When your brother steals (Derashah Vayyigash 5771)

I'm guest-speaking at a shul here in Toronto this Shabbos. Here's what I plan to say:

Like most people, I receive several daily emails from well-meaning friends and relatives who want to make sure I’m up on the latest videos. A Scotsman performing bicycle tricks on a castle keep, a collection of 1980’s pop stars lip-synching to the Beatles, interviews with people involved in the UN vote creating the State of Israel, I’m on it, because a few thousand best friends are thinking of me.

I assure you, I am most grateful.

This past week, one particular clip stood out from the batch – a 15-minute digest from The People’s Court, an American television show which features small claims arbitration hearings. To make a long story short: A couple claimed they had accidentally given the cleaners something which should not be dry cleaned, the cleaners had called them, and they had told the cleaners not to wash it. They washed it anyway, it’s ruined, and the couple is suing for $3,000, the cost of the item according to the original purchase receipt. The judge heard the claim, heard the defense, did a little checking – and found that the plaintiffs had presented a false receipt to the court. The item had been junk in the first place, and was never worth anything like $3,000.

Why did someone send me this clip? Because the perjuring plaintiffs were Heidi and Mendy, from Brooklyn.


Regrettably, Heidi and Mendy are not unique; they join a Hall of Shame that dedicates a new Jewish wing every other week, and the challenge these embarrassing cases raise in my mind is this: What do we do when our brethren steal? Whether it’s the meat processor turning a blind eye to his company’s improprieties, or the slumlord refusing repairs for his non-Orthodox or non-Jewish tenants, or the Los Angeles businessman snared along with his Jewish embezzling ring, how do we react when they turn to us to provide petitions, bail, or political pressure on their behalf? And how do we relate to them afterward? Do we turn away, do we re-define them as non-Orthodox, non-Jewish? Do we disown them?


This isn’t a new issue. Rav Meir of Lublin, also known as Maharam Lublin, addressed the matter in 16th century Poland in the case of a man who was jailed by the government for an affair with a non-Jewish woman. So did Rav Yair Bachrach, the Chavos Yair, in 17th century Germany in the case of a Jewish thief. So did Rav Yechezkel Katzenellenbogen, the Knesses Yechezkel, in 18th century Germany in the case of a Jew who was an adulterer as well as a thief – this is what we call progress. They were asked whether the Jewish community should intervene on behalf of these criminals – and I would venture to guess that their answer will come as a surprise to many people present this morning.

All of them offered the same response: If we feel that the penalty is excessive, then we are responsible to raise funds and apply pressure to gain the criminal’s release from prison. Far from distancing the villain, we claim him as our own.

But where does this come from?! In a nation whose Abrahamic tradition is founded upon the principles of צדקה ומשפט, righteousness and justice, how can there be any responsibility to, or identification with, a Jew who breaks the law for personal profit, knowingly subjecting himself to well-advertised penalties, desecrating Gd’s Name and placing Jews everywhere in danger of guilt by association?


The answer may lie in the actions of Yehudah, as described in the parshiyyos we read last week and this morning.

At the end of last week’s cliffhanger, the sons of Yaakov were en route north to Canaan with food for their starving families, when they were hailed by the Egyptian viceroy’s agents. The pursuers charged them with theft of the viceroy’s goblet. Bewildered, they denied the accusations. Taking pains to demonstrate their abhorrence for the crime, they spelled out the law-abiding character and personal integrity inherent in the Jewish ideal.

But then וימצא הגביע באמתחת בנימין, the goblet was discovered in Binyamin’s sack. Listen to the words of the Midrash Aggadah, putting us on the scene at that dramatic moment:

כיון שנמצא הגביע, אמרו לו אחיו גנב בר גנבתא, רחל אמך גנבה את התרפים ואתה גנבת את הגביע...

When the goblet was found, Binyamin’s brothers said to him: Thief, son of a thief! Your mother Rachel stole Lavan’s terafim, and you stole the goblet!

