Part VIII was here.
Here we conclude the transcript of R' Shirman's verdict. I must say that in the course of translating this I have found observations and rulings which I would question, but I must also say that I am no longer bothered by the strength of the court's language, including it's term Apikorus. I can now see why they would be motivated to use that language, even if I don't agree.
I would also love to hear a justification for the false signatures on conversion documents.
Section 15: טעונים פורמלים פרוצדוראליים אינם גוברים על דברים מהותיים שסותרים להם
R’ Shirman returns here to the procedural issue cited in the beginning of Section 11:
In an earlier litigation, R’ Daichovsky cited a decision from R’ Bakshi-Doron stating that marriage registrars will accept copies of conversion certificates from licensed rabbinic courts and the courts of conversion, and that all other conversions must receive approval of rabbinic courts or the department of the Chief Rabbinate dealing with this issue. This indicates that the two court systems – rabbinic and conversion-specific – function independently, and one cannot nullify a decision of the other.
The majority of the court in that litigation agreed with R’ Daichovsky and recognized the conversion, ignoring the challenges to the mitzvah-acceptance of the convert.
R’ Shirman argues that this decision runs counter to the 1984 declaration cited above at the end of Section 14 from R’ Kanaeivsky, R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R’ Schach and R’ Elyashiv, instructing marriage registrars to review conversions. If registrars should be able to review conversions, then expert courts certainly should be able to do so.
R’ Shirman further argues that within Torah it is unheard of to allow formal procedures (פורמליות פרוצדורליות) to trump substantive issues.
R’ Shirman supports this, again, with R’ Chaim Pilaggi’s comments (cited above in Section 13) regarding the ability of a court to review decisions of another court.
R’ Shirman notes that the court in the earlier litigation also based its view on the rule that certificates from the conversion courts must be recognized, and argues against that procedural position based, again, on the 1984 declaration cited above.
R’ Shirman turns to his colleague, R’ Bar Shalom, who supported R’ Daichovsky, to ask for the halachic basis for taking the procedural position over the halachic doubts regarding a conversion.
Section 16: אין להשען על דעת הרוב שעברה שינויים ותהפוכות
Note: I think I have all of the voices right in the following section, in which R’ Shirman cites an opinion from the third judge in the earlier Rechovot litigation mentioned above in Section 11 - but the text is unclear about where the third judge’s opinion ends, and R’ Shirman’s notes begin. I have done my best with this.
R’ Shirman notes that the majority decision in the earlier litigation did not remain with "formal authority" as its justification, but instead added the idea of R’ Daichovsky (Section 10 above) that acceptance of mitzvot is gauged at the moment of conversion (and not based on later behavior).
As was noted in an additional opinion sent to Rishon l’Tzion Rav Amar by the third judge, to explain why he had decided to vote “I don’t know” rather than take a stance in the case:
The majority in that earlier litigation came to its conclusion after first being of radically different views. One view wished to uphold the rejection of the conversion, the second view accepted the conversion with the justification that conversions cannot be annulled, and the third view argued that the local court had no authority to revoke the conversion, but that the case should go before the Chief Rabbinate for their verdict. The holder of the second view then joined with the holder of the third view, and together they established that until the chief rabbinate nullifies the conversion, the conversion stands.
The writer then asked what might be the halachic basis for removing conversion from the jurisdiction of an existing court, when the courts had always handled conversion and conversion is a matter of the courts, and handing it over to the office of the Chief Rabbinate.
R’ Isirer of Rechovot also challenged the majority view on this basis, and added that the three views among the judges do not constitute a consolidated verdict, but are actually three different views, and therefore two judges should be added to the court.
The writer then noted that this means the original decision was not at all clear, and that there was no dialogue among the judges, which is required in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 18:1 "וישאו ויתנו בדבר" and that the Beit Yosef (Choshen Mishpat 13) rules that we do not follow a majority unless the majority is reached after debate among them.
The writer of this opinion then asked how one could say that the couple should be able to marry pending the decision of the Chief Rabbinate; what if, as R’ Isirer asked, the Chief Rabbinate would then annul the conversion?
R’ Amar rejected these challenges without addressing the substantive issues raised in the letter, and said we rely on the majority.
The majority then recanted their original decision and wrote that no one could nullify a conversion until the original converting body would revoke it.
The writer contended that this verdict lacks all halachic basis, violates precedent, and did not involve any discussion among the members of the beit din, since the majority judges did not respond to the minority’s objections.
After an extended period the court issued a new decision, in which they no longer relied on the majority view of R’ Daichovsky and R’ Bar Shalom that the court which overturned the conversion had no jurisdiction, but instead relied on the view of R’ Daichovsky [cited above, that we only work with the convert’s intent at the moment of conversion], and R’ Bar Shalom joined him in this, again without debate among the judges. The writer noted that he again did not receive a response to his challenges.
This is why the third judge decided to rule “I don’t know” - because without any explanation from the other two judges, he couldn’t claim to understand their view. Therefore, two judges should be added, to obtain clarification [as is done when the judges cannot come to a decision].
Rav Amar stated that the third judge did count toward the decision because he had expressed a view on the case, but the third judge argued that without any understanding of the position of the others, and without debate, and with all of the changes in their positions, he could not say anything other than “I don’t know.”
R’ Shirman then recaps some earlier points related to our case:
· That the rule of not re-opening another court’s decision does not apply here, because that rule, as explained by the Rambam, relies on the assumption that the earlier court was expert. The whole challenge of R’ Attiyeh was that the earlier court was not expert.
· As far as the formal claim that the municipal court lacks authority to overturn the conversion, that is not relevant, because the original court’s authority is void due to their ineligibility as a court.
R’ Shirman adds that the original ruling from R’ Attiyeh did not actually disqualify the woman’s conversion or her status as a Jew, and it did not nullify her children’s status as Jews. Section 12 of the ruling specified that the woman may pursue a further judgment regarding her status; the court’s ruling was only insofar as the get which had been requested. R’ Attiyeh was only requesting that they be registered as ineligible to marry until their conversion could be examined anew by a proper court, because of the flaws which had been identified in the original .
R’ Shirman then notes that the plaintiff’s sources about accepting a conversion where the convert sinned afterward are not relevant here, because they assume that the initial conversion was done properly.
R’ Shirman adds that the Shulchan Aruch’s statement accepting a conversion where the court had not properly investigated the convert’s intent is not relevant here either, for that refers only to a court that has not examined the convert’s intent. Where the intent does become clear, and we see that there was no acceptance of mitzvot, or the court itself has been disqualified, the conversion is nullified.
Based on all of the above, there is room for doubt regarding the conversion of the litigant and her three children. The certificate of conversion should be nullified, and the woman and her children should be listed in the register of those who are ineligible to wed.
The court sees no reason, though, to include the (ex-)husband in the registry of those who are ineligible to wed.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's Court, Part VIII
Part VII was here.
In this section, R' Shirman continues to discuss:
a) The question of whether a court may re-open and re-examine the deeds of another court, and
b) The question of whether there is any procedural reason why a non-conversion court would not be able to question a conversion performed by a conversion-specific court.
Section 13: בירור בגדרי כלל בית דין בתר בית דין לא דייקי
R’ Shirman presents the context for the principle that a beit does not examine the deeds of another beit din: Rava tells Rav Pappa and Rav Huna bereih d’Rav Yehoshua to consult him before countering a verdict of his; if he cannot justify his ruling, he will recant (Bava Batra 130b). The Shitah Mekubetzet there, citing Ra'ah and Ran, explains that Rava would recant if he had erred in a dvar mishneh, not in a matter of opinion, for the latter type of error stands.
Based on that, R’ Chaim Pilaggi ruled that even if a court is expert, a court could challenge it, despite the rule of not examining another court’s actions.
It appears, says R’ Shirman, that the rule of not re-opening a court’s case applies lechatchilah, specifically when one knows nothing bad about it. He also finds support for this idea in Radvaz 1:279 (who bases himself on the Rashba) and Chatam Sofer 6:50. The latter responsum dealt with an attempt to justify the openness to overturning a verdict in Bava Batra 130b against Rabban Gamliel’s rejection of R’ Yehoshua’s challenge in Rosh HaShanah 25a.
R’ Shirman then again cites R’ Chaim Pilaggi, to show that if a second court investigates and finds reason to contradict the first, its ruling stands.
