I am my money

[For those who came looking for my post from last night: Sorry, but I took it down. The post was too simplistic for the idea I wanted to convey. Perhaps I will re-visit the topic at some point.]

The gemara [Gittin 57a] tells of an anonymous matron from the house of Boethus [see Marta bat Baytus here] who lived during the Roman siege of Yerushalayim. She sent her servant to the market for fine flour, but it was sold out before he arrived. He was not a terribly independent thinker, and he returned home for guidance on purchasing flour of a poorer quality. The matron sent him back for the cheaper flour, but, once again, it was sold out by the time he arrived. Again, he returned home for guidance.

This scene went through four iterations, the servant going for four different types of flour and, each time, returning empty-handed. [Maharsha suggests a link to the four types of flour-offerings brought in the beit hamikdash.]

Finally, the matron goes out to the streets herself, experiences something that is a shock to her pampered system (see the gemara there), and dies. During her pre-death shock, she throws her gold and silver into the streets, declaring, “What use is this to me?”

That story has always bothered me:

• First, was this servant truly so dull-witted that he didn’t realize he should purchase the best remaining flour, rather than go home to consult?

• And second, while the emotional aspect of the matron throwing her money into the street is clear, is there a deeper message? The gemara there connects it to Yechezkel's prediction [Yechezkel 7] that the Jews would throw their gold and silver into the streets; perhaps there is a deeper message involved?

Two stories of my own:

• I was recently cheated of some funds. I got over the loss quickly, but I remained troubled by what this told me about the person's personality.

• A while back, someone offered me money as a gift, for something I had done. I declined to take it for myself, and this person was upset.

These events, and similar ones, set me thinking about what money means to us, beyond the ability to purchase our (perceived) needs.

It seems to me that money is often our interface with the world; whether in coins or bills or barter, it is the “currency” of our relationships:

• What we do with money displays our values;
• The way we share or use our money shapes our relationships;
• Our financial decisions are key ways we exercise control over our world;
• Our spending shapes our commitments to others;
• And so on.

There is much more to say here, many sources could be invoked, etc., but it’s a blog post, not a derashah. [No derashah to write this week! What an odd feeling.] Bottom line: Our use of money, like our facial expression or our speech, is a key interface between us and the world, a statement of our identity.

This may be Yechezkel's message of people casting money into the streets; more than a statement that money is worthless during a famine, it’s a statement that their entire persons are gone, their identity is gone.

And perhaps that’s why the matron’s servant couldn’t act on his own: He feared misrepresenting his boss in public, lest her man be seen purchasing sub-quality produce.

Of course, since this week is Parshat Reeh, the message does tie into tzedakah as presented in Devarim 15:7-11. If our spending is an expression of our identity, then surely tzedakah is a way for us to express that finest element of our personalities…

Okay, fill in your own derashah and closer here; I told you, this is a blog post, not a derashah.

Daf: Gittin 73-78 – Divorce psychology

Avoiding preparing a derashah for Shabbos Haazinu, I will instead catch up a little more in these notes on Daf Yomi. There isn’t much here for the non-Daf reader, except perhaps for the note on Gittin 74a on the Talmud’s view of the psychology of divorce. If you are looking for more colorful material, may I suggest my post below on the Unity Kollel concept – and why I think we can already do this, in Israel.

Gittin 73b
The gemara gives examples of scenes one might witness, in which we would or wouldn’t be concerned that there was inappropriate sexual conduct. One of the cases is that we saw her “sleeping by the legs of his bed.” One of my Daffies noted the similarity to Ruth 3:14, where we also say nothing inappropriate happened.

Note that Abbaye here opposes changing editions in order to solve a problem. Elsewhere Abbaye is the one who offers an answer by changing an edition, and someone else (generally Rava) calls him on it.


Gittin 74a
Talmudic Psychology of Divorce: Rashi indicates here (אבל גט), based on the gemara, that in a normal case of divorce the husband does not wish to divorce his wife, but is compelled to do so. On the other hand, Rashi on Gitin 74b (דלצעורה איכוון) indicates that divorce arises from enmity.


Gittin 74b
This gemara’s account of Hillel’s enactment shows that the law of בתי ערי חומה (in which houses in Israeli walled cities may be reclaimed by their sellers, unilaterally, within a year of sale, by refunding the purchase price) was followed in the second Beit haMikdash. This is one of the proofs brought by Tosafot (בזמן) on Gittin 36a to show that all of the Yovel-related laws were practiced during the second Beit haMikdash. Ramban there, though, says it was practiced as a rabbinic law, not a biblical law. One practical ramification of this disagreement is in the question of how Prozbul works.


Gittin 75b
The gemara says Rav Huna quoted Rav, which is fine, but in the margin that is amended to Rav Huna quoting Rebbe. If so, I believe it should say משום רבי, not אמר רבי, since Rav Huna would not have met Rebbe.

The gemara presents an apparent conflict between our mishnah and a braita. Our mishnah says that if a woman’s get is conditional upon nursing a child, she must nurse the child for two years (the talmudic norm, per a gemara in Ketuvot). A braita, though, says she must only do it for a day in order to fulfill her condition.
Rava says there is no conflict – the braita is where no time was specified, the mishnah is where he specified two years. But I am confused: If such is the case, why would we need our mishnah? פשיטא, it would be obvious that two years would be the requirement!


Gittin 76a
One view in the gemara says that since the Torah goes out of its way to show both positive and negative language being used in many instances of contract conditions (such as regarding Reuven/Gad with Moshe, and the Sotah’s condition), that proves that this excessive language is not really needed for normal contracts. Had the Torah only stated it in one case, I would have said that the Torah meant for me to expand automatically to all other cases.
I am bothered by this proof – after all, some of the cited cases are simply citations of actual language, such as Avraham’s contract with Eliezer. Should the Torah have altered his language?


Gittin 77b
About ten lines up from the bottom, I think the word should be קיימה rather than קיימא – it is describing a woman standing in a yard.


Gittin 78a
Tosafot אינו is interesting.

Daf: Gittin 65-70 – Demonology, Rabbi Akiva, Talmudic medicine, More Demonology

Another installment of notes on Daf Yomi, falling farther and farther (further and further?) behind… If this isn’t your thing, check back later; I expect to post my thoughts on an interesting Unity Kollel concept.

Gittin 65b
The mishnah said that if a woman who is married to a kohen tells someone, “Receive my get in Location X,” she may eat terumah, as a fully married woman, until her agent arrives in Location X. In discussing the case, the gemara asks what would happen if the agent received the get in some other location, and ends up discussing a case in which she tells her agent, “Receive the get wherever you can, but it won’t be a get until you arrive in Location X.” This is problematic, though – for we require a specific act of transfer to validate the get, and the transfer into her possession doesn’t take place in Location X!
Tosafot גיטא suggests the somewhat convoluted explanation that she told her agent to tell the husband to appoint him as a delivery agent for the husband until he arrives in Location X, and then in Location X he will become the wife’s receiving agent. Alternatively, he acts as a receiving agent for an extended act of receiving, through the duration of that trip to Location X.


Gittin 66a
How are we to understand the demonology in the gemara's question here (“Should I be concerned that the voice in the pit saying ‘Divorce my wife for me’ is that of a demon?”), affecting this most practical area of law? Theoretically one could understand it as a matter of hallucination, and the gemara’s concern is that the passerby hallucinates seeing an outline in a pit and imagines hearing voices. However, this is hard to fit into the general framework of talmudic demonology.


Gittin 66b
Presumably, in the middle of the page, it should be משום רבי and not אמר רבי – Shemuel did not study under Rebbe, but could have cited things he learned in Rebbe’s name.