The brothers are frantic – we are betrayed by our own! And so Yehudah acknowledges before the viceroy, perhaps bowing his head, surely wringing his hands: מה נאמר, What can we say? מה נדבר, What can we speak? מה נצטדק, How can we justify ourselves? Gd has discovered our guilt, we will all be servants to our master.

And then read Yehudah’s plea at the outset of this morning’s reading – not once does he claim innocence, not once does he challenge the Egyptian sentence. For all of the subtext which Rashi and Rashbam detect in the interstices of Yehudah’s speech, not once is there an allegation of injustice. Yehudah avers that the Hebrew finds dishonesty repugnant beyond measure…

…but then Yehudah offers his own life in place of his brother’s, to gain the freedom of this dishonest thief.

This is not because of Yehudah’s promise to Yaakov to protect his brother; as Rav Dovid Kviat of the Mir Yeshiva notes, Yehudah’s responsibility to Binyamin terminates with the theft of the goblet, that’s not the duty for which Yehudah enlisted. Yehudah protects his brother for a different reason: ישראל אף על פי שחטא ישראל הוא – A Jew who sins, whether against Gd or man, is no less a Jew than any other.


Perhaps this is what inspired the Maharam Lublin, the Knesses Yechezkel, and the Chavos Yair, to rule that we ransom the thieves of our communities in order to rescue them from excessive penalties. We abhor their crimes, and our every word and deed must holler to the heavens and announce to the nations that we reject their base behavior! Just as the world knows that an observant Jew will not step foot in McDonalds, the world must also know that an observant Jew will not engage in shadowy business deals. But we nonetheless stand by the thief's side, to save him from destruction.

A necessary caveat: There are boundaries to our responsibility, and the poskim are careful to delineate them; Parshas Vayyigash is not carte blanche for the villains of Jewish society to sin and then demand limitless bail from our wallets. For example: If criminals endanger the Jewish community, then we are no longer bound to them. And if they act להכעיס, not for personal gain but for the sake of angering Gd, declaring themselves to be Other, then we are no longer bound to them. But barring such drastic conditions, we are very much bound to them. They are our brothers, they are our sisters, and we are theirs.


In Canada, thank Gd, the prospect of torture in prison is not a factor. We need not lobby and petition to avoid a death sentence for a common thief, and so the precedents I cited above are less relevant. But the question of whether to stand by our neighbors who have been indicted, to swallow our distaste and recognize them as lantzmen, is still very much present. What do we do?

To go beyond Yehudah and Binyamin and the authorities I cited earlier, and address this question as well: I would argue, as an extension of what we said above, that we are possessed of a responsibility to claim this criminal as our own, to recognize in him that same spark of Avraham and Sarah which makes us unique, and, ultimately, to bring him back to Torah. For prooftexts, look at our vast literature on kiruv. Kiruv is not limited to people who do not yet keep kosher; kiruv extends to people who do not yet keep yosher.

Reasonable people may disagree with me, of course, but I believe that we perform the mitzvah of הוכיח תוכיח את עמיתך, of rebuke, by drawing people close and helping them change their ways. Not to honor them, certainly, but to help them regain an honorable life.

To be frank: Doing this is icky. I don’t want to hang out with an adulterer, a thief, an embezzler. When I lived in Pennsylvania, I visited Jewish inmates at the local state prison. One of them was guilty of insurance fraud, including defrauding an elderly woman in order to feed his gambling habit. Certainly, I found his crimes repugnant, and I could only wonder what the non-Jewish readers of the newspapers thought when they read of his crimes. But I had to ask myself: If we won’t associate with them, then who will fill that gap? And who will help them achieve that honorable life? Think what we can accomplish, helping these people become whole!

We are summoned to rehabilitate rather than reject. What began with Yehudah’s attempt to ransom Binyamin continues with our efforts to redeem our own brethren. We declare to the world our revulsion at their crimes – and then we take them in, and help them to become sensitive and feel the revulsion as well.


