Rav Kook is big on the idea (based on Yoma 86) that if a person sins, and then that sin motivates him to teshuvah and growth, then the sin is shown to have been positive. This is part of a worldview which sees everything in our universe as possessing some positive aspect and redeemable character.
Lately, I’ve been contemplating the relationship between this outlook and the concept of מצוה הבאה בעבירה (mitzvah haba’ah ba’aveirah), the rule that a mitzvah enabled by a sin is not a mitzvah. For example, the gemara (Succah 29b-30a) rules that one may not use a stolen lulav on Succos, even after the original owner has abandoned hope of claiming it, because he possesses it only as a result of sin.
The disqualification of מצוה הבאה בעבירה would seem to argue that evil is not redeemable; once an evil has been committed, it and its product are forever corrupt.
However, there are several different formulations of this מצוה הבאה בעבירה principle and its application, because the rule does not seem to be applied uniformly in the Talmud and halachah. Examples of its uneven application include:
• A stolen succah may not be used, but because of a sentence in the Torah rather than because of מצוה הבאה בעבירה (Succah 9a);
• A lulav from a tree that has been worshipped as an idol may be used (Succah 31b);
• One may not remove the berries from a hadas on Yom Tov, because that makes the hadas eligible for use – but if one did so, one may then use the hadas for its mitzvah (Succah 32b, as resolved in Rambam Hilchot Lulav 8:5);
• One may fulfill the mitzvah of procreation by producing a mamzer, at least according to some authorities (Yevamot 22a; Rama Even haEzer 1:6; but note apparent dissension in other authorities);
• Aravah branches picked by a non-Jew on Shabbat for a Jew may be used (Mordechai Succah 747).
1. Tosafot (Succah 30a) offers one formulation: A mitzvah may use an object with which sin has taken place, like a lulav from a tree that has been worshipped. The only limit is that the mitzvah may not be enabled by the sin.
This seems logical, but aside from flying in the face of Rav Kook’s optimistic view that sin enables good when it promotes teshuvah, it also flies in the face of the acceptable hadas which was de-berried on Yom Tov.
2. Shaar haMelech (to Hilchot Lulav 8:5) offers a second formulation: A mitzvah may be enabled by an aveirah. The only limitation is that the same action cannot involve both mitzvah and aveirah.
So a previously de-berried hadas, or a previously-worshipped lulav, or an aravah picked on Shabbos, is fine. On the other hand, one may not use a stolen lulav, since the act of using it is an act of failing to return it to its rightful owner.
This also seems logical, and it mirrors the concept of אין קטיגור נעשה סניגור, that the same entity [or, in this case, action] cannot be both agent of sin and agent of merit [eg gold from the Golden Calf cannot be used for atonement in the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur].
To put this into Rav Kook's framework: Evil can be redeemed, but first one must abandon the evil.
3. The Yalkut haGershuni (cited in Sdei Chemed מ:עז:כו) suggests a third formulation: Evil cannot be used for a mitzvah because disobeying Gd contradicts the obedience of mitzvot. However, where the Torah defines a mitzvah purpose beyond obedience, and that purpose is not contradicted by the evil, then the product of that evil may be used for the mitzvah.
So a stolen lulav may not be used for Succot, because the nature of the mitzvah of picking up the Arba Minim is to demonstrate loyalty to Gd, and one who is loyal to Gd would not steal.
On the other hand, a stolen succah would not run afoul of מצוה הבאה בעבירה, since the Torah specifies that we sit in the Succah to remember the Divine protection in the desert. Stealing does not contradict remembering Gd’s protection in the desert.
Similarly, one who ate chametz on the afternoon before Pesach broke the law, but also fulfilled the mitzvah of eliminating chametz. The Torah’s goal is to eliminate chametz, and the fact that he ate chametz does not contradict the Torah’s defined good.
I'm not sure how to apply this to Rav Kook. To some extent I feel that sin automatically contradicts teshuvah - the goal of teshuvah is to draw close to Gd, and sin takes us in the opposite direction. But I'm not sure.
This idea is fraught with problems both technical (the disqualification of stolen matzah) and ethical (are we to read the Divine mind regarding its purposes?), but it’s still interesting.
The bottom line: Unless we adopt Shaar haMelech's formulation, the מצוה הבאה בעבירה disqualification seems to be a real challenge to Rav Kook’s rosy view of teshuvah.
Showing posts with label Judaism: Mitzvot and Obligations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judaism: Mitzvot and Obligations. Show all posts
Sunday, September 26, 2010
Thursday, May 22, 2008
Daf: Sotah 2-3
First: I am so glad to have Rashi back.
Second: I'm not going to note every time Maharsha has something to say in his חידושי אגדות, but it's a good idea to make it a habit of reading his notes for Sotah. He has a ton to say on these דברי אגדה.
As always, these notes will make a lot more sense if you have a gemara in front of you. The issues of shidduchim/bashert, as well as the meaning of קנאה, are interesting.
2a
Tosafot Shantz challenges the gemara’s interpretation of המקנא as בדיעבד language, based on other cases of similar language in the gemara, which is not read as בדיעבד. He offers two approaches: (1) The assumption here is that this is בדיעבד because there is logical reason to think it ought to be בדיעבד, and (2) The gemara asks the question only where it has an answer available.
See the Bach, note ה, on the word בכושרות
The comparison of shidduchim to Yam Suf is fascinating; see the discussion in Tosafot Shantz. In particular, his explanation addresses the question that splitting the Yam Suf was not at all קשה (difficult) for Gd in the first place!