R’ Shirman mentions that R’ Chaim Pilaggi did note an apparent contradiction in the Radvaz, for in one case Radvaz wrote as mentioned above, and in another he wrote that one court may actually revisit another court’s actions, and he didn’t mention anything about needing revelation of new facts. R’ Chaim Pilaggi resolved this by suggesting that Radvaz held that a court may, today, investigate an earlier court’s rulings. In the case where he mentioned the new court’s discovery of new facts, he did so in order to show that even if one held that a court could not revisit another court’s rulings, that would not apply if new facts were discovered.
R’ Shirman does note that the Beit Yosef cited the view of Radvaz (in Responsa Avkat Rochel) and rejected it, based on his own reading of the Rashba. However, he points out that the Beit Yosef agreed with Radvaz regarding cases in which the earlier court’s judges were not expert in the law under discussion. R’ Shirman then cites numerous others, including R’ Yisrael Meir Lau, who support the general rule that courts do not revisit the decisions of other courts, although they would support revisiting the decision of an inexpert court.
R’ Shirman concludes that the view of Radvaz is rejected, and so a court could not rely on the argument of Radvaz to justify revisiting the decisions of a municipal court.
Section 14: על בתי הדין לגיור שבימינו לא נאמר הכלל בית דין בתר בית דין לא דייקי
R’ Shirman begins by saying that, as he had said above, even if the principle that courts do not revisit the decisions of other courts remains in force, if the second court finds problems and weaknesses in the earlier ruling, that rule does not apply. Therefore, in light of the discovery of problems in mitzvah acceptance, the chazakah of the ruling is weakened and their decision may be re-examined and nullified, as seen from Rava’s declaration in Bava Batra 130b.
R’ Shirman then contends that most halachah-observant courts involved in conversion, whether in Israel or not, lack a chazakah of correct decisions and rulings – not in terms of deficient halachic knowledge, but in terms of not accurately perceiving the reality of the individual conversion case. He cites the Chazon Ish on the procedure of determining law and analyzing the circumstances in which the law is to be applied.
R’ Shirman cites his own experience, in seeing converts who never intended to accept mitzvot, but simply said they would.
Therefore, R’ Shirman argues, even the Beit Yosef, who balked at the positions of Rashba/Radvaz, would agree to apply them to conversion and say that the courts’ decisions could be re-opened for examination.
R’ Shirman then return to his earlier point, saying that even if we would say a court cannot re-open another court’s decision, we would have to accept the new court’s finding once it did re-open the decision and it did find flaws.
As far as the procedural issue cited earlier in Section 11, R’ Shirman argued again, as he did in Section 12, that the 1984 ruling (already cited in Section 10) from R’ Yaakov Kanaeivsky (the Steipler), R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R’ Shach and R’ Elyashiv, in which they warned that conversion without Torah and mitzvah acceptance is invalid even ex post facto, and should not be accepted by marriage registrars, shows that conversion certificates must still be investigated where there is a concern about the acceptance of mitzvot by the conversion candidate, or a concern about the status of the converting beit din.
We conclude with Part IX here.
In this section, R' Shirman continues to discuss:
a) The question of whether a court may re-open and re-examine the deeds of another court, and
b) The question of whether there is any procedural reason why a non-conversion court would not be able to question a conversion performed by a conversion-specific court.
Section 13: בירור בגדרי כלל בית דין בתר בית דין לא דייקי
R’ Shirman presents the context for the principle that a beit does not examine the deeds of another beit din: Rava tells Rav Pappa and Rav Huna bereih d’Rav Yehoshua to consult him before countering a verdict of his; if he cannot justify his ruling, he will recant (Bava Batra 130b). The Shitah Mekubetzet there, citing Ra'ah and Ran, explains that Rava would recant if he had erred in a dvar mishneh, not in a matter of opinion, for the latter type of error stands.
Based on that, R’ Chaim Pilaggi ruled that even if a court is expert, a court could challenge it, despite the rule of not examining another court’s actions.
It appears, says R’ Shirman, that the rule of not re-opening a court’s case applies lechatchilah, specifically when one knows nothing bad about it. He also finds support for this idea in Radvaz 1:279 (who bases himself on the Rashba) and Chatam Sofer 6:50. The latter responsum dealt with an attempt to justify the openness to overturning a verdict in Bava Batra 130b against Rabban Gamliel’s rejection of R’ Yehoshua’s challenge in Rosh HaShanah 25a.
R’ Shirman then again cites R’ Chaim Pilaggi, to show that if a second court investigates and finds reason to contradict the first, its ruling stands.
R’ Shirman mentions that R’ Chaim Pilaggi did note an apparent contradiction in the Radvaz, for in one case Radvaz wrote as mentioned above, and in another he wrote that one court may actually revisit another court’s actions, and he didn’t mention anything about needing revelation of new facts. R’ Chaim Pilaggi resolved this by suggesting that Radvaz held that a court may, today, investigate an earlier court’s rulings. In the case where he mentioned the new court’s discovery of new facts, he did so in order to show that even if one held that a court could not revisit another court’s rulings, that would not apply if new facts were discovered.
R’ Shirman does note that the Beit Yosef cited the view of Radvaz (in Responsa Avkat Rochel) and rejected it, based on his own reading of the Rashba. However, he points out that the Beit Yosef agreed with Radvaz regarding cases in which the earlier court’s judges were not expert in the law under discussion. R’ Shirman then cites numerous others, including R’ Yisrael Meir Lau, who support the general rule that courts do not revisit the decisions of other courts, although they would support revisiting the decision of an inexpert court.
R’ Shirman concludes that the view of Radvaz is rejected, and so a court could not rely on the argument of Radvaz to justify revisiting the decisions of a municipal court.
Section 14: על בתי הדין לגיור שבימינו לא נאמר הכלל בית דין בתר בית דין לא דייקי
R’ Shirman begins by saying that, as he had said above, even if the principle that courts do not revisit the decisions of other courts remains in force, if the second court finds problems and weaknesses in the earlier ruling, that rule does not apply. Therefore, in light of the discovery of problems in mitzvah acceptance, the chazakah of the ruling is weakened and their decision may be re-examined and nullified, as seen from Rava’s declaration in Bava Batra 130b.
R’ Shirman then contends that most halachah-observant courts involved in conversion, whether in Israel or not, lack a chazakah of correct decisions and rulings – not in terms of deficient halachic knowledge, but in terms of not accurately perceiving the reality of the individual conversion case. He cites the Chazon Ish on the procedure of determining law and analyzing the circumstances in which the law is to be applied.
R’ Shirman cites his own experience, in seeing converts who never intended to accept mitzvot, but simply said they would.
Therefore, R’ Shirman argues, even the Beit Yosef, who balked at the positions of Rashba/Radvaz, would agree to apply them to conversion and say that the courts’ decisions could be re-opened for examination.
R’ Shirman then return to his earlier point, saying that even if we would say a court cannot re-open another court’s decision, we would have to accept the new court’s finding once it did re-open the decision and it did find flaws.
As far as the procedural issue cited earlier in Section 11, R’ Shirman argued again, as he did in Section 12, that the 1984 ruling (already cited in Section 10) from R’ Yaakov Kanaeivsky (the Steipler), R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R’ Shach and R’ Elyashiv, in which they warned that conversion without Torah and mitzvah acceptance is invalid even ex post facto, and should not be accepted by marriage registrars, shows that conversion certificates must still be investigated where there is a concern about the acceptance of mitzvot by the conversion candidate, or a concern about the status of the converting beit din.
We conclude with Part IX here.
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's Court, Part VII
Notes:
Part VI was here.
The full Hebrew text is available on-line at Hirhurim here, and R' Doniel Eidensohn has posted relevant material here. Please let me know of other relevant halachic notes found on-line.
In this section, R' Shirman deals with the question of one court's ability, from halachic and procedural standpoints, to re-visit the decision of another court.
Section 11: דחית עמדת הרב ש. דיכובסקי והרב ע. בר שלום שבית דין רבני אינו מוסמך לבטל גיור שנערך על ידי בית דין מיוחד
The plaintiff claims that the local beit din in deciding to list the woman and her children in the registry for people who cannot marry, for a court lacks the standing to overturn the conversion of another court. This is based on a majority ruling from R’ Daichovsky and R’ Bar Shalom in a case in which a Rechovot court tried to overturn a conversion.
R’ Daichovsky cited a decision from R’ Bakshi-Doron stating that marriage registrars will accept copies of conversion certificates from licensed rabbinic courts and the courts of conversion, and that all other conversions must receive approval of rabbinic courts or the department of the Chief Rabbinate dealing with this issue. This indicates that the two court systems – rabbinic and conversion-specific – function independently, and one cannot nullify a decision of the other.
The plaintiff further cited the principle בית דין אחר בית דין אחר לא דייקי, that one court does not investigate the actions of another.