One voice in a Mechilta suggests that Yehudah’s defense of Binyamin is what won the monarchy for his descendants. This is logical; a melech/king is responsible for the welfare of every citizen, however distasteful their behavior. The king cannot turn away from his citizens. Because Yehudah understood this, he was worthy to ascend to the throne.

Gd-willing, when we absorb this lesson, when we do not turn away and disown but instead revile the crime while rehabilitating the criminal, then we will be worthy of seeing the descendants of Yehudah ascend the throne again.

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Notes:
1. I know that Vos iz Neias is running the explanation offered belatedly by Heidi and Mendy. I read it, and am very skeptical.

2. The teshuvos I cited are: Maharam Lublin 15, Chavos Yair 139, Knesses Yechezkel 38. See also Pischei Teshuvah Yoreh Deah 151:1. For a dissenting view, see Yam Shel Shlomo Gittin 4:72. And Chavos Yair has an interesting response to concern for guilt by association.

3. The Midrash Aggadah is Bereishis 44, and the Mechilta is Mechilta d'Rashbi 14:22.

4. Rav Dovid Kviat's observation is in his Succas Dovid to Vayyigash. Apparently, he does not accept the view of the end of the Midrash Aggadah I cited, that Binyamin convinced his brothers that he was innocent.

5. Sanhedrin 44a is the source of ישראל אף על פי שחטא ישראל הוא.

6. I wanted to talk more about the parallels in kiruv for sins against Gd and sins against man, but this would have distracted from the rest of the derashah.

Daf: Sotah 12-14

Sorry to take so long before posting another installment. There is so much to say on these pages, and so little time to type it up. As always, you'll really need a gemara in front of you to see what I am discussing.

12a
See Tosafot Acheirim

Tosafot cheimar suggests that Moshe's boat was camoflagued in the reeds because the tar and pitch linings were on the inside. This is interesting, b/c it magnifies the miracle that Bat Paroh saw the boat at all!

12b
How can Moshe say that the Jewish babies were saved because he was cast into the water – the whole decree to throw the kids in the water was because of him! See Tosafot and Maharsha, who both address the issue.

The question of “How could Moshe get hurt on the water if he will sing to Gd on the water one day” is odd; what is the connection? Especially as this may not be yam suf! (It is reminiscent of a gemara in Taanit, though, regarding a ditch-digger whose daughter fell in a ditch and was protected by his merit.)

How could you have had a 'leap month' in those days? They haven't even learned HaChodesh haZeh Lachem! Reminiscent of Seder Olam that the sod haibbur was passed down from Adam and Chavah.

The issue of nursing from an eater of treif is interesting - see Rav Schachter's noteworthy comment in this issue, cited in my post here.

13a
The gemara here, per Rashi on the 36 crowns, assumes that the two Korachs mentioned in the lineage of Esav in Bereishit 36 are different people – but see Rashi to Bereishit 36:5, where he says that they are the same person.

Did the children of Keturah come for Yaakov’s funeral? Rashi does not think so, but Tosafot Shantz does.

See the Maharsha on the mourning of the horses and donkeys (which, of course, is reminiscent of the city of Nineveh).

I have difficulty understanding why the Gemara here seems to criticize the Jews for being involved in taking the spoils of Egypt, when Berachot 9a, based on דבר נא in Shmot 11, indicates that HaShem had to plead with them to take spoils! (Unless the plea is from before the actual departure, and then they “got into it” afterward, while Moshe was getting Yosef’s body?)

13b
Note that the line קיים זה כל מה שכתוב בזה is the source for burying a Torah scroll with a righteous person.

Interesting transition in the line about Yosef being returned to Shechem. Yosef is “stolen” from Shechem, and returned to Shechem as a “lost object” – removing the human agency and blame from the picture. And is he Yaakov’s lost object?

Of course, the Torah seems to indicate that Yosef was removed from Dotan, not Shechem, but see Rashi here.

The gemara here seems to pin the death of Er and Onan on Yehudah, instead of on their own famous sins. Perhaps it’s that Yehudah’s problem made them vulnerable to punishment?