Gittin 67a
The gemara comments that Rabbi Akiva was like an אוצר בלום, a storehouse in which all items are stored in proper compartments (see Rashi on אוצר בלום). Rashi notes the division of R’ Akiva’s learning into the different bodies of midrash: Sifri, Sifra, etc.
It is worth noting that Rabbi Akiva’s students (the latter set, after the plague) ended up being the ones to record these bodies of midrash. There are a few different versions of the list of R’ Akiva’s students, but all versions include at least some of the names listed in Sanhedrin 86 as editors of those bodies of midrash: Rabbi Meir (teacher of Rebbe who edited the mishnah, and author of unattributed mishnayot), Rabbi Shimon (editor of Sifri), Rabbi Yehudah (editor of Sifra), Rabbi Nechemyah (editor of Tosefta) and Rabbi Yosi (editor of Seder Olam).


Gittin 67b
The gemara now begins a long record of medicines and therapies. Note Rav Hai Gaon’s teshuvah to students who wanted to implement these medicines; he strongly forbade it, saying that the sages were recording the medicine of their day, and it should not be used. I could discuss this much more, but some other time.

Some of the medicines and therapies we see here look very odd to us, but recall the gemara in Shabbat, regarding amulets: They only trusted treatments which they had seen work three times in a row, without an intervening failure. They were using classic empirical methods.


Gittin 68a
Here we get into some serious demonology. Note that Rav Hai Gaon - in a teshuvah – attributes talmudic demonology, which is more prevalent in the Babylonian Talmud than in the Talmud Yerushalmi, to influence of other cultures. He explains its relative sparseness in Yerushalmi as a result of being farther from Persian society.

Tosafot וכתיב notes that we have a speaker in the day of Shlomo haMelech quoting a pasuk which won’t appear for centuries, until the time of Hosheia! But he explains that the concept of the pasuk was knownlong before the prophecy in which it was recorded.

Gittin 70b
Tosafot וניחוש at the bottom of the page clearly indicates that our assumption, in handling agunah cases, must be on the side that will result in freeing an agunah. Note that he takes Rashi's definition of "agunah," that the husband is known and present but is not living with her in the manner of husband and wife (over Rashba's explanation that an agunah is a woman who is unsure whether or not she is married).

Daf: Gittin 61-64 – Tzedakah for all human beings, Halachic deception, Feed animals first

[Haveil Havalim is here...]

This is a feeble attempt to sort of catch up with my notes a little bit, in the middle of Yamim Noraim when I ought to be writing my Shabbos Shuvah derashah. If you’re not into the notes on the Daf, feel free to scroll down for other material, perhaps to speeches for Day 1 (Risk-taking) and Day 2 (Depression) of Rosh HaShanah. I won’t be offended.

Gittin 61a
The gemara says that there is a debate regarding the ownership of wild creatures caught in a trap which does not have a receptacle component, but I am not clear on why this is a debate. In the mishnah in Rosh HaShanah and Sanhedrin regarding disqualifying people from testimony for acts which are classified rabbinically as theft, we include people who lure birds from others’ dovecotes, even those the dovecotes do not hold the birds in receptacles.

In the story of Rav Kahana taking someone’s dates, he had the halachic status of a pauper because he was traveling on the road, and so he was entitled to them.

See Tosafot שדי אופיי, who disagrees with Rashi as to what Rav Kahana was doing to get the dates.

The gemara here approves of providing tzedakah for non-Jewish needy people when we provide it for Jewish needy people. Note that this does not qualify, though, for the maaser kesafim custom of giving 1/10. This is because we are dealing with two different practices here: Tzedakah obligates me to give to a needy person I see. Maaser Kesafim is a separate custom to separate 1/10 and find someone who needs it. (There are views that MK is more than a minhag, but I find the minhag explanation most compelling. See Prof. Cyril Domb’s excellent selection of resources on the topic in his book Maaser Kesafim.)


Gittin 61b
Note that Abayye here disagrees with Rava, but answers a challenge to Rava's view on his behalf.


Gittin 62a
The gemara here recommends that we tell an am ha’aretz that by touching dough he will return it to its untithed state, because we know he doesn’t take impurity seriously but he does take tithes seriously.
This idea of lying for halachic gain bothers me a great deal, especially when Tosafot שלמא further down the page says that one may not pretend to greet someone warmly when you are really greeting a third party, lest you be guilty of deception!

The gemara here notes that one should feed his animals before eating personally, from the order of HaShem’s promise that if you will follow the mitzvot, Hashem will give grass for your animals, and you will eat and be full. Note, though, that regarding drinking we say that people should drink first, since Rivkah gives water to Eliezer first, and only afterward to his camels.


Gittin 63b
In the middle of the page: I believe that the word should be ליישה rather than לישא. It’s a feminine verb for “kneading.”


Gittin 64a
We say here that if a man sends a proxy to betrothe an unspecified woman, and the proxy dies without informing him whom he betrothed (if any), then the man may not wed, lest he accidentally wed a relative of his betrothed. This is often cited as an explanation for how Lavan wished to destroy “everything,” as alleged in the Haggadah – since he and Betuel plotted to kill Eliezer, with the result that Yitzchak would now not have been able to wed. However, see my notes here explaining why this is not a concern, using Tosafot from Nazir 12a.


Gittin 64b
The gemara here says that the sages empowered an underage shifchah to acquire the meal of שיתופי מבואות on behalf of others, even though she is underage, since the entire construct is rabbinic. But I don’t understand – once they felt free to expand to an underage shifchah, why didn’t they also permit one’s underage children?
Perhaps it’s because then you have two problems – the fact that they are underage, and the fact that it isn’t actually a transaction, where they live in the parents’ home. (But then what if they live independently, and don’t depend on the parents’ table?)

Daf: Gittin 58-60 – The captive R’ Yishmael ben Elisa, ransoming captives, Recording Spoken Torah

Still trying to catch up on my Daf notes. It should be easier as we conclude the Tisha b'Av passages and move into more law-oriented material... For those who are looking for other material, jump down to read about my neurotic dream, or go here to read my rejection of the tyranny of 120.

Gittin 58a
I wonder if the 40 Seah and 9 Kav reference, regarding the quantity of tefillin of the Betar victims, is connected to the purification that comes from immersing in 40 Seah or, in certain cases, standing beneath a flow of 9 Kav of water.

R’ Yehoshua ben Chananiah is the one to encounter a Jewish prisoner in Rome because he was involved with the Roman aristocracy in general, as we see in many places in the gemara.

On the imprisoned child’s “ordered hair קווצותיו תלתלים,” see Nazir 4b on the righteous Nazir, who has the same description.

The imprisoned child, a young R’ Yishmael ben Elisha, completes the pasuk begun by R’ Yehoshua ben Chananiah. R’ Yehoshua ben Chananiah is impressed, and he declares that he Is certain this child is providing/will provide halachic rulings for Israel.
One standard explanation is that he is impressed by the child’s knowledge, as well as his acceptance of Divine judgment (as expressed in the pasuk he quoted).
However, note that in a similar passage in Nazir 29b with R’ Chanina, the child actually is offering a ruling with his statement, now. The same could be true here – perhaps the future R’ Yishmael ben Elisha is “providing a ruling” by completing the pasuk, reminding R’ Yehoshua ben Chananiah that one may not cite only half a pasuk.

Note that there are at least 2, and possibly 3, sages named R’ Yishmael ben Elisha, like this child in the story. See Tosafot Yevamot 104a אמר.

See Tosafot כל ממון on the problem of ransoming captives for an astronomical amount of money, and see my comments on another Tosafot here. Our Tosafot adds a justification to the three items already on the list of justifications in that other Tosafot: A captive whose life is in danger.


Gittin 59a
See Tosafot דכולהו on why Rebbe did not vote first in his beit din – as a matter of procedure, or as a matter of personal humility.


Gittin 59b
I think R’ Yitzchak Nafcha’s pasuk adds to Rav Matnah’s pasuk, because it is in a context of the kohanim receiving a gift – an honor which is like that of an aliyah.


Gittin 60a
The gemara here justifies the recording of works of aggada (extra-legal comments on Torah passages), despite the standing prohibition against recording the Spoken Torah, because otherwise people would forget them. This practice of writing things down preceded the recording of the mishnah; we find in the gemara references to מגילת סתרים, scrolls recorded and kept in secret, for example.
Sfat Emet to Megilah 3a notes that the prohibition was against publishing these scrolls, not against recording them.
Pnei Yehoshua to Megilah 3a observes that the concern that drove the sages to write down the Spoken Torah was not really about forgetting, but rather was about the intramural division and strife that would result from that forgetting.