R’ Shirman notes that this issue is relevant far beyond the actions of R’ Attiyeh’s court, and would affect past decisions involving “many tens and perhaps hundreds” of conversions in which courts have found flaws in the conversion process, tied to the central factor of accepting mitzvot, and have on that basis overturned or cast doubt upon the conversions. The courts in those cases have not been concerned about the cited procedural and halachic challenges to their authority.
Section 12: במעשה בית דין ואישור גיור לא נאמר הכלל של "בית דין בתר בית דין לא דייקי"
The principle of non-investigation comes from Bava Batra 132, and is brought as halachah in the Shach Choshen Mishpat 19:2. However, R’ Shirman contends, based on an earlier ruling of his own court, that the principle that one court does not investigate the actions of another court does not apply to conversion today.
R’ Shirman cites the 1984 ruling (already cited in Section 10) from R’ Yaakov Kanaeivsky (the Steipler), R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R’ Shach and R’ Elyashiv, in which they warned that conversion without Torah and mitzvah acceptance is invalid even ex post facto, and should not be accepted by marriage registrars. R’ Shirman notes that this ruling does not distinguish between courts of different locales or levels of name recognition, and he says that if registrars must investigate, then courts certainly must investigate.
To back up his ruling that a court may investigate an earlier court’s conversions, R’ Shirman cites an argument from his court’s earlier ruling from R’ Isirer, arguing that since the overturning of the conversion is based on information to which the original converting court did not have access, the rule of non-investigation does not apply.
R’ Shirman bases this assertion on a statement of the Rambam. The Rambam recorded the rule of non-investigation (Hilchot Edut 6:5), and added that this principle is based on the assumption (חזקה) that the original court was expert and would not err. In presenting that logic, the Rambam opens up the possibility that new information would warrant re-opening a case, since the חזקה of expertise would no longer be relevant.
R’ Shirman cites a similar conclusion from R’ Chaim Pilaggi’s סמיכה לחיים.
R’ Shirman contends that if a woman declares acceptance of mitzvot before a Beit Din, saying that she doesn’t turn on electric lights on Shabbat although she does not do kiddush or havdalah, and she is told to get married (halachically) immediately after the conversion, and then four months later she acknowledges in a Beit Din that she turns on lights on Shabbat, and justifies her actions by saying observance is difficult, and her husband says there has been no meaningful (משמעותי) change since the conversion aside from niddah observance, this is information that, had it been known to the converting court, would have caused the court to refuse her conversion in the first place. This is considered new, relevant, information to justify re-opening the case. The court is indeed obligated to re-open such a case, to prevent stumbling blocks for individuals and for the community.
The issue of re-opening an earlier court's decision continues in Part VIII, here.
Part VI was here.
The full Hebrew text is available on-line at Hirhurim here, and R' Doniel Eidensohn has posted relevant material here. Please let me know of other relevant halachic notes found on-line.
In this section, R' Shirman deals with the question of one court's ability, from halachic and procedural standpoints, to re-visit the decision of another court.
Section 11: דחית עמדת הרב ש. דיכובסקי והרב ע. בר שלום שבית דין רבני אינו מוסמך לבטל גיור שנערך על ידי בית דין מיוחד
The plaintiff claims that the local beit din in deciding to list the woman and her children in the registry for people who cannot marry, for a court lacks the standing to overturn the conversion of another court. This is based on a majority ruling from R’ Daichovsky and R’ Bar Shalom in a case in which a Rechovot court tried to overturn a conversion.
R’ Daichovsky cited a decision from R’ Bakshi-Doron stating that marriage registrars will accept copies of conversion certificates from licensed rabbinic courts and the courts of conversion, and that all other conversions must receive approval of rabbinic courts or the department of the Chief Rabbinate dealing with this issue. This indicates that the two court systems – rabbinic and conversion-specific – function independently, and one cannot nullify a decision of the other.
The plaintiff further cited the principle בית דין אחר בית דין אחר לא דייקי, that one court does not investigate the actions of another.
R’ Shirman notes that this issue is relevant far beyond the actions of R’ Attiyeh’s court, and would affect past decisions involving “many tens and perhaps hundreds” of conversions in which courts have found flaws in the conversion process, tied to the central factor of accepting mitzvot, and have on that basis overturned or cast doubt upon the conversions. The courts in those cases have not been concerned about the cited procedural and halachic challenges to their authority.
Section 12: במעשה בית דין ואישור גיור לא נאמר הכלל של "בית דין בתר בית דין לא דייקי"
The principle of non-investigation comes from Bava Batra 132, and is brought as halachah in the Shach Choshen Mishpat 19:2. However, R’ Shirman contends, based on an earlier ruling of his own court, that the principle that one court does not investigate the actions of another court does not apply to conversion today.
R’ Shirman cites the 1984 ruling (already cited in Section 10) from R’ Yaakov Kanaeivsky (the Steipler), R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R’ Shach and R’ Elyashiv, in which they warned that conversion without Torah and mitzvah acceptance is invalid even ex post facto, and should not be accepted by marriage registrars. R’ Shirman notes that this ruling does not distinguish between courts of different locales or levels of name recognition, and he says that if registrars must investigate, then courts certainly must investigate.
To back up his ruling that a court may investigate an earlier court’s conversions, R’ Shirman cites an argument from his court’s earlier ruling from R’ Isirer, arguing that since the overturning of the conversion is based on information to which the original converting court did not have access, the rule of non-investigation does not apply.
R’ Shirman bases this assertion on a statement of the Rambam. The Rambam recorded the rule of non-investigation (Hilchot Edut 6:5), and added that this principle is based on the assumption (חזקה) that the original court was expert and would not err. In presenting that logic, the Rambam opens up the possibility that new information would warrant re-opening a case, since the חזקה of expertise would no longer be relevant.
R’ Shirman cites a similar conclusion from R’ Chaim Pilaggi’s סמיכה לחיים.
R’ Shirman contends that if a woman declares acceptance of mitzvot before a Beit Din, saying that she doesn’t turn on electric lights on Shabbat although she does not do kiddush or havdalah, and she is told to get married (halachically) immediately after the conversion, and then four months later she acknowledges in a Beit Din that she turns on lights on Shabbat, and justifies her actions by saying observance is difficult, and her husband says there has been no meaningful (משמעותי) change since the conversion aside from niddah observance, this is information that, had it been known to the converting court, would have caused the court to refuse her conversion in the first place. This is considered new, relevant, information to justify re-opening the case. The court is indeed obligated to re-open such a case, to prevent stumbling blocks for individuals and for the community.
The issue of re-opening an earlier court's decision continues in Part VIII, here.
Monday, May 12, 2008
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's Court, Part VI
Here is Part VI of R' Shirman's verdict; Part V was here.
In this section, R' Shirman justifies disqualifying a conversion ex post facto on the basis of lack of acceptance of mitzvot. It is technically unnecessary for his decision, as he points out, but he addresses it anyway.
Section 10: דחיית שיטת הרב דיכובסקי וקביעתו העקרונית שלא ניתן לפסול גירות בדיעבד לאחר שנעשה
The plaintiff claimed that R’ Attiyeh is in error in listing the woman and her children in the register of those who are ineligible to wed. That claim is based on R’ Daichovsky’s comment in another case, that we examine a convert’s mitzvah acceptance only at the moment of conversion.
R’ Shirman first points out that since the disqualification is actually on the grounds that the court was ineligible, even a full acceptance of mitzvot by the convert would not be relevant.
R’ Shirman continues to examine R’ Daichovsky’s point, though, because R’ Attiyeh did additionally wish to disqualify the conversion on the basis of lack of mitzvah acceptance.
R’ Daichovsky’s point rests on the contention that we are only concerned with intent at the moment of conversion, and that any later examination can only reach doubtful conclusions about what happened, whereas the court which was present at the conversion itself was definitely convinced of the conversion candidate’s sincerity. Later doubts do not override earlier certainty.
R’ Shirman argues that this approach ignores the substantial literature by halachic authorities who discussed the strength of the mitzvah-acceptance requirement in conversion. R’ Shirman says he had even shown R’ Daichovsky a 1984 halachic ruling from R’ Yaakov Kanaevsky (the Steipler), R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R’ Shach and R’ Elyashiv, in which they warned that conversion without Torah and mitzvah acceptance is invalid even ex post facto. R’ Ovadia Yosef also wrote this, saying that if it is known from the start that a convert does not accept Torah and mitzvot, and only pays lip service, then the conversion is not even valid ex post facto.