Tosafot הא points out that in Moed Katan 18b we say that one may do kiddushin on Chol haMoed, lest someone else beat him to it, and the gemara there asks that if all is bashert, one shouldn’t have any such concern. Tosafot asks why the answer there isn’t simply that the gemara there is talking about a second marriage. However, I am not clear on why any of this is a problem – HaShem leaves us room to make mistakes, and so a person might yet miss out on his bashert! Tosafot appears not to agree with this idea.
2b
If the husband were believed on his own say-so to say he did קינוי, he could always claim falsely that he had done קינוי!
Rashi איכא עיקר is very important – he indicates that legitimate קינוי is not done in rage, but rather is a rational declaration.
Rashi also notes that קנאה means anger here. It also fits better than “jealousy” when we see terms like א—ל קנא. (HaShem doesn’t get angry, of course, but He shows signs of anger.)
I didn’t do a CD-ROM search, but I believe it’s usually רב יימר בר שלמיא, not רב יימר בר ר' שלמיא.
Rav Yeimar’s approach explaining קינוי as something which causes strife between her and others fits Nedarim 83a-b in which we say that a man is not able to prohibit his wife from being involved with burying others, because it will cause her pain. (Note that in Nedarim we see other reasons it will cause her pain.)
3a
Rashash says that when Reish Lakish says a person won’t sin unless gripped by a spirit of foolishness (רוח שטות), he is tying that into קינוי, for which the Torah says ועבר עליו רוח קנאה. This fits the view that a husband is not allowed to do קינוי.
The rendering of ועבר as “before” calls to mind the discussions of עבר meaning “before” regarding עובר לעשייתן.
R’ Akiva’s statement that a kohen is obligated to become tamei to bury his wife fits the Rambam, who explains the permission to become tamei for her as an issue of מת מצוה, which is obligatory.
Tosafot לה notes a difference between חובה and מצוה, in that if it’s only a mitzvah, one who is engaged in another mitzvah may be exempt from this one. If it’s a chovah (requirement), though, then he is obligated to drop everything and do this one. This has interesting ramifications for the way the gemara and poskim have classically viewed Shabbat candles as a חובה, over and above its status as a מצוה of honoring Shabbat. (See Teshuvot Rav Natronai Gaon 66, for example, as well as the gemara in the second perek of Shabbos on נר ביתו overriding other mitzvot.)
3b
Tosafot למשרי points out the origin for following patrilineal descent among people who are not Jewish.
Second: I'm not going to note every time Maharsha has something to say in his חידושי אגדות, but it's a good idea to make it a habit of reading his notes for Sotah. He has a ton to say on these דברי אגדה.
As always, these notes will make a lot more sense if you have a gemara in front of you. The issues of shidduchim/bashert, as well as the meaning of קנאה, are interesting.
2a
Tosafot Shantz challenges the gemara’s interpretation of המקנא as בדיעבד language, based on other cases of similar language in the gemara, which is not read as בדיעבד. He offers two approaches: (1) The assumption here is that this is בדיעבד because there is logical reason to think it ought to be בדיעבד, and (2) The gemara asks the question only where it has an answer available.
See the Bach, note ה, on the word בכושרות
The comparison of shidduchim to Yam Suf is fascinating; see the discussion in Tosafot Shantz. In particular, his explanation addresses the question that splitting the Yam Suf was not at all קשה (difficult) for Gd in the first place!
Tosafot הא points out that in Moed Katan 18b we say that one may do kiddushin on Chol haMoed, lest someone else beat him to it, and the gemara there asks that if all is bashert, one shouldn’t have any such concern. Tosafot asks why the answer there isn’t simply that the gemara there is talking about a second marriage. However, I am not clear on why any of this is a problem – HaShem leaves us room to make mistakes, and so a person might yet miss out on his bashert! Tosafot appears not to agree with this idea.
2b
If the husband were believed on his own say-so to say he did קינוי, he could always claim falsely that he had done קינוי!
Rashi איכא עיקר is very important – he indicates that legitimate קינוי is not done in rage, but rather is a rational declaration.
Rashi also notes that קנאה means anger here. It also fits better than “jealousy” when we see terms like א—ל קנא. (HaShem doesn’t get angry, of course, but He shows signs of anger.)
I didn’t do a CD-ROM search, but I believe it’s usually רב יימר בר שלמיא, not רב יימר בר ר' שלמיא.
Rav Yeimar’s approach explaining קינוי as something which causes strife between her and others fits Nedarim 83a-b in which we say that a man is not able to prohibit his wife from being involved with burying others, because it will cause her pain. (Note that in Nedarim we see other reasons it will cause her pain.)
3a
Rashash says that when Reish Lakish says a person won’t sin unless gripped by a spirit of foolishness (רוח שטות), he is tying that into קינוי, for which the Torah says ועבר עליו רוח קנאה. This fits the view that a husband is not allowed to do קינוי.
The rendering of ועבר as “before” calls to mind the discussions of עבר meaning “before” regarding עובר לעשייתן.
R’ Akiva’s statement that a kohen is obligated to become tamei to bury his wife fits the Rambam, who explains the permission to become tamei for her as an issue of מת מצוה, which is obligatory.
Tosafot לה notes a difference between חובה and מצוה, in that if it’s only a mitzvah, one who is engaged in another mitzvah may be exempt from this one. If it’s a chovah (requirement), though, then he is obligated to drop everything and do this one. This has interesting ramifications for the way the gemara and poskim have classically viewed Shabbat candles as a חובה, over and above its status as a מצוה of honoring Shabbat. (See Teshuvot Rav Natronai Gaon 66, for example, as well as the gemara in the second perek of Shabbos on נר ביתו overriding other mitzvot.)
3b
Tosafot למשרי points out the origin for following patrilineal descent among people who are not Jewish.
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