Note that Rashi and Rambam disagree on the meaning of בסירוגין here.


Gittin 60b
The gemara talks about not having “shofar” rotate from place to place, lest people think it is being moved because of a problem at the first site. See Rashi’s two views on what they mean with the “shofar” here, and Tosafot’s reason for preferring his second explanation.

Daf: Gittin 56b-57b – Titus, Divine muteness, Onkelos, Eretz Tzvi, Suicide in Judaism

We continue the “Tisha b’Av” gemara regarding the destruction of the Beit haMikdash and the fall of Beitar. For those who are looking for something other than Daf Yomi notes, feel free to skip down for an article on surviving the 120-year death sentence.

Gittin 56b
Titus slashes the parochet curtain before the Ark, and sees blood emerge; he believes that this shows he has done something to Gd. The Maharam Shif suggests that the blood may have been from the sprinklings of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, but this is problematic. As Maharam Shif notes, the sprinklings were toward the curtain rather than on it – but, also, the gemara here states explicitly that the emergenc of the blood was miraculous.

The sages observed that Gd did not act to defend the second Beit haMikdash from the Romans, and altered verses as part of a pain-driven, theodicy-based challenge to Gd's mute unresponsiveness. For a passage that goes even further, see Yerushalmi Berachot 7:3, where Yirmiyah and Daniel actually altered the way we praised Gd, eliminating some of the praises, after the destruction of the first Beit haMikdash – until the Great Assembly restored those praises. (That is a beautiful passage of gemara; I need to use that in a derashah at some point.)

The gemara refers to Sisra drowning in water; that may be a reference to his chariots becoming stuck in the mud, or to Yael’s substitution of milk for water, which led to his death.

Abbaye uses the Aramaic word נקטינן here to introduce an aggadic observation. That’s odd; נקטינן is normally used regarding legal statements.

Regarding the identity of Onkelos in the story of Onkelos and Titus and conversion to Judaism, Mahartz Chajes discusses this and notes that he is not the Onkelos who recorded an Aramaic commentary on the Torah.


Gittin 57a
It is suggested that, in this passage, either Bilam, or “the sinners of Israel” are meant to be a reference to Jesus.

Regarding the three great cities on Har haMelech, the Yerushalmi has a different take on the explanation of Kfar Shichlayim and Kfar Dichraya. See also the Maharsha here.

The gemara here calls Israel ארץ צבי, but I don’t believe such a term appears in Tanach. The citation from Yirmiyah 3:19 is actually ארץ חמדה נחלת צבי צבאות גויים. Either way, the literal meaning of צבי in context is to connote something desirable – the desirable/desired land.


Gittin 57b
The Babylonian Nevuzaradan’s decision to write a will for disposition of his assets before converting to Judaism is a rebuke to Achitofel, who betrayed Dovid, was caught, and then wrote a will disposing of his assets before strangling himself.

The issue of Jewish children – and communities – committing suicide rather than face torture and death is a large and complex topic. Tosafot קפצו here has a brief discussion, but there is much more to say. For a start:
Bava Kama 91b clearly prohibits suicide.
Bereishit Rabbah 34:13 shows that we have exceptions – Shaul, as well as Chananiah, Mishael and Azariah.
Mitigating circumstances include certain death (Radak Shemuel I 31:5) and fear of having to violate one of the sins which warrant ייהרג ואל יעבור, death before violation (Tosafot Avodah Zarah 18a).
Pain, as a mitigating factor, is hotly debated but generally rejected for active suicide – see Avodah Zarah 18a, Chatam Sofer Yoreh Deah 326:3 and Shut Beit Efrayim Yoreh Deah 76.
There is much more to say, but any discussion would be incomplete if it did not include the story cited by Ritva (I forget where) and the Beit Yosef (Yoreh Deah 157), of the rabbi who was involved in his community’s mass suicide to avoid the crusaders, and who lived to see the decree against the community annulled, so that the deaths were unnecessary. See the horrible details there.

We then encounter the well-known story of the woman and her 7 sons who refused to bow to the idol:
Note that the story does not involve anyone named Chanah; that name doesn’t appear until the 15th century or so.
See three versions – ours, the Maharsha’s and Eichah Rabbah 1:50, all of which offer different orders of pesukim recited by the seven children.
The Maharsha and the Yefeh Anaf explain why each child chose a different pasuk. The Maharsha matches each pasuk to a day of the week; Yefeh Anaf on the midrash shows that each pasuk responded to a different claim made by the Roman.

Daf: Gittin 45-50 - Prisoner exchanges, Minim, Yovel, Lending, Is Marriage a Mitzvah?

Still catching up on posting thoughts on the Daf. For those who are less text-oriented, jump down to My Noachide Wedding.

Gittin 45a
The gemara here mentions Levi bar Darga redeeming his daughter from captivity for 13,000 gold coins. Note my comments here (Nedarim 25a) and here (Nedarim 41), about thirteen being a number used in the gemara for exaggeration, for effect.

Our gemara talks about not paying too much to ransom captives. Tosafot דלא here asks the classic question regarding talmudic cases in which overly large sums were paid, and gives three answers which shape, to this day, our policy in issues like prisoner exchange: Greater expenditures are justified, potentially, if one is redeeming his wife/himself, or if one is redeeming a person who is exceptionally valuable for society, or if one is in an environment where capturing/ransoming is normal, so that one is not really risking additional kidnapping by acceding to a demand.


Gittin 45b
See Rashi here on מין. Here Rashi says “min” means “one who cleaves to idolatry, like a priest.” See also Rashi to Sanhedrin 38a, where Adam haRishon is accused of being a “min.” See also Rashi to Shabbat 116a ספרי מינין. See also Rashi Berachot 12a "Minim", and Rashi Shabbat 75a. However, Rashi Berachot 12b מינות says “those who convert the logic of Torah to erroneous analysis and idolatry.” (Note the censored edition there, though, which may explain this comment in Rashi.)


Gittin 46a
Tosafot כיון is very important, explaining the justifications for honoring the deal struck between the Jews and the Givonim after entering Israel.

Fascinating, from a methodological perspective: The gemara here translates talmudic use of the word רבים based on biblical use of the word רבים!


Gittin 46b
See Tosafot הנודר explaining why taking a vow is like building an illegal altar.


Gittin 47b
Rashi here המוכר שדהו לפירות says that Yovel ceased after the initial exile of Reuven and Gad. Tosafot Gittin 36a “b’Zman” and Tosafot Erchin 31b/32a Hitkin disagree, arguing that they had Yovel in the second Beit haMikdash. Tosafot has substantial proof on his side. Ramban to Gittin 36a disagrees with him, though.


Gittin 49b
See the important Tosafot ור' שמעון, pointing out that we are free to analyze the reasons for/lessons from mitzvot (דורש טעמא דקרא); the only debate regarding the legitimacy of this approach is regarding using those reasons/lessons for practical halachic decisions.

The gemara here points out that we wish to encourage lending; this is because loans are the premier engine for tzedakah in a Torah society. See my comments in “Government as Economic Protector.”

Rashi and Tosafot disagree as to the meaning of משום חינא. Rashi’s view seems to say that we are trying to provide a woman with an incentive to marry a man, whereas Tosafot explains that we are trying to make it easier for her to find a husband.


Gittin 50a
The gemara here indicates that marriage is a mitzvah.
See Beitzah 36b-37a, where marriage is a mitzvah only if one does not currently have a wife and children. From there it is clear that marriage is, at most, a mitzvah-enabler (for permissible procreation) but not a mitzvah in itself.
However, the Rambam (Mishneh Torah Hilchot Ishut 1:2) says marriage is, indeed, a mitzvah. See the Magid Mishneh there and in Hilchot Ishut 1:4, who tries to explain this as either a copyist's error or a reference to a prohibition against living together without marriage.
See also the Rosh to Ketuvot 1:12, on the berachah we recite for kiddushin not being a birkat hamitzvah.