R’ Shirman then contends (on his own, not quoting anyone) that the test of intention to accept mitzvot is in the lifestyle led by the candidate until the moment of conversion. In the case under discussion, life with a man who is separated from Torah and mitzvot, in a community which does not practice Torah and mitzvot, indicates what was in her mind at the conversion. Further, he notes that she continued to live with that man for months after the conversion, without chuppah or kiddushin. They did not join an observant community or a shul, and the husband never wore tefillin. The litigant’s claim that she observed mitzvot as she could further indicates, says R’ Shirman, that her behavior was limited to external tradition and not truly religious conduct.
Part VII, here, moves into procedural issues as well as the question of a court re-opening decisions from an earlier court.
In this section, R' Shirman justifies disqualifying a conversion ex post facto on the basis of lack of acceptance of mitzvot. It is technically unnecessary for his decision, as he points out, but he addresses it anyway.
Section 10: דחיית שיטת הרב דיכובסקי וקביעתו העקרונית שלא ניתן לפסול גירות בדיעבד לאחר שנעשה
The plaintiff claimed that R’ Attiyeh is in error in listing the woman and her children in the register of those who are ineligible to wed. That claim is based on R’ Daichovsky’s comment in another case, that we examine a convert’s mitzvah acceptance only at the moment of conversion.
R’ Shirman first points out that since the disqualification is actually on the grounds that the court was ineligible, even a full acceptance of mitzvot by the convert would not be relevant.
R’ Shirman continues to examine R’ Daichovsky’s point, though, because R’ Attiyeh did additionally wish to disqualify the conversion on the basis of lack of mitzvah acceptance.
R’ Daichovsky’s point rests on the contention that we are only concerned with intent at the moment of conversion, and that any later examination can only reach doubtful conclusions about what happened, whereas the court which was present at the conversion itself was definitely convinced of the conversion candidate’s sincerity. Later doubts do not override earlier certainty.
R’ Shirman argues that this approach ignores the substantial literature by halachic authorities who discussed the strength of the mitzvah-acceptance requirement in conversion. R’ Shirman says he had even shown R’ Daichovsky a 1984 halachic ruling from R’ Yaakov Kanaevsky (the Steipler), R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, R’ Shach and R’ Elyashiv, in which they warned that conversion without Torah and mitzvah acceptance is invalid even ex post facto. R’ Ovadia Yosef also wrote this, saying that if it is known from the start that a convert does not accept Torah and mitzvot, and only pays lip service, then the conversion is not even valid ex post facto.
R’ Shirman then contends (on his own, not quoting anyone) that the test of intention to accept mitzvot is in the lifestyle led by the candidate until the moment of conversion. In the case under discussion, life with a man who is separated from Torah and mitzvot, in a community which does not practice Torah and mitzvot, indicates what was in her mind at the conversion. Further, he notes that she continued to live with that man for months after the conversion, without chuppah or kiddushin. They did not join an observant community or a shul, and the husband never wore tefillin. The litigant’s claim that she observed mitzvot as she could further indicates, says R’ Shirman, that her behavior was limited to external tradition and not truly religious conduct.
Part VII, here, moves into procedural issues as well as the question of a court re-opening decisions from an earlier court.
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's Court, Part V
Here is Part V; Part IV was here.
In this segment, R' Shirman presents his conclusions regarding the evidence of forgery. I have to admit to being surprised by his conclusion in Section 9.
Section 7: מעשה זיוף מעשה בית דין לגיור כעילה לפסלותם של הרב דרוקמן והרב אביאור מלהיות דיינים בבית דין מגייר
R’ Shirman first addresses the question of whether false signatures disqualify R’ Druckman and R’ Avior from serving as judges for conversion, such that all of their conversions would be invalid.
R’ Shirman points out that Rambam, Smag and Shulchan Aruch all list "love of truth" among their criteria for a judge, and Kenesset haGedolah says the criteria listed are actual requirements. R’ Shirman concludes that within that view, a judge who tricks, and engages in lies and forgery, would then be invalid.
R’ Shirman notes that Birkei Yosef says the traits are not requirements, and that it’s only that when such judges are available, we must use them rather than other people. However, R’ Shirman contends that all would agree that were a judge to conduct himself in a manner opposing these traits, and the conduct would be in the course of his role as a judge, then the judge would not be acceptable.
R’ Shirman draws analogies to shochtim who dealt in improper meat certification, and who were therefore disqualified from continuing to serve. R’ Shirman acknowledges that in this case there actually is, possibly, a conversion process before three judges - but since R’ Avior is among them, and he is a forger, this cannot be considered a proper conversion process before three judges.
R’ Shirman concludes the section by again noting that since the disqualification is conversion-related, it cannot be compared to other cases in which judges have general sins on their records.
Section 8: מעשה זיוף תעודות הגיור כאסורי דאורייתא של גניבת דעת ליחיד ולציבור ולמדינה, גניבת ממון, לפני עור וחילול ה'
R’ Shirman states that executing documents with forged signatures violates serious biblical violations: fooling the public, fooling the conversion candidates, fooling the national government regarding status and rights and citizenship and thereby violating dina d’malchuta, placing a stumbling block before the blind, and chillul HaShem.
Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 228:6 cites Chullin 94a on the prohibition against fooling people, and Ritva on that gemara says it is a biblical prohibition from לא תגנובו ולא תכחשו. Other authorities consider this a d’rabbanan.
R’ Shirman cites additional authorities on this, and contends that regardless of whether fooling people is biblical or rabbinic, these courts’ actions constitute a biblical violation of לפני עור (per the earlier discussions).
R’ Shirman adds that there is also a financial aspect of causing loss to individuals, communities and the country, and that would be a violation of biblical law against theft. He cites Igrot Moshe regarding students stealing the answers to government exams; Rav Moshe wrote that this is prohibited under dina d’malchuta as well as fooling people and stealing money when one seeks a job on the basis of these test scores.
R’ Shirman cites R’ Menashe Klein in Mishneh Halachot regarding forged diplomas; he ruled that this is fooling people, and that because it enables employment it is also theft of money.
R’ Shirman continues to cite the case of a hotel kitchen employee who is a non-observant convert, and who cannot be employed in that kitchen - so that the false conversion document costs both the hotel (in having to fire him) and the employee.
R’ Rosen further raised the issue of chillul HaShem when he discussed these problems with R’ Eliyahu Shapira z”l and R’ Mordechai Eliyahu. R’ Shirman notes that this chillul HaShem has come to pass, in the wake of the case in Warsaw.
Section 9: פסילת הדיין כתוצאה ממעשה הזיוף והמרמה חלה משעת מעשה העבירה
R’ Shirman again (!) notes that disqualification of judges for forgery of signatures would disqualify all of their acts of conversion, for lack of a kosher beit din during the conversion process. It would be retroactive to the time of their disqualification. Therefore, it would extend back to the revelations of R’ Rosen.
The conversion case before the court is from 1992, years before those revelations, and so R’ Rosen’s revelations would not disqualify that conversion. As R’ Shirman cites from the Rama, disqualification of witnesses and judges is only on the basis of definite knowledge, not doubt, such as in a case in which people testify to the non-observance of witnesses after those witnesses have presented testimony, and it is not known which occurred first. (Choshen Mishpat 34:23)
However, R’ Shirman contends that the revealed forgeries demonstrate powerfully that these courts ignore halachic requirements of conversion courts.
In Part VI, found here, R' Shirman turns to the question of whether one may rescind a conversion ex post facto.
In this segment, R' Shirman presents his conclusions regarding the evidence of forgery. I have to admit to being surprised by his conclusion in Section 9.
Section 7: מעשה זיוף מעשה בית דין לגיור כעילה לפסלותם של הרב דרוקמן והרב אביאור מלהיות דיינים בבית דין מגייר
R’ Shirman first addresses the question of whether false signatures disqualify R’ Druckman and R’ Avior from serving as judges for conversion, such that all of their conversions would be invalid.
R’ Shirman points out that Rambam, Smag and Shulchan Aruch all list "love of truth" among their criteria for a judge, and Kenesset haGedolah says the criteria listed are actual requirements. R’ Shirman concludes that within that view, a judge who tricks, and engages in lies and forgery, would then be invalid.
R’ Shirman notes that Birkei Yosef says the traits are not requirements, and that it’s only that when such judges are available, we must use them rather than other people. However, R’ Shirman contends that all would agree that were a judge to conduct himself in a manner opposing these traits, and the conduct would be in the course of his role as a judge, then the judge would not be acceptable.
R’ Shirman draws analogies to shochtim who dealt in improper meat certification, and who were therefore disqualified from continuing to serve. R’ Shirman acknowledges that in this case there actually is, possibly, a conversion process before three judges - but since R’ Avior is among them, and he is a forger, this cannot be considered a proper conversion process before three judges.