Interesting: Yaakov’s degradation comes from others (who call him Yosef’s servant), but Yosef’s degradation, which is a punishment of sorts for him, comes from himself (when he calls himself ‘bones’). Recall the gemara in Taanit regarding placing ash on the heads of the sages on a public fast – degradation is worse when it comes from others.

Note that although Moshe dies at 120, that is not a source for saying that 120 is a maximum on people’s lives. I hope to post on this issue soon, but for now see Tosafot Bava Batra 113a ומטו.

14a
Rashi renders גסטרא here as a ruler, but note the usual translation of a split or broken receptacle.

Regarding the Bach’s note א, recall that there is a midrash in which Moshe does attempt to bring the Jews back to Israel after their exile.

We see here the idea of a grave being a significant place for prayer.

Here our patriarchs are called עצומים, mighty ones; this is parallel to the term איתנים used for them in the gemara toward the beginning of Rosh HaShanah on ירח האיתנים.

Tosafot כדי on “דורשין טעמא דקרא” makes the important distinction between analyzing the deeper meaning of pesukim for ethical lessons and analyzing the deeper meaning of pesukim for lessons which may affect the way we fulfill a mitzvah. See also Hirsch’s introduction to Horeb.

14b
Regarding the “face of the altar” see Tosafot Shantz as well as Rashi Zevachim 62a.

Daf: Sotah 10-11

There is so much to see and say here, and no time to write it all down in a clear form. Here is some of it, anyway:

10b
On the line, “Better to throw one’s self into an oven than to embarrass another person publicly,” Rashi takes our gemara simply: We see that one should let himself be put in an oven rather than embarrass someone else, since Tamar was willing to suffer this fate. Tosafos in Bava Metzia 59a points out that this is seen in the Torah’s pasuk itself, in which the word מוצאת does not have any vowels on the א, so that the word is actually מוצת, to be kindled (a la ויצת אש בציון – Eichah 4).

The gemara notes the recurrence of הכר נא in the book of Bereishit linking the sale of Yosef with Yehudah/Tamar, but there are many more borrowed phrases and images unifying Bereishit (as well as the Torah itself), and giving the lie to the Documentary Hypothesis. A few quick examples: The young goats (Yaakov’s meal for Yitzchak, the goat’s blood for Yosef’s tunic, Tamar’s fee), the link of עלי קללתך and עלי היו כלנה, the numerous references to walking in the דרך ה', and the cross-biblical theme of צדקה ומשפט which carries us from Bereishit 18:19 all the way through Devarim 33:21 and then into the neviim.

The gemara talks about Yehudah being named for his future admission/הודאה, but the Torah gives a reason for his name – it’s הפעם אודה את ה', Leah’s thanks to Gd! Maharsha says she would have named him אודה under her original reason; HaShem inspired her to call him יהודה.

I am puzzled by the gemara’s declaration that Yehudah sanctified the Name of HaShem by publicly admitting his wrong; we are taught אשרי נשוי פשע כסוי חטאה (and see the Rambam in the beginning of Hilchot Teshuvah on this point) that one should not divulge private sin to the masses, lest it actually cause a desecration and desensitization!

11a
See the Maharsha on the gemara's analysis of the pasuk describing Miriam's wait for Moshe.

Why do we bring a pasuk from Yeshayah מי נח זאת לי as proof that won’t destroy the world with water, instead of bringing the post-Flood biblical pledge, לא אוסיף להכות את כל חי?! Perhaps because that earlier pasuk isn't water-specific?

The gemara here regarding Yisro's reward for refusing to participate in Paroh’s persecution indicates that Yisro's descendants, or at least some of them, did become Jewish. (See our discussion on Yael.) But then why did they live next to Amalek, per Shemuel I on Shaul’s war with Amalek?

Some have the minhag of blowing a Teruah Gedolah at the end of Yom Kippur. This mirrors Rashi here, that the Jews heard a Teruah at Har Sinai, since the shofar blast at the end of the Revelation at Har Sinai (במשוך היובל המה יעלו בהר) is one of the sources for the shofar blast at the end of Yom Kippur.