Daf: Gittin 41-44 – Procreation, Shady outreach methods, Pleonasm, Freeing an עבד to enable mitzvah observance

Still catching up on old notes… for those who are interested, bear with me while I catch up. For those who are not interested, well, I guess it doesn’t matter whether I am caught up or not, right? Skip down the page to hear about evertything that’s wrong with rabbinic speeches.


Gittin 41b
The gemara here cites, as proof that an עבד should be allowed to marry, the pasuk of לא תהו בראה לשבת יצרה, “Gd did not create the world to be empty; Gd formed it for settlement.” They do not bring the classic פרו ורבו “Bear fruit and multiply.” Tosafot לא explains why.


Here we talk about forcing a person to violate biblical law, having him free his עבד, in order to enable the עבד to fulfill a mitzvah of procreation; this is odd, given that Shabbat 4a says we do not tell a person to sin in order to benefit others!
Tosafot כופין offers two approaches: 1) In the case in Shabbat 4a we are dealing with a sinner who did something wrong (putting dough in an oven right before Shabbat) to enter that position; here, the עבד did nothing wrong. 2) Procreation is a mitzvah which helps the community.
Both of these approaches open major questions regarding sinning to benefit someone else, and regarding Outreach methods. What would you think of a Jew who broke a Jewish law in order to become close with someone who was sinning, arguing that he was justified by Tosafot’s argument here – since he would be helping this person, who might then turn out to help others? Or what would you think of a Jew who lied to someone for the sake of “outreach,” making that same argument?

An important point of methodology: Why do we use logic here against a pleonasm (גזירה שוה)? This pleonasm is מופנה, utilizing textual anomalies on either side – so it should not be open to challenge! Tosafot מה suggests that even with a strong pleonasm, logic can challenge it, and result in us using different methods of analyzing those textual anomalies.


Gittin 42b
Tosafot הואיל explains that we need a גט שחרור (document freeing an עבד) in a case in which people might suspect that the עבד was not really freed. This bothers me; the gemara sounds as though the עבד is not free without this document, but in this case the document is really just supposed to be, per Tosafot, an extra protection for the freed עבד’s sake!


Gittin 43b
Note that the gemara here brings the imperative of פרו ורבו, Bear fruit and multiply, for an עבד – which it did not do back on 41b. See Tosafot back on 41b, and the Maharsha on that Tosafot.


Gittin 44a
The gemara at the bottom of this page is fascinating. Ordinarily we say מילתא דלא שכיחא לא גזרו ביה רבנן, that the sages did not make decrees for unusual cases. Here, though, they did make the decree – just not to be too harsh.

The gemara here discusses freeing an עבד in order to enable him to perform mitzvot, since his master has put him in a position where he will otherwise be unable to perform mitzvot. That sounds like it should be an automatic requirement – but we see in this gemara that the עבד has the right to say, “No, I’d rather remain an עבד even though that means I will not be able to perform mitzvot.”

Gittin 33-36 - Agunah, Nachmeni and Punishment for swearing falsely and in vain

Some notes on recent pages studied in the Daf Yomi. Possibly of interest to Daffies; all others, feel free to read or skip as you choose.

Gittin 33a
As we have already noted, the Rashba and Rashi have two different definitions of “agunah” as a technical term.
-Rashba says it refers to a woman who does not know whether she is married.
-Rashi says it also refers to a woman who is married, but is not able to live with her husband.

Therefore, on Gittin 32a when the gemara says that one may not nullify a get after giving it to a delivery agent, unless in the present of the agent, Rashi explains that this is because the husband may just be trying to pain her - making her an agunah - because now she will remain married to him, but be emotionally distant from him.
Rashba, though, would not consider that an agunah situation. Therefore, Rashba says it’s actually לצעוריה קא מכוין, something which pains the delivery agent. The fear is that all agents will have to wonder whether they are on a fool’s errand. Therefore, they will hesitate to deliver gittin. It is not about agunah at all.

However, this approach to 32a creates a problem on 33a, where the gemara says explicitly (in Reish Lakish’s view) that this is a matter of agunah! So the Rashba explains that we have an additional concern, that she might hear that the get has been annulled but not know whether it was annulled before or after she received it. Thus she does not know whether she is married - fitting Rashba’s definition of agunah.


The gemara here discusses הפקעת קידושין, annulment of marriage, a fascinating topic. Certainly, one must see the very interesting remarks of Tosafot ואפקעינהו here. See, too, the opinions brought in Shitah Mekubetzet to Ketuvot 2b.


Gittin 34a
Rashi and Tosafot disagree on how legal guardians (אפטרופוס) of inheriting orphans function. Rashi says they choose portions of the estate for their charges. Tosafot disagrees and argues that the court does the distribution, and the guardians then take care of the property put into their care.


Gittin 34b
See the note in R’ Akiva Eiger’s Gilyon haShas on possible sources of the title נחמני Nachmeni given to Abbaye. Rashi’s explanation (that Rabbah bar Nachmeni was his guardian) is the familiar one, but there is another possibility, as R’ Akiva Eiger shows.

The gemara says we record the names of parties in a get, and record “וכל שום שיש לו,” “and any other name he has.” Tosafot brings two views, one that we literally write וכל שום שיש לו, the other that we record the actual other names. We follow the latter view.


Gittin 35a
The gemara presents a story in which a woman swore falsely, by mistake, regarding an item in her care, and suffered as a result. Tosafot לא asks why she was punished, since we say that a person who is forced by circumstance to swear falsely does not bring a korban. Tosafot offers two answers: (1) That one in such a situation doesn’t bring a korban, but is subject to punishment, or (2) That she was careless regarding an item she was supposed to guard, and that carelessness was what led to the false oath. She is liable for the carelessness.
For a strong statement against oaths, verging on declaring all oaths to be שבועת שוא, oaths in vain, see Sefer Chasidim 418-419.

Rashi חוץ לבית דין משביעין is very important for a core understanding of the vows we are discussing here.


Gittin 35b
Interesting; the gemara here uses הפרה when it really means התרה; a judge does התרה, not הפרה. This is surprising; Bava Batra 120b says that if a judge uses the term הפרה, saying “מופר לך”, the vow is not annuled!

Gittin 28-32 – Aging, Agunot, Reductio ad absurdum and the Negev’s Hadley Cell

This week we have a bat mitzvah in shul, and the derashah is really centered on that bat mitzvah, so I won’t be posting it for at-large reading. Here are some notes from recent Daf Yomi topics, though. For those learning Daf Yomi this may be of interest.

For all others – Haveil Havalim is located here on Sunday; see you then!

Gittin 28a
Why am I confident that if I find a Get among a man’s own personal effects, I can be sure it is his? Rashi says it’s because the Get is in his house, but Tosafot או seems to disagree; he says the issue is not the house, since many people may pass through the house, but rather it’s the fact that the Get is among his personal effects.

Statistically, people who reach a certain age without developing key diseases are likely to reach a very old age. The gemara noted this here in its כיון דאיפליג איפליג comment - "once a person has reached a certain age in good health, we expect him to reach an unusually great age."

The gemara says that a proxy sent to deliver a Get need not be concerned that the sender may have died before the delivery, because “it would be impossible” to worry about this. Rashi explains this in light of his definition of Agunah. Rashi takes “Agunah” to refer to a woman who is married but unable to live with her husband, even just because of physical distance, and so he understands that the gemara is concerned with providing a mechanism through which a Get may be delivered long-distance, to prevent this Agunah circumstance.