R’ Shirman concludes the section by again noting that since the disqualification is conversion-related, it cannot be compared to other cases in which judges have general sins on their records.
Section 8: מעשה זיוף תעודות הגיור כאסורי דאורייתא של גניבת דעת ליחיד ולציבור ולמדינה, גניבת ממון, לפני עור וחילול ה'
R’ Shirman states that executing documents with forged signatures violates serious biblical violations: fooling the public, fooling the conversion candidates, fooling the national government regarding status and rights and citizenship and thereby violating dina d’malchuta, placing a stumbling block before the blind, and chillul HaShem.
Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 228:6 cites Chullin 94a on the prohibition against fooling people, and Ritva on that gemara says it is a biblical prohibition from לא תגנובו ולא תכחשו. Other authorities consider this a d’rabbanan.
R’ Shirman cites additional authorities on this, and contends that regardless of whether fooling people is biblical or rabbinic, these courts’ actions constitute a biblical violation of לפני עור (per the earlier discussions).
R’ Shirman adds that there is also a financial aspect of causing loss to individuals, communities and the country, and that would be a violation of biblical law against theft. He cites Igrot Moshe regarding students stealing the answers to government exams; Rav Moshe wrote that this is prohibited under dina d’malchuta as well as fooling people and stealing money when one seeks a job on the basis of these test scores.
R’ Shirman cites R’ Menashe Klein in Mishneh Halachot regarding forged diplomas; he ruled that this is fooling people, and that because it enables employment it is also theft of money.
R’ Shirman continues to cite the case of a hotel kitchen employee who is a non-observant convert, and who cannot be employed in that kitchen - so that the false conversion document costs both the hotel (in having to fire him) and the employee.
R’ Rosen further raised the issue of chillul HaShem when he discussed these problems with R’ Eliyahu Shapira z”l and R’ Mordechai Eliyahu. R’ Shirman notes that this chillul HaShem has come to pass, in the wake of the case in Warsaw.
Section 9: פסילת הדיין כתוצאה ממעשה הזיוף והמרמה חלה משעת מעשה העבירה
R’ Shirman again (!) notes that disqualification of judges for forgery of signatures would disqualify all of their acts of conversion, for lack of a kosher beit din during the conversion process. It would be retroactive to the time of their disqualification. Therefore, it would extend back to the revelations of R’ Rosen.
The conversion case before the court is from 1992, years before those revelations, and so R’ Rosen’s revelations would not disqualify that conversion. As R’ Shirman cites from the Rama, disqualification of witnesses and judges is only on the basis of definite knowledge, not doubt, such as in a case in which people testify to the non-observance of witnesses after those witnesses have presented testimony, and it is not known which occurred first. (Choshen Mishpat 34:23)
However, R’ Shirman contends that the revealed forgeries demonstrate powerfully that these courts ignore halachic requirements of conversion courts.
In Part VI, found here, R' Shirman turns to the question of whether one may rescind a conversion ex post facto.
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's Court, Part IV
Here is Part IV; Part III was here.
[Note: I am spelling the name Shirman because I've seen it transliterated that way in several places. I've also seen Sherman and Scherman. No disrespect is intended; please let me know if you have an accurate source for the English-language spelling.]
This, to me, begins the most problematic section.
The entire first part depended on the allegation that R' Druckman does not require mitzvah observance, a contention which is simply declared without substantiation.
Here, though, the discussion enters into signature forgery and inappropriate signatures, and seems to be based in public fact... this does worry me.
Section 6: תאור פרשיות זיוף תעודות מעשה בית דין לגיור שנעשה על ידי אבה"ד הרב דרוקמן וסגנו הרב אביאור
In addition to his ruling, R’ Attiyeh asked R’ Shirman to confirm his finding that the converting court is pasul, and so the conversion is invalid. R’ Attuyeh cited the case brought by Attorney ש. יעקבי against R’ Druckman for forging a conversion document for a court in Warsaw, by signing on it when in fact he was in Israel on the date of the conversion. R’ Druckman acknowledged, in a hearing, that he was not in Warsaw during the conversion, and was not part of a group of three as noted in the document on which he had signed. He explained that he had promised the woman to convert her, and so he had signed on the deed.
Attorney יעקבי added that R’ Avior, a member of the conversion courts, was also actively involved in the creation of that forged document.
Attorney יעקבי also contended that this was not a lone incident, and mentioned another, similar case. He said that R’ Druckman had been summoned to a hearing over that, and had pledged not to do this again.
Attorney יעקבי also contended that he had tens more cases like this.
R’ Atiyyeh also included ifnromation from a journalist Elazar Levine, from a website, on the investigation into R’ Druckman.
R’ Shirman said that after analyzing Attorney יעקבי’s information, he found a frightening picture of false documents and false testimony on acts of the conversion courts and confirmation of Jewish status in close to 200 conversion documents from 1999 through 2005.
R’ Shirman cited a letter from 2000 from R’ Yisrael Rosen, then the head of the conversion courts, to R’ Mordechai Eliyahu, on forgery he had uncovered from an unnamed judge who had signed on documents for conversions for which he had not been present – documents which said במותב תלתא יתיבנא etc. R’ Rosen said the signing rabbi did not deny the allegations. R’ Rosen said he thought the signing rabbi was simply careless in signing papers that were put before him without examining them.
R’ Shirman contends that R’ Rosen sent the letter to R’ Druckman and received no reply.
R’ Rosen said he asked R’ Druckman directly about what would be required in order to be able to sign a document, and R’ Druckman said being present for tevillah would suffice. R’ Shirman argues that this should not be sufficient to be able to sign the paper, given that the paper mentions having investigated and clarified the desire of the conversion candidate.
R’ Shirman goes on to detail the process of the investigation of R’ Druckman, the rest of the beit din, and specifically R’ Avior who is accused of signing R’ Druckman’s name on conversion documents.
The reason given by R’ Rosen for these signatures is that R’ Yisrael Meir Lau required that a qualified dayyan be present at every conversion.
R’ Rosen’s lengthy file concludes with three questions asked of R’ Mordechai Eliyahu as well as R’ Avraham Shapira z”l:
1) What to do with court documents that are now known to be false and have not been given to the converts yet;
2) What to do with court documents that are now known to be false and have been given to the converts already;
3) What to do with court documents from the past half-year since these allegations have come to light.
More in Part V on the way R' Shirman's court addresses these questions, here.
[Note: I am spelling the name Shirman because I've seen it transliterated that way in several places. I've also seen Sherman and Scherman. No disrespect is intended; please let me know if you have an accurate source for the English-language spelling.]
This, to me, begins the most problematic section.
The entire first part depended on the allegation that R' Druckman does not require mitzvah observance, a contention which is simply declared without substantiation.
Here, though, the discussion enters into signature forgery and inappropriate signatures, and seems to be based in public fact... this does worry me.
Section 6: תאור פרשיות זיוף תעודות מעשה בית דין לגיור שנעשה על ידי אבה"ד הרב דרוקמן וסגנו הרב אביאור
In addition to his ruling, R’ Attiyeh asked R’ Shirman to confirm his finding that the converting court is pasul, and so the conversion is invalid. R’ Attuyeh cited the case brought by Attorney ש. יעקבי against R’ Druckman for forging a conversion document for a court in Warsaw, by signing on it when in fact he was in Israel on the date of the conversion. R’ Druckman acknowledged, in a hearing, that he was not in Warsaw during the conversion, and was not part of a group of three as noted in the document on which he had signed. He explained that he had promised the woman to convert her, and so he had signed on the deed.
Attorney יעקבי added that R’ Avior, a member of the conversion courts, was also actively involved in the creation of that forged document.
Attorney יעקבי also contended that this was not a lone incident, and mentioned another, similar case. He said that R’ Druckman had been summoned to a hearing over that, and had pledged not to do this again.
Attorney יעקבי also contended that he had tens more cases like this.
R’ Atiyyeh also included ifnromation from a journalist Elazar Levine, from a website, on the investigation into R’ Druckman.
R’ Shirman said that after analyzing Attorney יעקבי’s information, he found a frightening picture of false documents and false testimony on acts of the conversion courts and confirmation of Jewish status in close to 200 conversion documents from 1999 through 2005.
R’ Shirman cited a letter from 2000 from R’ Yisrael Rosen, then the head of the conversion courts, to R’ Mordechai Eliyahu, on forgery he had uncovered from an unnamed judge who had signed on documents for conversions for which he had not been present – documents which said במותב תלתא יתיבנא etc. R’ Rosen said the signing rabbi did not deny the allegations. R’ Rosen said he thought the signing rabbi was simply careless in signing papers that were put before him without examining them.
