Daf: Gittin 45-50 - Prisoner exchanges, Minim, Yovel, Lending, Is Marriage a Mitzvah?

Still catching up on posting thoughts on the Daf. For those who are less text-oriented, jump down to My Noachide Wedding.

Gittin 45a
The gemara here mentions Levi bar Darga redeeming his daughter from captivity for 13,000 gold coins. Note my comments here (Nedarim 25a) and here (Nedarim 41), about thirteen being a number used in the gemara for exaggeration, for effect.

Our gemara talks about not paying too much to ransom captives. Tosafot דלא here asks the classic question regarding talmudic cases in which overly large sums were paid, and gives three answers which shape, to this day, our policy in issues like prisoner exchange: Greater expenditures are justified, potentially, if one is redeeming his wife/himself, or if one is redeeming a person who is exceptionally valuable for society, or if one is in an environment where capturing/ransoming is normal, so that one is not really risking additional kidnapping by acceding to a demand.


Gittin 45b
See Rashi here on מין. Here Rashi says “min” means “one who cleaves to idolatry, like a priest.” See also Rashi to Sanhedrin 38a, where Adam haRishon is accused of being a “min.” See also Rashi to Shabbat 116a ספרי מינין. See also Rashi Berachot 12a "Minim", and Rashi Shabbat 75a. However, Rashi Berachot 12b מינות says “those who convert the logic of Torah to erroneous analysis and idolatry.” (Note the censored edition there, though, which may explain this comment in Rashi.)


Gittin 46a
Tosafot כיון is very important, explaining the justifications for honoring the deal struck between the Jews and the Givonim after entering Israel.

Fascinating, from a methodological perspective: The gemara here translates talmudic use of the word רבים based on biblical use of the word רבים!


Gittin 46b
See Tosafot הנודר explaining why taking a vow is like building an illegal altar.


Gittin 47b
Rashi here המוכר שדהו לפירות says that Yovel ceased after the initial exile of Reuven and Gad. Tosafot Gittin 36a “b’Zman” and Tosafot Erchin 31b/32a Hitkin disagree, arguing that they had Yovel in the second Beit haMikdash. Tosafot has substantial proof on his side. Ramban to Gittin 36a disagrees with him, though.


Gittin 49b
See the important Tosafot ור' שמעון, pointing out that we are free to analyze the reasons for/lessons from mitzvot (דורש טעמא דקרא); the only debate regarding the legitimacy of this approach is regarding using those reasons/lessons for practical halachic decisions.

The gemara here points out that we wish to encourage lending; this is because loans are the premier engine for tzedakah in a Torah society. See my comments in “Government as Economic Protector.”

Rashi and Tosafot disagree as to the meaning of משום חינא. Rashi’s view seems to say that we are trying to provide a woman with an incentive to marry a man, whereas Tosafot explains that we are trying to make it easier for her to find a husband.


Gittin 50a
The gemara here indicates that marriage is a mitzvah.
See Beitzah 36b-37a, where marriage is a mitzvah only if one does not currently have a wife and children. From there it is clear that marriage is, at most, a mitzvah-enabler (for permissible procreation) but not a mitzvah in itself.
However, the Rambam (Mishneh Torah Hilchot Ishut 1:2) says marriage is, indeed, a mitzvah. See the Magid Mishneh there and in Hilchot Ishut 1:4, who tries to explain this as either a copyist's error or a reference to a prohibition against living together without marriage.
See also the Rosh to Ketuvot 1:12, on the berachah we recite for kiddushin not being a birkat hamitzvah.

Gittin 36 - Written Torah, Prozbul, Shemitah and Yovel today, and Joyous Suffering

I had intended to record my notes on Gittin 36 through 38, but there’s so much on 36 alone that I have to settle for that. If you have the patience, and access to a gemara, you may find some of these interesting.

Or not.

Gittin 36a
Ordinarily, a vow taken “על דעת רבים - on the mindset of the community” cannot be nullified, for the mindset of the individual taking the vow, and any subsequent regret he feels, is irrelevant. Here, though, we say that such a vow may be revoked for the sake of a mitzvah. Tosafot explains that the community, it may be assumed, does desire that the mitzvah take place. Further, he says it is not a reference to the community in general, but rather to specified individuals - who could, I suppose, be polled for their approval.
However: What is the mitzvah in our case?!

The gemara mentions דיסקי as one way in which people would recognize the signatures of various sages. Rashi explains that דיסקי were letters of responsa, as well as letters of greeting.
This is one example, among several, that show there was a practice of recording Torah well before Rebbe canonized the mishnah. Elsewhere we have seen recordings of berachot, scrolls on which people recorded novellae cited in the beit midrash, and Aramaic translation/commentary in the targumim. The Sfat Emet (Megilah 3a) contends that the prohibition against recording Torah was specifically against publishing it.

The gemara here records Hillel’s justification for formalizing the Prozbul; the issue was a need to ensure a flow of (interest-free) loans. This was critical, since it was (and still is) the greatest form of tzedakah - it allows for a greater magnitude of aid than we could ever see from gifts. Therefore the sages made numerous enactments to encourage lending - this Prozbul, as well as requiring that debts be repaid with a strong currency, eliminating intense interrogation of witnesses and more. This is what the sages called שלא תנעול דלת בפני לווין, to keep the door from being closed before lenders.

Note the basic debate between Rashi and Tosafot as to how Prozbul works.

The gemara here says that Hillel could subvert Shemitah’s release of overdue debts because Shemitah is rabbinic rather than biblical today. This is a problem for the view (see Erchin 31b-32a) that Shemitah remained biblical throughout the second Beit haMikdash, when Hillel lived!
Tosafot here answers that Hillel created the enactment to apply after the destruction of the Beit haMikdash.
Ramban here finds that answer unacceptable, and argues that one must say it was rabbinic during the second Beit haMikdash.


Gittin 36b
Tosafot ותקון asks why the sages would have enacted a rabbinic memorial to shemitah, but not to Yovel. He answers that the prohibition against farming during Yovel, coming on the heels of Shemitah, would be too great a difficulty to impose rabbinically. Note that Tosafot must follow the system of counting that we use, that does not count Yovel as part of the Shemitah cycle. This is against the view that Yovel is part of the seven-year Shemitah cycle, and so is not always the year following Shemitah.

Rashi יחרם כל רכושו stresses that this co-opting of the property of people who did not return for the second Beit haMikdash was a verdict of the Great Assembly. Perhaps this is lest one consider it a הוראת שעה of a prophet, and therefore invalid as precedent for rabbinic action.

See Tosafot דאלימי on what kind of Beit Din is needed to perform a Prozbul.

I prefer to take שמחין ביסורין as “joyous despite suffering” rather than “joyous in suffering.” But I could be wrong.