Gittin 28b
One view in our gemara says that even if we were concerned that a Get-sender might die before delivery, one could still drink from a barrel with the expectation of tithing at the end, and not be concerned lest the barrel break in the interim, since one could appoint someone to guard the barrel. The gemara then asks, “But who will watch the watchman?”
In other circumstances, such as the beginning of Yoma, the gemara answers such reductio ad absurdum questions by saying, “אין לדבר סוף, There is a limit to what we can do.” The gemara here does not give that answer.
I think the reason we do not give that answer here is that here we have a real, practical concern about an existing problem, and we cannot answer that by saying, “Oh, well, we can’t worry about that.” In the other cases, though (like in the beginning of Yoma regarding setting up a backup wife for a Kohen Gadol before Yom Kippur), the idea is a positive enactment to forestall a problem later, and there is a limit to how much forestalling we can do.
In other words: In our case, if the barrel breaks then he drank untithed produce. This is a pressing problem, and it’s right here. In the other cases, if the Kohen Gadol’s wife dies then we simply need to appoint a new Kohen Gadol for Yom Kippur.

Rashi קומנטריסין seems to have a typo – it should be להרוג, not ליהרג. A rather significant difference!

The gemara here talks about believing a secular court when it declares,מסיח לפי תומו, that it has executed someone. The gemara in Bava Kama 114b limits such declarations, saying they apply only to permit a woman to remarry or remain with her husband, or for a rabbinic issue.


Gittin 29a
We know that a court may well find merit for the defendant after the verdict is in; when the gemara says that doesn’t happen, it means that this is not common. (Rashi, Tosafot)


Gittin 30a
See Tosafot מי.


Gittin 30b
The third answer on the page seems to rely on changing the braita, reversing the חוששין and the אין חוששין.


Gittin 31a
Rashi brings two explanations of “when the water gathers in the בוסר”, in the former talking about unripe grapes filling with fluid as they ripen, and in the latter talking about water being added to the pressing of terminally underripe grapes, to produce vinegar. The latter fits our general use of בוסר, as grapes which will never ripen. See Tosafot ובשעת, though.


Gittin 31b
The gemara here spends quite a bit of time on the importance of the winds for the survival of the world. The gemara does this elsewhere, as well.
Certainly, in Israel the winds are of grave importance. The “Hadley cell” formed by hot air rising at the equator, flowing to the 30-degree latitude and then cooling and descending in the Negev causes the Negev air to soak up moisture, which is what dries out that area and prevents rainfall. Changes in wind strength and direction could affect the resulting dryness and temperature.


Gittin 32a
Tosafot מהו points out that a Get may be annulled without witnesses, but that we require clearcut knowledge of his intentions before the Get is delivered.


Gittin 32b
A husband wrote a Get, hired a delivery agent, and then cancelled the Get. The gemara asks if he may then re-start the mission, using the same Get document.
On the face of it, there should be no problem doing this; why is this a question? I heard in the name of Rav Herschel Schachter that the problem might be the interruption between writing (וכתב) and delivering (ונתן) the Get.

Gittin 24-27 – The Agunah problem of a pre-fab Get

Pretty dull notes here for anyone who is not currently studying Gittin. About the only point you might find interesting is the discussion of why pre-fab Gittin are not acceptable, below at Gittin 26b. Otherwise, feel free to jump to some other post.

Gittin 24a
Note that throughout the page, דמטית התם should be דמטית להתם


Gittin 24b
If this idea of ברירה seems odd to you, since it depends on a later action of mine to resolve the current doubt – and not for a later independent event, the way it usually does – don’t be alarmed. The gemara will discuss this on 25-26.

Note the Rava/Rabbah change toward the bottom of this page; it’s because Abayye is presented as challenging Rava’s statement, and Abayye doesn’t do that with Rava, his student. He does it with Rabbah, his rebbe.


Gittin 26a
Rabbi Eliezer’s view, in the end of the mishnah, is unclear. Rashi seems to think he is approving writing the boilerplate part of the document in advance, and leaving the names out. Tosafot, though, makes the case (based on a discussion toward the end of 26b) that Rabbi Eliezer is actually approving writing the entire thing in advance.

Worth noting: The word “משום” is seen here as a term of indirect association with a source (in this case, a pasuk; the more direct term is שנאמר). We do the same thing in other passages when a law is cited משום a certain authority – we assume that it was not heard directly from that authority, but rather it was heard from someone else in his name.


Gittin 26b
Agunah law: The gemara discusses a pre-fab get, a case in which a scribe writes a get in advance, and a man whose name matches that of the man in the get, and whose wife’s name matches the wife’s name in the get, is involved in a domestic dispute and grabs the get and throws it to his wife – so that his wife is left as an agunah (to use the gemara’s terminology). To forestall such a possibility, the gemara prohibits scribes from having such “ready documents” lying around.
However: It is not clear why she is an agunah here; she is validly divorced!
1) I made a note in my gemara’s margin some 15-20 years ago that perhaps, due to the haste of the case, the get was not signed by witnesses, and so there is debate as to its validity – and this is why she is left as an agunah. I don’t know where I saw this idea, though.
2) Rashba takes a similar approach, reading “threw” literally and says that he threw it to her and left town, and it is not clear whether the get was closer to him or to her, so that her status is in doubt.
3) Rashi, though, has a different definition of “agunah.” He says that we are not dealing with a doubtful situation; rather, the concern is that the hasty husband will find a ready-made get and divorce his wife quickly. The term “agunah” then means simply that she will lack a husband. This is consistent with Rashi’s comment in Sanhedrin 107a מעונות defining “agunah” not as a woman whose marital status is in doubt, but rather as a woman whose husband fails to live with her conjugally. The sages see this situation as painful for her, and legislate to avoid it.


Gittin 27b
Tosafot סימנים unpacks the gemara’s point about whether we rely on “unique characteristics - סימנים” as identification biblically or rabbinically.
The idea is that true proof can come only through witnesses, as seen from the courtroom disqualification of circumstantial evidence. So according to the view that “unique characteristics” are only accepted as identification rabbinically, the biblical rule would be that we needed witnesses for all purposes of identification, such as claiming lost objects, or identifying a corpse.

Tosafot ודוקא explains why I would be more likely to believe a talmid chacham on his own stated recognition of an item.

Gittin 19-23 - Innocent testimony, wounding an eved and the blind discussing the blind

As always, please read this with a gemara in front of you; it won't make much sense without it. Or you could skip to the less technical posts below, I suppose. There's a good post, just after this one, about shul dues and membership requirements.

Gittin 19b
The gemara records Rav Pappa’s practice of accepting non-Jewish Persian translators for Persian-language legal documents, meisiach l’fi tumo - speaking innocently, apparently without knowing their statements would have legal ramifications.
It is not entirely clear that these pseudo-witnesses need to be unaware of the legal ramifications. See, for example, Aruch haShulchan Yoreh Deah 69:58 on this. This has major ramifications for the credibility of a housekeeper in a kosher kitchen; see the Beit Yosef to Yoreh Deah 69 on this.
We may also require corroboration of his statements from outside sources (kishur devarim) - see an interesting analysis in Yad haMelech to Mishneh Torah Hilchot Geirushin 12:16.


Gittin 20a
The gemara here indicates that having letters traced (written over existing writing) in a Sefer Torah would be aesthetically unpleasing; it is not clear to me why this is so.

Rashi thinks that we accept the statement Levi cited because he worked so hard to get it accepted. That has interesting ramifications for styles of argumentation… (But see also Tosafot משמיה there.)

The gemara here uses the term ירך yerech to mean “back” or “outside.” This is reminscent of the term ירך המשכן, used, for example, in Bamidbar 3:29.


Gittin 20b
See Tosafot אשה on why a woman would not realize that she needs to give her husband the Get-materials.


Gittin 21b
Rashi at the top of the page (לא אפשר) is difficult for me to understand; why does the eved’s mitzvah obligation have anything to do with the prohibition against wounding him? First, we prohibit wounding anyone. Second, everyone has at least the mitzvot bnei Noach! I lump this together with Rashi from the bottom of 12a, as discussed here.


Gittin 22b
See Tosafot והא on the question of how one might use a person to write a Get even if he is not, personally, eligible to be one’s שליח proxy. The idea that וכתב is not an imperative for the husband to write it, but rather that it should be written by someone [and not necessarily the husband’s proxy], is interesting.


Gittin 23a
See Tosafot ממי on whether the Get-deliverer must be able to identify the husband and wife - and if so, why our problem is limited to blind delivery agents, specifically.

