First: I am so glad to have Rashi back.
Second: I'm not going to note every time Maharsha has something to say in his חידושי אגדות, but it's a good idea to make it a habit of reading his notes for Sotah. He has a ton to say on these דברי אגדה.
As always, these notes will make a lot more sense if you have a gemara in front of you. The issues of shidduchim/bashert, as well as the meaning of קנאה, are interesting.
Tosafot Shantz challenges the gemara’s interpretation of המקנא as בדיעבד language, based on other cases of similar language in the gemara, which is not read as בדיעבד. He offers two approaches: (1) The assumption here is that this is בדיעבד because there is logical reason to think it ought to be בדיעבד, and (2) The gemara asks the question only where it has an answer available.
See the Bach, note ה, on the word בכושרות
The comparison of shidduchim to Yam Suf is fascinating; see the discussion in Tosafot Shantz. In particular, his explanation addresses the question that splitting the Yam Suf was not at all קשה (difficult) for Gd in the first place!
Tosafot הא points out that in Moed Katan 18b we say that one may do kiddushin on Chol haMoed, lest someone else beat him to it, and the gemara there asks that if all is bashert, one shouldn’t have any such concern. Tosafot asks why the answer there isn’t simply that the gemara there is talking about a second marriage. However, I am not clear on why any of this is a problem – HaShem leaves us room to make mistakes, and so a person might yet miss out on his bashert! Tosafot appears not to agree with this idea.
If the husband were believed on his own say-so to say he did קינוי, he could always claim falsely that he had done קינוי!
Rashi איכא עיקר is very important – he indicates that legitimate קינוי is not done in rage, but rather is a rational declaration.
Rashi also notes that קנאה means anger here. It also fits better than “jealousy” when we see terms like א—ל קנא. (HaShem doesn’t get angry, of course, but He shows signs of anger.)
I didn’t do a CD-ROM search, but I believe it’s usually רב יימר בר שלמיא, not רב יימר בר ר' שלמיא.
Rav Yeimar’s approach explaining קינוי as something which causes strife between her and others fits Nedarim 83a-b in which we say that a man is not able to prohibit his wife from being involved with burying others, because it will cause her pain. (Note that in Nedarim we see other reasons it will cause her pain.)
Rashash says that when Reish Lakish says a person won’t sin unless gripped by a spirit of foolishness (רוח שטות), he is tying that into קינוי, for which the Torah says ועבר עליו רוח קנאה. This fits the view that a husband is not allowed to do קינוי.
The rendering of ועבר as “before” calls to mind the discussions of עבר meaning “before” regarding עובר לעשייתן.
R’ Akiva’s statement that a kohen is obligated to become tamei to bury his wife fits the Rambam, who explains the permission to become tamei for her as an issue of מת מצוה, which is obligatory.
Tosafot לה notes a difference between חובה and מצוה, in that if it’s only a mitzvah, one who is engaged in another mitzvah may be exempt from this one. If it’s a chovah (requirement), though, then he is obligated to drop everything and do this one. This has interesting ramifications for the way the gemara and poskim have classically viewed Shabbat candles as a חובה, over and above its status as a מצוה of honoring Shabbat. (See Teshuvot Rav Natronai Gaon 66, for example, as well as the gemara in the second perek of Shabbos on נר ביתו overriding other mitzvot.)
Tosafot למשרי points out the origin for following patrilineal descent among people who are not Jewish.