See the Rosh at the end of the mishnah on Achilah and Shetiyah (printed on 62b) – he takes the remarkable stance that the nodeir would be permitted to eat and drink.
It’s important to understand why people experiencing these four states are compared to the dead. It’s not a flat comparison; rather, all four are cut off from something, as a deceased person is cut off from something – society, enjoyment of this world, or continuity.
The poverty of Dasan and Aviram would still seem to be a Nolad factor! See the Ran at the end of the daf, citing a Yerushalmi. This also has applications for the beautification experiment of Rabbi Yishmael at the bottom of 66a and the Rosh at the bottom there.
See the Ran on hatarah “b’fanav” on which nedarim actually require the presence of the other party, and why.
The gemara says that Moshe had to go back to Yisro after the sneh experience, for permission to go back to Egypt. This explains Part 1 of a two-part problem, regarding Moshe’s post-Sneh behavior – why does Moshe not go straight to Egypt, but instead return to Yisro. However, it does not explain the second part of the problem, the fact that Moshe still doesn’t go to Egypt, but rather waits for a second Divine instruction.
In the Mishnah’s case of someone being informed that so-and-so had died, the Rosh suggests that the death had occurred before the neder, based on the Yerushalmi, such that the whole neder is simply a mistake. This leads to a basic machlokes between the Ran and the Rosh as to whether Rabbi Yochanan is saying that Rabbi Meir would require hatarah, or not.
I have to think that מת נולד הוא is an intentional pun.
On the mishnah, see the Ran’s explanation of why this doesn’t contradict 22a.
It’s fascinating that Rabbi Akiva here demands the sale of hair, given his wife Rachel’s sale of her own hair to support them.
The Ran on the top mishnah provides a source from the Yerushalmi for the idea that there is no partial nullification of a neder.
The Ran argues that in the wine/onion cases we don’t require hatarah; they are simply mistaken nedarim.
The practice of marrying one’s sister’s daughter is all over the gemara, as this was considered a praiseworthy way to guarantee her support, if she had difficulty finding a husband on her own. The gemara praises this behavior. You may also recall from the beginning of Gittin מחפה על בת אחותו, that this practice was one of the reasons they required an accurate date on a get – lest the niece be involved in something inappropriate, and the uncle desire to cover up for her by ante-dating a get.
See the last Rosh on v’hitirah R’ Yishmael – is this like the anticipated nolad of poverty on 64b?
The Rosh points out the interesting difference between R’ Shimon’s approach and that of the Sotah case. And, of course, no one needs to die here – they can go for hataras nedarim!
Note that the Rosh has “tlafchi” instead of “tilfi” in the beginning of the Amelia Bedelia story, which makes the whole thing read much cleaner.
See the Ran on “Naarah” who points out the lower limit of this law is not 12.
Note the Ran on בבת אחת in “v’Chazar”
Rosh (beginning of the medium lines) says that we learn av from baal as far as nidrei inui nefesh, but I don’t understand why one needs to do that – the father has his own source?
The Ran has a very interesting discussion (in ורבה) on whether a father has power of all nedarim or only those that affect him.
On the two-olives case:
1. Ran and Rosh believe her neder was about two specific olives. Tosafos says it’s about all olives, and she ate two of them.
2. I am flabbergasted by the Rosh’s analysis, that one olive of the two has simply been removed. How could this make any sense? And what happened to 66a about not nullifying part of a neder?!
3. The Ran’s three approaches to the case are fascinating – as is R’ Akiva Eiger’s note on the 3rd, pointing out that regarding meilah we don’t use “olives” but rather we use shaveh perutah as the standard.