R’ Shirman contends that R’ Rosen sent the letter to R’ Druckman and received no reply.
R’ Rosen said he asked R’ Druckman directly about what would be required in order to be able to sign a document, and R’ Druckman said being present for tevillah would suffice. R’ Shirman argues that this should not be sufficient to be able to sign the paper, given that the paper mentions having investigated and clarified the desire of the conversion candidate.
R’ Shirman goes on to detail the process of the investigation of R’ Druckman, the rest of the beit din, and specifically R’ Avior who is accused of signing R’ Druckman’s name on conversion documents.
The reason given by R’ Rosen for these signatures is that R’ Yisrael Meir Lau required that a qualified dayyan be present at every conversion.
R’ Rosen’s lengthy file concludes with three questions asked of R’ Mordechai Eliyahu as well as R’ Avraham Shapira z”l:
1) What to do with court documents that are now known to be false and have not been given to the converts yet;
2) What to do with court documents that are now known to be false and have been given to the converts already;
3) What to do with court documents from the past half-year since these allegations have come to light.
More in Part V on the way R' Shirman's court addresses these questions, here.
Daf: Nazir 59-63 - Women, Weapons and non-Jewish nazirites
Getting toward the end of Nazir here. Some very interesting discussions of cross-dressing, as well as women carrying weapons, and a non-Jewish nazir.
59a
The discussion of cross-dressing and of women carrying (let alone wielding) weapons of war begs the question of Yael the Keini’s actions in killing Sisera. Pseudo-Rashi here offers the standard explanation, that this is why Yael used a tent peg rather than a dagger. It isn’t clear that the whole story is a problem in the first place, though, since Yael, it may be argued, was not Jewish. This is subject to the debate of whether Yitro, Yael’s ancestor, returned home and converted his family, or not.
Note that when the Jews went to war against Amalek under Shaul in Shemuel II 15, they asked the Keini to move away from Amalek first. It certainly sounds as though the Keini did not consider themselves Jewish.
For more on the issue of women and weapons of war, see Abarbanel on Devorah, as well as Tzitz Eliezer 20:31:1 on Devorah. See also Targum to Shoftim 5:26 on Yael. For modern applications, see Yechaveh Daat 5:55, Igrot Moshe 4:9 and 4:75:3, and Tzitz Eliezer 18:63.
See Tosafot חזינא and ההוא, and the Rosh, regarding the status of scissors for male shaving of פיאות.
The title of בר פחתי is, of course, reminiscent of הקריבהו נא לפחתך. The word פחה is linked to pasha, I believe.
59b
See the Rosh explaining how this was supposed to sharpen the minds of the students.
60b
The last five lines on the page appear to be a restatement of what we know from before? Noet that the Rosh has לישנא אחרינא here.
61a
I am troubled by the statement, from the Erchin discussion, that בני ישראל is global rather than Jewish-specific – it’s only because of the additional word איש that we are able to say it is universal in the ערכין case! But I’ve never found an answer for this.
61b
Tosafos quotes a pasuk to show that an עכו"מ does not have the פרה אדומה ritual.
Lest anyone ask how the Torah could legislate such a prohibition for an עכו"מ, outside the 7 mitzvos bnei noach, I’d point out that we have prohibitions against עכו"מ learning Torah (Sanhedrin 59a) and observing Shabbat (Sanhedrin 58b).
62b
Note, on the first mishnah, that when the אדון forces the עבד כנעני to break his vow and drink, the vow remains binding such that when the עבדות ends, the vow is reinstated. (Rosh, and gemara later)
Note the reversal of the names of Abbaye and Rava. This is standard, based on the idea that since Abbaye started out as Rava’s rebbe, he does not respond to Rava’s ideas, but rather Rava responds to his. Sometimes Rava’s name is edited to “Rabbah” for the same reason.
63a
The use of רגלים לדבר here is odd. The phrase means that we have observed an event or a fact which indicates that certain results or associated events/facts are also likely. It comes from the term רגל as “cause” (as well as “foot,” much as עקב is also “cause” as well as “heel”). Here, though, the term רגלים לדבר doesn’t fit. The Rosh notes as much.
59a
The discussion of cross-dressing and of women carrying (let alone wielding) weapons of war begs the question of Yael the Keini’s actions in killing Sisera. Pseudo-Rashi here offers the standard explanation, that this is why Yael used a tent peg rather than a dagger. It isn’t clear that the whole story is a problem in the first place, though, since Yael, it may be argued, was not Jewish. This is subject to the debate of whether Yitro, Yael’s ancestor, returned home and converted his family, or not.
Note that when the Jews went to war against Amalek under Shaul in Shemuel II 15, they asked the Keini to move away from Amalek first. It certainly sounds as though the Keini did not consider themselves Jewish.
For more on the issue of women and weapons of war, see Abarbanel on Devorah, as well as Tzitz Eliezer 20:31:1 on Devorah. See also Targum to Shoftim 5:26 on Yael. For modern applications, see Yechaveh Daat 5:55, Igrot Moshe 4:9 and 4:75:3, and Tzitz Eliezer 18:63.
See Tosafot חזינא and ההוא, and the Rosh, regarding the status of scissors for male shaving of פיאות.
The title of בר פחתי is, of course, reminiscent of הקריבהו נא לפחתך. The word פחה is linked to pasha, I believe.
59b
See the Rosh explaining how this was supposed to sharpen the minds of the students.
60b
The last five lines on the page appear to be a restatement of what we know from before? Noet that the Rosh has לישנא אחרינא here.
61a
I am troubled by the statement, from the Erchin discussion, that בני ישראל is global rather than Jewish-specific – it’s only because of the additional word איש that we are able to say it is universal in the ערכין case! But I’ve never found an answer for this.
61b
Tosafos quotes a pasuk to show that an עכו"מ does not have the פרה אדומה ritual.
Lest anyone ask how the Torah could legislate such a prohibition for an עכו"מ, outside the 7 mitzvos bnei noach, I’d point out that we have prohibitions against עכו"מ learning Torah (Sanhedrin 59a) and observing Shabbat (Sanhedrin 58b).
62b
Note, on the first mishnah, that when the אדון forces the עבד כנעני to break his vow and drink, the vow remains binding such that when the עבדות ends, the vow is reinstated. (Rosh, and gemara later)
Note the reversal of the names of Abbaye and Rava. This is standard, based on the idea that since Abbaye started out as Rava’s rebbe, he does not respond to Rava’s ideas, but rather Rava responds to his. Sometimes Rava’s name is edited to “Rabbah” for the same reason.
63a
The use of רגלים לדבר here is odd. The phrase means that we have observed an event or a fact which indicates that certain results or associated events/facts are also likely. It comes from the term רגל as “cause” (as well as “foot,” much as עקב is also “cause” as well as “heel”). Here, though, the term רגלים לדבר doesn’t fit. The Rosh notes as much.
Sunday, May 11, 2008
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's Court, Part III
Here is Part III; Part II was here.
I wish to stress again that I am not "siding with" R' Shirman's ruling. I just feel it is important that the issue be discussed with knowledge of the issues at hand.
Section 5: בית דין מגייר שעובר בגיור על לפני עור אין לראותו כשוגג
R’ Shirman then returns to an earlier theme, from Section 2: That a court which ignores the serious results of inappopriate conversion cannot be excused as erring in pursuit of a mitzvah. Therefore, he writes, “Any act of conversion they perform is lacking a kosher beit din, and therefore there is no strength or effectiveness for their conversion.”
R’ Shirman rejects, as he did in Section 2, any comparison between this case and people who bury on the first day of Yom Tov.
R’ Shirman also again rejects any claim that there is a mitzvah in bringing these people into בני ישראל.
R’ Shirman then quotes a member of the conversion courts (ר' פריס) who had written that we live in a time when we must look to the future of the Jewish nation.
He quotes another member of the conversion courts (ר' רוזנפלד) who had written that because of intermarriage concerns we are in an עת לעשות לה', and we must help them convert lest they become mixed into the population in Israel without conversion.
He quotes a third member of the conversion courts (ר' בס) who writes that closing the doors to converts today is in act of opening gates to the outside and to assimilation. He writes that conversion is a public need, and there should be no piling of obstacles in the way of the convert.
R’ Shirman adds that the judges on these courts see conversion as a mitzvah due to national responsibility and public need.
R’ Shirman then tries to contend that this is different from the Yom Tov gravediggers because the Yom Tov gravediggers see the actual deed of digging a grave as a mitzvah, whereas the courts see a mitzvah down the road from their conversion, but then he recants.