Rashi's two approaches to translating the gemara on ערי מסכנות take the Gemara’s line in opposite directions – one is that it's about the building in Egypt, the other is that it's about construction in general.

On “resembling thorns in their eyes,” the Maharsha's approach (the Egyptians resembled thorns in their own eyes) seems to fit the wording more accurately than Rashi (the Egyptians felt punctured by thorns).

11b
The pasuk brought here, תחת התפוח עוררתיך שמה חבלתך אמך שמה חבלה יולדתך, is one source for the myth that the fruit in the garden was the apple, from a mis-reading of the Hebrew root ח-ב-ל as corruption – “Under the apple tree, your mother corrupted you.” It should be read like חבלי לידה, “your mother birthed you.” (There is also a second source, the Latin “mal” which is associated with the apple/malus.)

The Maharsha explains why I might be more or less likely to identify Miriam or Elisheva as the second of the meyaldot.

The Gemara’s derash readings of חיות depend on reading it with a patach under the ח, instead of the actual kamatz.

The gemara that says Miriam gave birth to Chur after her illness must not be referring to her illness with tzaraat, but rather to a childhood illness, for Chur was dead (per midrash) by the time she experienced her tzaraat. This also fits 12a; see Rashi on 12a עזובה.

Daf: Sotah 7b-9 - Yehudah and Tamar, Laws and Logic, Bundles of Mitzvos and the Innocent Sotah

[Note: This week's Haveil Havalim is here.]

As always: Easier to understand this with the gemara in front of you. And see Rashi. And Tosafot. And the Maharsha.

7b
The gemara suggests that Yehudah's admission of his involvement with Tamar led to Reuven's admission of his error with Bilhah.
The Bach (note א) points out the problem put forth by Tosafot Bava Kama 92: The midrash says Reuven returned to Yosef's pit (and found Yosef had been sold) after his penance for what happened with Bilhah – but the Torah's account of Yehudah/Tamar is presented only after the sale of Yosef!
We might answer this based on the contention of Ibn Ezra (Bereishit 38:1) that the incident with Tamar happened long before the sale of Yosef. Rashi on the chumash seems to say the same.
However, this approach does run counter to the gemara's view that the whole Yehudah/Tamar story occurred during the 20 years from the sale of Yosef through the time when the brothers descended to Egypt for food.

On the bottom of the page, Abbaye seeks to solve a problem by emending a text, or having us read it non-literally – and Rava opposes his approach on the grounds of the existing text. The same will happen again on 8b and on 11a.

8a
R' Shimon's controversial position of dorshin taama d'kra, that we may analyze laws for their underlying logic and reasons, and then use that logical analysis to alter the way we apply the mitzvah, is invoked here. For more on this see the main discussion in Bava Metzia 115a on taking collateral from a wealthy widow. See also Tosafot ahead on 14a “kedei.”

The issue of ein osin mitzvot chavilot chavilot is problematic; it seems to militate against using a single object for multiple mitzvot, but we certainly do that, as in the case of using one cup of wine for kiddush and havdalah when Shabbos leads into Yom Tov.
It appears, as noted by Rashi here, that the main issue is preventing the impression that the mitzvah is burdensome.

Further on the same topic, Tosafot והא objects that our gemara is discussing biblical verses and principles, and the idea of chavilot chavilot is d'rabbanan and should not be invoked. Perhaps we could answer that the gemara's question was actually not from that braita about chavilot/chavilot, but rather was against that braita, from the אותה source in the biblical sentence? Admittedly, though, this would be tough to fit into the words of our gemara.

Rabbah says we worry that if the sotah appears less-than-garbed in court and emerges innocent, then those who saw her in her less-than-garbed state will be drawn after her. But if she is innocent, then why don't we worry about embarrassing her?! I think this goes back to the point we made at the start of Sotah - that she is not innocent, for we know that she was alone with another man. The only question is whether that resulted in actual adultery.

Rava comments that men are visually stimulated, and less likely to be drawn by that which they have imagined but not seen. Aside from the generally interesting character of this comment, it has interesting ramifications for the issue of kol isha with a radio or taped voice.