Of particular interest: The two Amoraim (sages of the later Talmudic era) who debate the issue of a blind delivery agent are Rav Yosef and Rav Sheshet - who were both blind, themselves.

Gittin 15-18 – Hand-washing, Dating a get, and the frequency of sexual immorality

As always, please read with a gemara in front of you. It will just make more sense that way.

Gittin 15b
The gemara discusses netilat yadayim, washing one’s hands for ritual purposes, and addresses the case of pouring water on one and immersing the other. At least, this is the way Rashi explains it. Rabbeinu Tam, though, (Tosafot הנוטל), has a different edition, in which the case is very different: A hand is washed from a single pour, instead of the usual multiple pours. Ordinarily we require two pours in order to remove the first water, which has contracted tumah (some do three, for separate reasons), but here we are saying that if the second pour with a double portion of water, that suffices.


Gittin 16a
The gemara talks about a get held by two deliverers. Rashi seems to say that both must, literally, grip the document, but Tosafot (אבל) disagrees.


Gittin 17a
I am very troubled by the יתד היא שלא תמוט answer offered by R’ Ami to justify issuing two contradictory legal statements, one stricter and the second more lenient. If R' Ami means that his former, more stringer position, is a decree to prevent trouble, then this decree will end up creating agunot unnecessarily, something the gemara has explicitly said we avoid (such as the bottom of 2b, top of 3a)!

R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish offer reasons why we require a date on a get document. Rashash notes a third reason: To establish at what time the husband ceases to be “related to” his ex-wife’s family, for the purpose of validating or rejecting his role as a witness in a court case.


Gittin 17b
The gemara seems to say that extramarital sexual relations are rare and therefore not worthy of rabbinic decrees dealing with its occurrence. This does not seem to be the case, given various rabbinic enactments which are instituted for such cases, such as the preference for Wednesday night weddings in order to expedite a Thursday morning trip to court (Ketuvot 2a)! Tosafot זנות explains that sexual immorality is, indeed, not considered unusual; what is unusual is such an occurrence with witnesses and a legal warning.


Gittin 18a
Rav and Shemuel debate how to count the 3-month “havchanah” waiting period for a woman who has been divorced and wishes to re-marry. (The goal of havchanah is to ensure that we can properly identify paternity of a child born severeal months into her second marriage.) Rav says to count from the time the get is delivered, but Shemuel says to count from the time the get is written. The gemara says we follow Shemuel, which is unusual; we usually follow Rav on prohibitions, Shemuel on financial matters! Perhaps, though, we follow Shemuel here because of the latter amoraim who took his side – Rav Ashi, as well as Rav Kahana and Rav Papi.

Gittin 10-14 - The company we keep, Divine mercy, and more

I'm away from my home computer – in Philadelphia while my wife, the eponymous Rebbetzin, takes an exam here – and so I can't type in Hebrew for this post.

For whatever it's worth, Philadelphia strikes me as odd; having walked the streets a bit today, I found fewer smiles than I expected (I've seen many more on the streets of Manhattan), and more cigarettes than I expected.

In any case: On to the Daf. As usual, please read with a gemara in front of you, for maximum clarity.

10a
Tosafot b'Shlichut appears to have a good approach to the “b'shlichut b'al korchah” line, with Rabbeinu Chananel's explanation. However, as Tosafot notes at the end, the language doesn't really match.

The company we keep - The gemara here discusses signing a document along with a Kuti witness, where one knows that this Kuti is careful about mitzvot. The Kuti witness is accepted, because we assume the righteous witness would not have signed without checking the legitimacy of the Kuti witness.
This is interesting, in light of Sanhedrin 23a and Shevuot 30b in which we discuss the idea that one should not sign a document along with a problematic witness (or sit on a beit din with a problematic judge). The Sanhedrin source is stricter than Shevuot; Shevuot indicates that I could sign with another party if I didn't know that person's status (which would ruin our gemara's assumption regarding the Kuti, unless we would say that default Kuti status is that of a rasha), but Sanhedrin requires that I actually know he is righteous.
See also the difference between Mishneh Torah Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:14 and 22:10.
For more on this issue, see Meiri on that gemara in Shevuot, Perishah to Choshen Mishpat 7, and Yabia Omer 2:Choshen Mishpat 1.


10b
Note that, once again, Abayye presents an explanation which does not match our gemara's edition, and Rava calls him on it. However, Rava explicitly alters the edition, with a 'chisurei mechsira' argument.


12a
Note that the gemara's interpretation of “lo telaket le'ani” is explicitly against the te'amim of the trop.

Divine mercy - The last Rashi on the page is extremely interesting; Rashi says that Gd will have mercy upon an eved because the eved is obligated in some mitzvot. This is problematic in light of Tehillim 145:9, a sentence cited as law in gemara and Rambam, which says, “Gd's mercy is upon all of His creations!”


14a
See Tosafot Chada


14b
On the third line – it should say 'nihalayhu'

Note that both Rav Natan and “Yesh omrim” appear in the same machloket here, although the gemara elsewhere (end of Horiyyot) identifies them as one and the same. Tosafot somewhere (I am without my library, but it may be the Bava Batra reference in the margin on this page) suggests that statements made by R' Natan early in his career, before he received this moniker, are cited with his given name.

See Tosafot “vaChachamim Omrim” on the interesting question of how money is handled in civil cases, where the verdict is “Teiku.”

Rashi and Tosafot have a fascinating debate here, and in Ketuvot 85b, on what the gemara is recommending when it authorizes a judge to do “shuda” - to use his discretion.

Gittin 7-9 Accidental sin, helping an eved marry, and illiterate witnesses

As always, read with a gemara in front of you. Or, you could just skip it, of course.

7a
The gemara’s contention that Gd protects the righteous from accidental sin has its roots in various sources, such as the promise that HaShem will protect a Sanhedrin from accidentally killing an innocent victim. This is problematic, though, for we find cases of rabbinic error; whole segments of gemara deal, for example, with judicial error. Tosafot השתא tackles the problem by distinguishing between eating non-kosher and other sins; see his comments there.

דום may be taken as “be silent” or as “hope for.” But see Rosh haShanah 16b, as well as teshuvah #6 of the Tzemach Tzedek (the first, not the Lubavitcher Tzemach Tzedek), on the issue of liability for the causing the downfall of others.

Note that our gemara mis-cites Hosheia 9:1; the word there is כעמים, not בעמים. This may be a typo, but it may also be an אל תקרי approach, since the adjusted meaning of the sentence more closely fits our gemara’s point.

See Tosafot זמרא on the permissibility of listening to music in our own day. Ashkenazi poskim, like Tosafot, seem to be more lenient than Sephardic poskim in this issue.


8b
See Tosafot אף על גב on the point that settling Israel justifies אמירה לעכו"מ, but other mitzvot do not.

See Tosafot הדר.


9a
Tosafot שוו raises a very interesting question: We want to aid proper verification of a get in order to help a woman re-marry, but where is our incentive to make it easier to verify a document freeing an עבד? In the Torah’s version of עבדות, which is primarily long-term economic commitment, where is the harm? If he cannot marry a בת חורין, he can marry a שפחה - and the gemara later, on 13a, will contend that he prefers this! Tosafot offers a suggestion which runs counter to 13a, and an additional suggestion that the עבד wishes to fulfill mitzvot. Ramban and Ritva, though, will say that the עבד who is in limbo can marry no one, and so our expedited verification will help him a great deal.


9b
Rashi חוץ מגיטי נשים takes the view of the Chachmei Provence (2:48) that the reason secular governments have judicial authority recognized by Jewish law (dina d’malchuta dina) is because Gd instructed them to carry out such laws, in the mitzvot of Bnei Noach. For more on this see my post here.

Rashi בגיטי נשים does not seem to recognize any עיגון situation for an eved - contrary to the remarks of Tosafot שוו on 9a.