R’ Shirman concludes the section by arguing that the idea of converting as a social need is flawed, for these candidates do not begin to function as Jews.
I am breaking here because the verdict then goes in a new direction, addressing the allegations that leading members of the conversion courts had actually forged documents of conversion.
I hope to continue with Part IV tomorrow. [Note: It is now here.]
I wish to stress again that I am not "siding with" R' Shirman's ruling. I just feel it is important that the issue be discussed with knowledge of the issues at hand.
Section 5: בית דין מגייר שעובר בגיור על לפני עור אין לראותו כשוגג
R’ Shirman then returns to an earlier theme, from Section 2: That a court which ignores the serious results of inappopriate conversion cannot be excused as erring in pursuit of a mitzvah. Therefore, he writes, “Any act of conversion they perform is lacking a kosher beit din, and therefore there is no strength or effectiveness for their conversion.”
R’ Shirman rejects, as he did in Section 2, any comparison between this case and people who bury on the first day of Yom Tov.
R’ Shirman also again rejects any claim that there is a mitzvah in bringing these people into בני ישראל.
R’ Shirman then quotes a member of the conversion courts (ר' פריס) who had written that we live in a time when we must look to the future of the Jewish nation.
He quotes another member of the conversion courts (ר' רוזנפלד) who had written that because of intermarriage concerns we are in an עת לעשות לה', and we must help them convert lest they become mixed into the population in Israel without conversion.
He quotes a third member of the conversion courts (ר' בס) who writes that closing the doors to converts today is in act of opening gates to the outside and to assimilation. He writes that conversion is a public need, and there should be no piling of obstacles in the way of the convert.
R’ Shirman adds that the judges on these courts see conversion as a mitzvah due to national responsibility and public need.
R’ Shirman then tries to contend that this is different from the Yom Tov gravediggers because the Yom Tov gravediggers see the actual deed of digging a grave as a mitzvah, whereas the courts see a mitzvah down the road from their conversion, but then he recants.
R’ Shirman concludes the section by arguing that the idea of converting as a social need is flawed, for these candidates do not begin to function as Jews.
I am breaking here because the verdict then goes in a new direction, addressing the allegations that leading members of the conversion courts had actually forged documents of conversion.
I hope to continue with Part IV tomorrow. [Note: It is now here.]
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's Court, Part II
Part I was here; this is Part II-
Section 3: ביטול גיור כשבית הדין המגייר עובר על איסור דאורייתא של לפני עור
R’ Attiyeh also brought the view of the Migdal Tzofim that judges who accept ineligible converts violate לפני עור, the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind. Therefore, they are disqualified as judges.
R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo 35:3) wrote that judges who accept converts who clearly have no intention of keeping mitzvot are violating לפני עור even if the conversion is valid, for now this convert will be liable for his sins.
R’ Shirman then notes that he found the same idea in Rav Kook (Daat Kohen Hilchot Milah v’Gerut 154), that accepting such converts is a violation of לפני עור, either because the conversion is invalid and so people will think erroneously that they are Jewish, or because the conversion is valid and now they are liable for their sins.
R’ Shirman also cites the Sridei Eish (2:96) regarding conversion of a minor in a non-mitzvah-observant household, where the child also will not observe mitzvot. He wrote that the conversion is invalid, and causes a stumbling block for people.
R’ Shirman then digresses into an interesting discussion of the nature of לפני עור, and the question of whether the prohibition applies only to aiding in the transgression, or even in making the transgression possible by creating the stumbling block. (I recall an interesting article on this in HaDarom a few years back, regarding a travel agent selling a Jew a ticket for a Shabbat plane flight. - TRH) The application here is that in labelling this person a Jew one is not actually forcing anyone to marry him/her. He compared the case to a discussion of the Netziv regarding marrying off a couple who will not observe niddah.
R’ Shirman concludes that he does not believe a biblical violation of לפני עור has occurred, because the judges do not aid in the actual aveirah. However, he notes that he presented this argument to R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and did not succeed in swaying him. R’ Shirman then writes that he reconsidered his own position and realized that in the conversion case the link between the conversion and the aveirah is very close, closer even than in the marriage of two people who will not observe the laws of niddah, and therefore the title of לפני עור is more appropriate there.
He then cites the Beit Ploni for further support that converting such people is a problem of causing others to stumble. The Beit Ploni did not use the term “לפני עור,” though.
Along the way R’ Shirman discusses whether it is beneficial for a child to be converted to Judaism without mitzvah observance.
R’ Shirman then concludes that this issue of לפני עור is sufficient to disqualify the judges entirely - not only as a violation of Torah law, but as an aveirah which runs counter to the essence of a converting court’s nature.
Section 4: מעשה בית הדין המגייר כמצוה מגדיר מהות הגדר
R’ Shirman now cites Yevamot 47b which states that conversion of a candidate is a mitzvah.
The Tashbetz asks where this fits into the 613.
The issue comes up, as well, in the discussion of reciting the berachah on a convert’s immersion before the conversion itself, and the text of אשר קדשנו במצוותיו וצונו, that Gd has instructed this mitzvah. The Raavad discusses this regarding a minor’s conversion, and labels it a mitzvah.
R’ Shirman then cites R’ Albertsaloni who lists this as part of the mitzvah of loving the convert. This is difficult, though, given that such a mitzvah applies only post-conversion.
R’ Shirman analyzes this based on two approaches to the mitzvah of loving the convert: The Rambam’s view (Aseh 207 and further cited locations) that this mitzvah is because of the convert’s special spiritual level, vs. the Chinuch’s view (Mitzvah 431) that this mitzvah is because of the convert’s special social status.
R’ Shirman argues that based on the Rambam’s view, we can understand R’ Albersaloni’s view that helping the ger convert is part of expressing that love.
R’ Shirman then offers another approach to the Tashbetz’s question from the Raavad’s words regarding the berachah; he sees here the idea that helping the ger to convert is a fulfillment of אהבת ה', loving Gd.
R’ Shirman adds that if this is the mitzvah, then the merit for a minor in converting is dependent upon him becoming connected to HaShem, the Torah and its mitzvot.
R’ Shirman then embarks on a tangent regarding inappropriate conversion of minors, such as in adoption cases, before returning to his central point: That since conversion of candidates is a mitzvah, and since the mitzvah is dependent upon increasing their connection to HaShem, therefore conversion of candidates who will not follow the mitzvot is not the mitzvah of conversion at all.
More to come, in Part III, Gd-willing...
Section 3: ביטול גיור כשבית הדין המגייר עובר על איסור דאורייתא של לפני עור
R’ Attiyeh also brought the view of the Migdal Tzofim that judges who accept ineligible converts violate לפני עור, the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind. Therefore, they are disqualified as judges.
R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Minchat Shlomo 35:3) wrote that judges who accept converts who clearly have no intention of keeping mitzvot are violating לפני עור even if the conversion is valid, for now this convert will be liable for his sins.
R’ Shirman then notes that he found the same idea in Rav Kook (Daat Kohen Hilchot Milah v’Gerut 154), that accepting such converts is a violation of לפני עור, either because the conversion is invalid and so people will think erroneously that they are Jewish, or because the conversion is valid and now they are liable for their sins.
R’ Shirman also cites the Sridei Eish (2:96) regarding conversion of a minor in a non-mitzvah-observant household, where the child also will not observe mitzvot. He wrote that the conversion is invalid, and causes a stumbling block for people.
R’ Shirman then digresses into an interesting discussion of the nature of לפני עור, and the question of whether the prohibition applies only to aiding in the transgression, or even in making the transgression possible by creating the stumbling block. (I recall an interesting article on this in HaDarom a few years back, regarding a travel agent selling a Jew a ticket for a Shabbat plane flight. - TRH) The application here is that in labelling this person a Jew one is not actually forcing anyone to marry him/her. He compared the case to a discussion of the Netziv regarding marrying off a couple who will not observe niddah.
R’ Shirman concludes that he does not believe a biblical violation of לפני עור has occurred, because the judges do not aid in the actual aveirah. However, he notes that he presented this argument to R’ Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and did not succeed in swaying him. R’ Shirman then writes that he reconsidered his own position and realized that in the conversion case the link between the conversion and the aveirah is very close, closer even than in the marriage of two people who will not observe the laws of niddah, and therefore the title of לפני עור is more appropriate there.
He then cites the Beit Ploni for further support that converting such people is a problem of causing others to stumble. The Beit Ploni did not use the term “לפני עור,” though.
Along the way R’ Shirman discusses whether it is beneficial for a child to be converted to Judaism without mitzvah observance.