The gemara says that women are “obligated” to come see the Sotah, but note the Rambam's formulation as to who must come see.

It's interesting that our mishnah and Rava use the same pasuk, but our mishnah concludes “permitted” and Rava concludes “obligated.”

9a
See Tosafot Manimin on the status of national identity (Amon, Moav, Egypt) today.

9b
The measure-for-measure with the serpent of Eden is less precise than with others in this gemara – it's that he tried to take more than he had, and so he lost even what he had.
Note: The snake thought he could get Chavah for himself because he thought the command about the fruit was just for Adam, so that she would eat and survive, and Adam would eat and die.

Daf: Sotah 6-7

There is a ton here on these pages; see Rashi and Maharsha on pretty much everything.

In my notes here, see especially the note on how we respond to suffering, the significance of clothing color, and the stories of Reuven and Yehudah. As always, having a gemara with you will help.

6a
Abayye is seen responding to Rava here, which is unusual. In general our edition rejects having Abayye, the mentor, question Rava, the student, and Rava’s name רבא is consequently changed frequently to Rabbah רבה – since Rabbah was Abayye’s mentor.

See Tosafot אם; this is an important point regarding the way we handle problems in life. Rather than observe idiosyncratic situations and ask ourselves why they are happening, we tend to explain away idiosyncrasies with pat answers, ignoring warning signals.

6b
It’s odd, to me, that we would destroy a valid korban due to a rabbinic concern. I recall that in Zevachim we specifically say not to do that?

The word כפרה (kapparah) is not specific to atonement for sin; Rashi notes that here, on the gemara’s use of כיפרה.

7a
Rashi’s version of a technical התראה warning, in "דידעי", does not fit the normal format of התראה.

In the first mishnah: If they are going to Yerushalayim anyway, why does the local court get involved at all? Just to provide escorts?! Perhaps this is why the Rambam writes (Hilchot Sotah 3:1 – note that this is mislabeled in the עין משפט on the daf) that the local hears and evaluates the testimony before sending them on.

The black clothing as a sign of mourning is interesting; see Pesachim 109a on colored clothing being joyous, and see Shabbos 114a especially, and see Yoma 19a (Kohanim ineligible for wearing black), Bava Metzia 59b (black for a solemn, sad occasion), Moed Katan 17a (black clothes for the person who wants to sin), and Maharsha to Sotah 22b (black clothes as a sign of mourning), Maharsha to Kiddushin 40a (black clothes against the yetzer hara), and more. Of course, also see Yeshayah 1:18 and Kohelet 9:8 on white and innocence and joy, and Shulchan Orach Chaim 610:4 on white clothing for Yom Kippur.


7b
See the Rambam on the mishnah regarding לבה גס בה – the concern is that being with familiar people bucks up one’s spirit.

What was Yehudah’s sin? Being with a zonah was permitted, and punishing Tamar for apparent extramarital involvement (because the גאולה bond to Shelah and his family was quasi-marital) was legitimate! Note that Rashi and Ibn Ezra to Bereishit 38 both say the embarrassment for Yehudah actually came from giving over such expensive and personal items for the sake of a liaison.

How could we tell her Reuven sinned, of the gemara in Shabbos says explicitly that Reuven did not sin? Rashi here seems to say it’s just moving the bed that is the sin. Rama (in his Responsum 11) has a different view, though – he says we lie about Reuven, giving him a bad reputation, for the sake of restroing shalom in general and avoiding erasing Gd’s Name.

See Rashi on להם לבדם נתנה הארץ.

See Rashi vs Tosafot on לא עבר זר

The idea of reward for Teshuvah fits nicely with the gemara in Yoma on proper teshuvah converting sins to זכויות, merits.

Rashi gives you the very interesting backstory on why Yehudah’s bones rolled in his casket.

The gemara’s idea of the person feeling posthumous pain when his body is harmed is reminiscent of the big discussion in Berachot 18b on whether a person experiences pain while the body deteriorates.