Daf: Nazir 31a-37a

Mostly technical notes in this edition, some linguistic and some on the flow of the Gemara.

31a
Tosafos כיצד offers two ways to understand Beit Shamma’s position – Either that the first one will be kodesh, or that the first black one will be kodesh

31b
In the beginning of the eighth line, it appears to me that the “ק” is a mistake; it should simply be סלקא דעתך.

Aramaic lesson: טיהרא = צהרים – The ט and the צ are interchangeable. Similar Hebrew word: צהר, from the Teivah. And see the beginning of Berachos on טהר יומא. For that matter, I have to wonder about טהור as well…

The Rambam in his comments to the Mishnah explains it very clearly.

32a
איבעית תימא as opposed to איבעית אימא is an interesting quirk of language, consistent with other oddities of Nazir, as per the Rosh’s note from earlier in the masechta.

In the mishnah at the bottom of the page: The Rosh and Tosafot believe that in this case the Nazir has not yet designated the specific animal, but pseudo-Rashi disagrees.

32b
Note the Rosh’s little biography of R’ Eliezer.

Note, as well, the Rosh’s explanation of the pesukim in Daniel regarding the future destruction of the second Beis haMikdash. This is one reason why the count of 70 plus 420 is so important, raising the stakes on the problem of the missing 164-or-so years in the Seder Olam chronology.

33b
See Tosafos.

34a
On the second line, it should be אי rather than ואי.

Hebrew: The word גפן here means “vine,” not “grapevine.” We use גפן like that in other places (most obviously צמר גפן), although there are places where גפן alone is assumed to mean grapevine (like the butler’s dream).

On combining items toward the total prohibition: Tosafos gives the obvious combinations of solids. Pseudo-Rashi asks for trouble by mixing solids and liquids, which is a whole other ballgame.

34b
The whole כלל-פרט vs ריבוי-מיעוט methodology is fascinating. At its core, the question is whether I view any class stated in the Torah as automatically including 100% of its sub-cases (כלל) or as expanding a small set of cases (ריבוי), and whether I view any specified case as representing only itself (פרט) or as an exclusionary-but-not-isolated example (מיעוט).

See the Rosh here on בין הבינים and compare it with his comments on בין הבינים on 38b.

See Tosafos on 35a שני on liability for eating the seeds and skins.

35a
The Rosh presents the fascinating possibility that we could have suggested that R’ Eliezer rejects the entire method of כלל-פרט-כלל, for the entire Torah, and not just here.

37a
The gemara talks about three factors defining the stringency of a prohibition: (1) It cannot become permitted, (2) even benefit is prohibited, and (3) יש היתר לאיסורו Hatarat nedarim cannot affect it. The gemara then says only two of these apply to Arlah. Pseudo-Rashi says this is because Arlah lifts after three years, but that is problematic – the fruit of those first three years is assur forever! What do we mean when we say that Arlah only has two of the factors? Tosafos והוא presents two approaches:
A. Factor (3) יש היתר לאיסורו doesn’t refer to Hatarat Nedarim, but rather it means that the prohibition is not all-encompassing. In the 4th year of Arlah – the year of נטע רבעי – the fruit may be redeemed.
B. Factor (3) יש היתר לאיסורו actually means that we are allowed to create the entity which we will not be allowed to use. As opposed to כלאים , which one is not permitted to create, one is permitted to plant a tree, even though that will generate Arlah.