If we are to etch in signatures for illiterate witnesses and have them fill the signatures with ink, or if we will use stencils (per Rabbeinu Chananel cited in Tosafot here), how will we recognize their signatures as their own?! Some fifteen years ago, my friend Tzvi Hebel suggested that we don’t have to recognize their signatures at all, just that the delivery agent has to see them “sign” the document, and this is indeed fulfilled.

Daf: Gittin 2-6 - Get delivery, Trust, and 'These and These are the words of the Living Gd'

All right, I'll put up some notes on Gittin, but most of these are technical and will only be of interest to people who are learning Gittin right now (if that!).

2a
Why does Gittin begin with a proxy delivering a get? Perhaps because the hand-to-hand delivery is one of the few elements spelled out biblically (the Torah explicitly mentions the husband giving the get to his wife), and so the gemara begins with that which is חביב, beloved, to the sages, that which is extrapolated and clarified rabbinically. A similar approach is used in the beginning of Shabbos (Tosafot on starting with Hotzaah) and the beginning of Yevamot (the gemara on the order of the 15 cases in the first mishnah there).

See Tosafot ממדינת on why we talk about “islands in the sea” instead of the generic “חוץ לארץ outside of Israel.”


2b
See the first Tosafot לפי on why we single out this one law - the לשמה requirement - as a law with which Jews living in galut were not familiar.

The issue of trustworthiness here is very important. It isn’t that we don’t trust those batei din, it’s that we think they don’t know everything they need to know. This comes up in all sorts of areas, such as kashrut - we may trust the sincerity of a person, but we also need to determine his level of knowledge.


3a
Tosafot חד explains that we are not only concerned that the husband might disqualify the Get; we are also concerned that he might cause general trouble.


3b
Rashi ואין בו אלא עד אחד sides with Shemuel from a debate on Gittin 86a-b; this is problematic, given that we side with Rav there! Also, see Rashi there ואם.


4a
What is Rabbah bar bar Chanah adding with his Bei Kubi-Pumbedita example? Perhaps it is just an example for Babylonians who had not seen the Israeli examples.


4b
About ¾ of the way down the page: If there are many courts around, why will people in different cities know each other’s signatures? Just the opposite - everyone will go to their own courts!
Nachlat Moshe suggests that the courts themselves may have networked, through agents who traveled to the different courts. Also, בתי דינין דביעי may not be as Rashi took it, but may mean one central court, to which everyone went.


5b
Rabbi Shimon bar Abba’s hypothetical invisible ally doesn’t solve the problem - we should still be concerned lest the situation worsen! (Unless we don’t make the decree because having two deliverers is unusual?)

I thank Rabbi Ian Bailey for reminding me that Bar Hedya, who is a get-deliverer trainee here, was also the money-hungry dream-interpreter in Berachot 56.


6a
See Tosafot מכי on what changed when Rav arrived in Bavel.


6b
Very interesting: R’ Ila’i raised a problem with R’ Yishmael’s position, out of ignorance, and R’ Yishmael did not embarrass him by correcting him. Rather, he simply said, “Leave it be” and allowed R’ Ila’i to think him mistaken.

See Tosafot זבוב on how the fly/hair explanations fit the pasuk.

The apparently pluralistic idea here of אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים, “These and these are the words of the living Gd” (or “These and these are the living words of Gd”), is very important. Although the story under discussion is a historical event which must have happened one way or another, Gd will value each interpretation simply because it was stated by a serious student who was trying to understand the story. Thus Gd will honor each of those statements as statements of Torah.

See Tosafot שלש.

Sotah 49 – Daily Prophets, Jerusalem of Gold, Eliyahu zachur latov

I’m not sure whether I will post notes for Gittin; we’ll see. But here’s the end of Sotah, best examined with a gemara in front of you.

49a
Using Rashi’s explanation of מוכרי רבב, tallow-merchants, the connection between this passage and the preceding one is unclear. Maharsha, though, suggests that people would use tallow instead of the lost נופת צופים referenced in the gemara’s preceding passage.

The Maharsha points out that King David prayed for livelihood for merchants, but Chavakuk prayed for livelihood for Torah scholars.

Why, specifically, does the gemara stress that two Torah scholars must exchange words of Torah when they are traveling on the road, or face harm? What about at home? Perhaps this is because of the gemara’s general approach to travel, that this is a time of danger, and so one requires special protective merit.

The gemara talks about the importance of kedusha d’sidra, the kedushah recited at the end of Shacharit in “Uva l’Tzion.” The gemara identifies this as Torah study. This dovetails nicely with the view that the reason the chachamim instituted recitation of the opening section in Uva l’Tzion [as the Haftorah] was to ensure that we would learn Navi [Prophets].

This “city of gold” ornament may be the “Yerushalayim shel zahav” “Jerusalem of Gold” ornament worn in mishnaic times and given by R’ Akiva to his wife Rachel; see Mishnah Shabbat 6:1, Shabbat 59a-b and Nedarim 50a. That is the view of Rabbeinu Tam, cited in Rosh to Shabbat 6:4. Rashi would disagree, though, for the ornament here is a crown, and Rashi says the “Jerusalem of Gold” was a brooch.
According to Rabbeinu Tam, how could people wear these in mishnaic times, if they were banned after the destruction of the Beit haMikdash? The Hagahot Ashri to Rosh Shabbat 6:4 explains that the prohibition was specifically for brides and grooms, because of the joy involved when they wore these ornaments.

When the gemara talks about the special traits of each sage, and how each trait disappeared from the world with the death of that sage, Rashi offers passages to explain the relationship between each sage and his trait. For R’ Yochanan ben Zakkai’s special trait of knowledge, though, Rashi does not explain it – but see Succah 28a, where R’ Yochanan ben Zakkai is credited with possessing all sorts of esoteric knowledge.


49b
On the second line, it should say יש לנו להשען.

One the thirteenth line, it should say ועל מי.

In the piece inserted in our gemara, located at the bottom of the page, where it mentions Eliyahu haNavi, the ensuing acronym ז"ל should read “זכור לטוב he should be remembered for the good” rather than “זכרונו לברכה, his memory is a blessing.” See Esther Rabbah 10:9 and Maharil Hilchot Purim on the association of both Eliyahu and Charvonah with this honorific.

Sotah 46-48 – Theodicy, Elisha learning Talmud, and Complaining to Gd

As always, better to read this with a gemara in front of you.


Some more notes on 46b
The gemara (taking its discussion as a whole) identifies three benefits to escorting another person: (1) Protecting him, (2) Honoring him, (3) Learning Torah from/with him.

In discussing Elisha’s curse of the “young boys” in Melachim I 2, the gemara confronts the problematic scene of a prophet of Gd attacking children over a personal insult. Granted that the gemara (47a) views this as a sin on his part – for which he is punished – the gemara is still troubled by his actions.
In answering the question of מה ראה at the bottom of the page, the gemara offers three explanations of Elisha’s actions – which coincide with three of the answers the sages offer to address the fundamental problem of theodicy: If Gd rewards good behavior and (only) punishes harmful behavior, and Gd is omnipotent and omniscient, then why do apparently bad things happen to apparently good people?
1) Elisha didn’t consciously harm them; it was an automatic result of their insult to the prophet. In the theodicy discussion, this is known as the “natural consequences” view, that harm occurs outside the context of punishment, in the natural order of things.
2) Elisha saw that their parents were guilty of heinous sin. In the bad things/good people discussion, this is known as the “sins of the parents” view, that harm occurs to a family, even to innocent members of the family, because of collective guilt.
3) Elisha saw that they were personally guilty of grave sin. In the bad things/good people discussion, this is the approach of, “They weren’t really such great people in the first place.”
There are, of course, other approaches to the theodicy problem. I just find the parallel interesting.


47a
The gemara mentions that Elisha was involved in “שמנה שרצים,” which I would have taken to mean he was involved in laws of purity related to those eight creepy-crawlies listed in Parshat Shemini. Rashi, though, takes it to mean that Elisha was learning the chapter in Gemara Shabbat entitled שמנה שרצים, which deals with far different matters. I wonder what compels Rashi to take that view.

Ben Dinai, the outlaw mentioned at the bottom of this page, is known to us in the Kinot prayers of Tisha b’Av as well.


