view back on 68a that the
husband would be nullifying one olive and the father nullifying the other (credit: Henry)

83a-b
It’s interesting to note that everyone here in this gemara takes it for granted that women go to the cemetery; I am familiar with a custom among some sectors of German Jewry, for example, that woman do not attend the cemetery.

85a
I found it valuable to see Tosafos Chullin 131a יש בו in order to grasp this gemara

See the Rosh’s note on ר' יוסי ב"ר יהודה, regarding the inappropriate use of the term קנס. His note regarding the language in Nedarim is, of course, reminiscent of Tosafos Nedarim 7a on תיבעי לך.

86a
The key here is to remember three factors that determine the strength or weakness of a נודר: (a) Ownership of the item, (b) Connection to the person who will become forbidden to use the item, and (c) Existence of the item currently.

87a
It’s odd that pseudo-Rashi says the second והתניא supports Rav Ashi. We usually call a והתניא a support only if it actually provides support – this one challenges Rav Ashi, until we re-write it!

The Ran translates מגדף here as blasphemy. Elsewhere (Krisus, as I recall), we translate מגדף alternatively as singing to idolatry. Presumably he doesn’t do so here because it would be redundant with the next action listed.

See the Ran on the first part of the Mishnah, offering two different views of what אינו מופר means here.

87b
The Rosh (printed on 87a) offers an interesting explanation of why the Rabbanan disagree with R’ Yishmael on his read of יקימנו.

The Ran offers two approaches to understanding R’ Meir’s stance. It would appear that his second approach would make R’ Meir’s opposition apply to the רישא as well as the סיפא.

See the wildly divergent approaches of the Ran and the Rosh on the Gemara’s goal in bringing in עיר מקלט.

Daf: Nedarim 76-81

Here are some quick items on Nedarim 76-81:

76a-b
Why wouldn’t we use a Kal vaChomer for this? Because Kal vaChomer is the only method of derashah (hermeneutical principle, for the multisyllabically inclined) which one may employ on his own say-so and personal logic, and is therefore considered vulnerable to error. For the same reason, we say אין עונשין מן הדין, a court may not punish based on kal vachomer deduction.

76b
Regarding the word “Yom” you must see Rashbam on Bereishis 1:4 (ויהי ערב ויהי בקר), and Ibn Ezra on Shemos 35:5 (ביום השבת). (Note that Ibn Ezra wrote an entire screed against Rashbam’s philosophy of Yom - it's the Iggeret haShabbat, available on-line here.)

Rav’s use of “chavivi” “my beloved” for his uncle R’ Chiyya is parallel to our own use of דוד for uncle. Note that R’ Chiyya was his maternal and paternal uncle; see the beginning of Pesachim, 4b or so.

The Ran and the Rosh have entirely different explanations of what R’ Chiyya bar Rav and Rabbah bar Rav Huna were doing.

It is interesting to note the Rosh’s explanation of R’ Chiyya bar Rav’s actions vis-à-vis his wife’s nedarim, given the history of R’ Chiyya with his father (Rav)’s wife, who used to intentionally do the opposite of what his father wanted, on Yevamos 63.

77a
See the Rosh’s two approaches in או דילמא

77b
See the Ran’s citation of, and disagreement with, the Rashba.

79a
The Ran specifies that one may only do שאילה upon his upholding of a neder on the same day.

Based on the top of 81b, it appears that all of the “I will not bathe” references here are to bathing in the genital area, specifically.

79b
Halfway down, חייל עליה נדרה should be חייל עלה נדרה, I think. I haven't checked the usual sources for this, though.

80a
The Ran and pseudo-Rashi offer different explanations of the term הנאת רחיצה

80b
Rav Moshe Feinstein in Yoreh Deah 1:145 notes that in R’ Yosi’s case of “our laundry vs. their lives,” it doesn’t actually refer to a life-and-death situation.

81a
Shemuel, once again, weighs in with a medical opinion.

Re: Sha’amumita, see the Depression issue raised under שעמום in Kesuvos 59b.

See, of course, the famous Rabbeinu Yonah cited by the Ran on the problem of not reciting Birchot haTorah before learning Torah.

81b
The fox analogy is an attempt to use clean language.