47b
The word רוצחנין should, presumably, be רצחנין or רוצחין.

In the punishment for our corruption, the text in our edition has ונולא and Rashi says it refers to the fall of the Jewish monarchy, but the Maharsha has it as ונזלא and explains it refers to the growth of the Roman monarchy.


48a
If our gemara is uncomfortable with the Leviyyim saying the line from Tehillim (as they suffer Roman persecution), “Gd, awaken, why do You sleep,” then why did the sages canonize that line in Tehillim in the first place?
The Maharsha explains that when we have a Beit haMikdash and we are able to live in Israel, we are not entitled to complain. The line in Tehillim was written regarding the period of exile, at which point we are entitled to voice this complaint.

Sotah 45-46

We are now a bit behind the pace here in Allentown, slowing me down in getting these out to you. Not that much here in any case; mostly technical notes, other than some interesting references on Yerushalayim and on the gemara's own discussions.

First, one last note on 44b – The court for eglah arufah must have an odd number of judges, per our mishnah, but I am not clear on why that should be so. The requirement for an odd-numbered court is practical (to prevent a tie in voting) rather than ritual, as is proved by the fact that if an even-numbered court renders a ruling, the ruling is valid. So why do we need an odd-numbered court for this purely ritual activity of measurement?

45a
Note that בית פאגי is the origin of the place-name “Bethpage.”

Technically, if the מזג-dilution reference teaches that we require that the Sanhedrin seat no fewer than 1/3 of its members, the minimum number should be 24, not 23!
However, one could take the approach brought at the end of Tosafot Sanhedrin 14b אל, in which he understands the מזג reference as Gematria – the Sanhedrin should not be lacking 50, the gematria value of the word מזג. In that case, the threshold is 22, and we add one more because of the desire for an odd-numbered court. I know I’ve seen another elsewhere, perhaps on the mishnah printed on Sanhedrin 37a, but I don’t recall it at the moment.

Of course, the separate problem with the above passage is that the gemara’s wine-dilution is traditionally 1-3, not 1-2; see Tosafot Shabbat 77a דאמר רבא on this point.


45b
Our gemara here relies on the view that Yerushalayim was not divided among the tribes. This is a fascinating topic; see Rashi and Radak to Shoftim on the trade-off of the ruins of Jericho for the tribe who would surrender land for the building of the Beit haMikdash, taking the view that it did come from tribal land.

It’s interesting to see the debate on how embryonic cells begin to differentiate; we know from other gemara passages that despite the historic cultural (aside from halachic) aversion to autopsy, the sages of the gemara did have autopsy knowledge of embryonic development.


46a
The word איכא about ¾ of the way down should be ואיכא.

Note that Rashi and our gemara have different editions regarding the calf, at the bottom. Our gemara has שלא עשה פירות, Rashi has שאינו עושה פירות. These clearly mean different things – but Rashi translates his edition as though it matched ours.


46b
Language point: On the changed-edition about ten lines down, note that אמר רבא means Rava is making a new statement, but רבא אמר means that Rava is disagreeing with the preceding comment.

On the third of the widest lines - What will R’ Yoshiyah do with the lesson we are drawing from אשר?

Why does pointing to the city entrance count as “escorting” someone? Maharsha explains that this is because the essential purpose of the escort is to show the traveler the best path, where he will not encounter harm. Personal escorting may not be necessary. (But how much greater the reward if one does escort personally!

On the term קץ, used here to refer to disgust (disgust with life, in this context) – see Rashbam on Bamidbar 21:5, ונפשנו קצה בלחם הקלוקל. It seems to me that his explanation, that the Jews were disgusted because of 39 years of the same dry, round food, fits the word קצה better than the explanations of other commentaries fit that word.

How do we know Paroh took 4 steps, in particular? Perhaps by counting the word ויצו עליו פרעה אנשים, but perhaps because we assume this was a 4-cubit trip, by default explanation of how one escorts. Of course, his reward ended up harming himself and his country, but no one forced him to spend his reward that way…

Daf: Sotah 33-35 - lots happening here

There's a lot going on in these pages; I've just added some notes on a few of the many issues. As always, read with a gemara in front of you, but I have taken a few extra minutes to try to make some of these items comprehensible for those without a gemara.

33a
The gemara says that the entire Torah is supposed to be read in the original Hebrew. Rashi and Tosafot Shantz disagree on the application of that statement, as far as whether it refers to the weekly Torah reading or only to the biblically required Torah readings. Of particular note is the marginal comment on the Tosafot Shantz, suggesting that Parshat Parah is biblical.

Do the angels only speak Hebrew, or do they speak all non-Aramaic languages? See the Maharsha. (And boy is that topic odd – especially as it has halachic ramifications!)


33b
Tosafot and the Maharsha seem to have different explanations of the question of והלא לא ראו את הגלגל – Tosafot מול understands it to be asking that one cannot see Gilgal from Mount Gerizim and Mount Eval, but the Maharsha seems to think it is asking that the Jews cannot see Gilgal from their desert location.

The gemara lists times when Kohanim carried the Aron. See the Gilyon haShas on other times the Aron was carried by Kohanim. The Radak he cites asks and answers as Tosafot וכשהחזירוהו does here.


34a
I would have assumed the “300 mil” number was just an exaggeration, as is the gemara’s evaluation of the distance from earth to the clouds (in other discussions), but Tosafot יותר does not think so.


34b
See Tosafot כחנייתן on the matter of how the Jews crossed the Yarden.

The idea that a person could walk faster than water travels downstream is odd, to say the least. Rashi רבה and Tosafot מר both wrestle with this issue, and develop different solutions.

Regarding the issue of naming someone for an event that has not yet happened (as in the case of נחבי בן ופסי and סתור), see the Maharsha in Berachot on naming Ruth רות for the deeds of her descendant Dovid haMelech. Naming has elements of prophecy associated with it. See also our earlier discussion on Leah naming Yehudah for what he would do in the future.

The gemara here famously describes Moshe re-naming Yehoshua before his espionage mission; the Maharsha says that Yehoshua’s earlier labelling of “Yehoshua” in the Torah is only because his name would be changed later.

See Tosafot אבותי on the question of whether the deceased actually know what is happening in this world – and follow up in that gemara in Berachot 18-19 on this issue, particularly given the comment in the margin here. Based on our liturgy, such as some of the Tisha b’Av kinot, we certainly believe that the deceased do find out what is happening in this world.

See the Aruch on ענק; he renders it as neck.


35a
The Torah Temimah, commenting on the story of the spies, explains why the spies should have suffered particularly from wounds to their tongue and belly, and from the dreaded askerah death. The tongue was for lashon hara. The belly was for slandering Israel, which is seen in the gemara as the navel of the world. Askera is considered an appropriate punishment for lashon hara [but see also Pesachim 105a, where it is also a punishment for eating before havdalah…]

The idea of Dovid being blamed for Uzza’s death, when Uzza acted independently, is reminiscent of an issue discussed in many halachic authorities, of one’s liability for the death of a person who is doing a job for you. The Mahari Weil ruled that one is spiritually liable for the death of a person who is doing a job in his employ, and the issue has been greatly debated since. See Sanhedrin 95, Mahari Weil 125, Maharshal 96, Maharam Lublin 44, Beis Yosef at the end of Choshen Mishpat 188 (on financial liability), Tzemach Tzedek (the earlier) 6, Chasam Sofer 177, Avnei Nezer Yoreh Deah 478.


35b
Rashi’s explanation of בעבר הירדן is interesting; see also Rashbam to Devarim 1:1. There are others who are more troubled by this phrase.

If the Jews are not supposed to accept peace with the Canaanites they encounter, how do we understand Rachav’s survival? Tosafot לרבות gives one answer here, and this approach is seen in Malbim to Yehoshua 2:12 as well. Radak to Yehoshua 6:25 gives a similar answer, saying she converted. On the other hand, Ibn Ezra to Shemot 20:7 says that the oath bound the Jews, despite their mitzvah regarding her.