R’ Shirman then concludes that this issue of לפני עור is sufficient to disqualify the judges entirely - not only as a violation of Torah law, but as an aveirah which runs counter to the essence of a converting court’s nature.
Section 4: מעשה בית הדין המגייר כמצוה מגדיר מהות הגדר
R’ Shirman now cites Yevamot 47b which states that conversion of a candidate is a mitzvah.
The Tashbetz asks where this fits into the 613.
The issue comes up, as well, in the discussion of reciting the berachah on a convert’s immersion before the conversion itself, and the text of אשר קדשנו במצוותיו וצונו, that Gd has instructed this mitzvah. The Raavad discusses this regarding a minor’s conversion, and labels it a mitzvah.
R’ Shirman then cites R’ Albertsaloni who lists this as part of the mitzvah of loving the convert. This is difficult, though, given that such a mitzvah applies only post-conversion.
R’ Shirman analyzes this based on two approaches to the mitzvah of loving the convert: The Rambam’s view (Aseh 207 and further cited locations) that this mitzvah is because of the convert’s special spiritual level, vs. the Chinuch’s view (Mitzvah 431) that this mitzvah is because of the convert’s special social status.
R’ Shirman argues that based on the Rambam’s view, we can understand R’ Albersaloni’s view that helping the ger convert is part of expressing that love.
R’ Shirman then offers another approach to the Tashbetz’s question from the Raavad’s words regarding the berachah; he sees here the idea that helping the ger to convert is a fulfillment of אהבת ה', loving Gd.
R’ Shirman adds that if this is the mitzvah, then the merit for a minor in converting is dependent upon him becoming connected to HaShem, the Torah and its mitzvot.
R’ Shirman then embarks on a tangent regarding inappropriate conversion of minors, such as in adoption cases, before returning to his central point: That since conversion of candidates is a mitzvah, and since the mitzvah is dependent upon increasing their connection to HaShem, therefore conversion of candidates who will not follow the mitzvot is not the mitzvah of conversion at all.
More to come, in Part III, Gd-willing...
Transcript of the Verdict of R' Shirman's court, Part I
[This week's Haveil Havalim is here]
I have been reading more than I ought to be reading of the back-and-forth regarding R' Shirman's disqualification of R' Druckman's courts, and their past conversions.
I still don't have a "side" in this; I can see problems on both sides, regrettably. And the real tragedy, of course, is for the individuals and families caught in the middle. The whole thing is sickening.
But I am particularly aggravated by the number of people who are commenting on this without reading what is a publicly available document, the decision of R' Shirman. It's not secret, it's not classified, it's publicly available on-line. And yet, the pontificators and bloviators are out in force, commenting on that which they have not bothered to read.
So I've decided to do something about it: I am posting an English digest of the major points made in R' Shirman's decision. Here is Part 1; I'm not sure whether I'll get to Part 2 tonight, but eventually I hope to cover the whole thing:
Section 1: Cites the claims of each side
R’ Attiyeh’s claim that the woman and her children are not Jewish, because:
a) the court which converted them is pasul and the judges are pasul, such that the conversion itself is invalid, and
b) the woman never accepted mitzvot, and does not observe central mitzvot to this day.
The woman’s response is that her conversion was valid, with valid judges, and that she does observe mitzvot to some extent, including Shabbat candles, Yom Tov celebration, fasting on Yom Kippur, avoidance of chametz on Pesach and sitting in a Succah on Succot.
There is also a further issue, in which the court wished to list the woman and her children in the registry of people who may not wed. The woman contends that the court has no standing in this matter, for one court does not have the ability to overturn the conversion of another court.
The woman also contends that the court cannot list her children in the registry, for she is not personally credible to disqualify her children, with their chazakah of Judaism.
The woman concluded her charges by declaring that R’ Attiyeh’s court is guilty of the severe prohibition of Onaat haGer, oppressing the convert.
Section 2: ביטול גיור משום פסול בית הדין המגייר
The court examines the possibility of rescinding a conversion based upon disqualification of the converting court. This is based upon the charge that R’ Druckman’s court frivolously discounts the halachic requirement of קבלת מצוות, acceptance of mitzvot, and in disregarding this law they are guilty of מגלה פנים בתורה שלא כהלכה, knowingly misinterpreting Torah and its laws, so that they are rendered “intentional sinners and apikorsim.”
If so, then per Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268:3, which requires three כשרים for a court, the conversion had no court.
R’ Attiyeh also cited R’ Moshe Shternbuch’s Teshuvot v’Hanhagot disqualifying conversion which will not lead to mitzvah observance. R’ Shternbuch himself cited many authorities, and said that a court which accepts such converts is causing them to stumble and guilty of great sin. He added that such a court would not be a legitimate court, since they give inappropriate rulings. Therefore, if a court would know that that converts will not maintain their mitzvah observance, their conversions would be invalid.
R’ Shternbuch further argued, in another responsum, that all courts operate for conversion as proxies of the courts which had true semichah, and that courts which would accept non-observant converts would lose their ability to be proxies of those older courts.
In a third responsum, R’ Shternbuch refused to grant an aliyah to a sincere, observant convert, because he had converted previously in a court which accepted converts who did not accept mitzvot. He wrote that the man is a נכרי by letter of the law.
R’ Shternbuch did write that perhaps we could accept him, if we were stuck, until he could immerse before proper judges, if we could argue that the judges thought they were doing a mitzvah.
R’ Attiyeh then brought further, similar material from the Teshuvot Migdal Tzofim.
As far as the possible acceptance of the judges because they think they are doing a mitzvah, this would likely not be relevant in our case. The source for that principle is the acceptance of witnesses who bury people on the first day of Yom Tov, a sin which does not relate directly to functioning in court. Here, the transgression relates directly to their function as judges. It’s like disqualification for taking a bribe.
To be continued in Part II here.
I have been reading more than I ought to be reading of the back-and-forth regarding R' Shirman's disqualification of R' Druckman's courts, and their past conversions.
I still don't have a "side" in this; I can see problems on both sides, regrettably. And the real tragedy, of course, is for the individuals and families caught in the middle. The whole thing is sickening.
But I am particularly aggravated by the number of people who are commenting on this without reading what is a publicly available document, the decision of R' Shirman. It's not secret, it's not classified, it's publicly available on-line. And yet, the pontificators and bloviators are out in force, commenting on that which they have not bothered to read.
So I've decided to do something about it: I am posting an English digest of the major points made in R' Shirman's decision. Here is Part 1; I'm not sure whether I'll get to Part 2 tonight, but eventually I hope to cover the whole thing:
Section 1: Cites the claims of each side
R’ Attiyeh’s claim that the woman and her children are not Jewish, because:
a) the court which converted them is pasul and the judges are pasul, such that the conversion itself is invalid, and
b) the woman never accepted mitzvot, and does not observe central mitzvot to this day.
The woman’s response is that her conversion was valid, with valid judges, and that she does observe mitzvot to some extent, including Shabbat candles, Yom Tov celebration, fasting on Yom Kippur, avoidance of chametz on Pesach and sitting in a Succah on Succot.
There is also a further issue, in which the court wished to list the woman and her children in the registry of people who may not wed. The woman contends that the court has no standing in this matter, for one court does not have the ability to overturn the conversion of another court.
The woman also contends that the court cannot list her children in the registry, for she is not personally credible to disqualify her children, with their chazakah of Judaism.
The woman concluded her charges by declaring that R’ Attiyeh’s court is guilty of the severe prohibition of Onaat haGer, oppressing the convert.
Section 2: ביטול גיור משום פסול בית הדין המגייר
The court examines the possibility of rescinding a conversion based upon disqualification of the converting court. This is based upon the charge that R’ Druckman’s court frivolously discounts the halachic requirement of קבלת מצוות, acceptance of mitzvot, and in disregarding this law they are guilty of מגלה פנים בתורה שלא כהלכה, knowingly misinterpreting Torah and its laws, so that they are rendered “intentional sinners and apikorsim.”
If so, then per Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268:3, which requires three כשרים for a court, the conversion had no court.
R’ Attiyeh also cited R’ Moshe Shternbuch’s Teshuvot v’Hanhagot disqualifying conversion which will not lead to mitzvah observance. R’ Shternbuch himself cited many authorities, and said that a court which accepts such converts is causing them to stumble and guilty of great sin. He added that such a court would not be a legitimate court, since they give inappropriate rulings. Therefore, if a court would know that that converts will not maintain their mitzvah observance, their conversions would be invalid.
R’ Shternbuch further argued, in another responsum, that all courts operate for conversion as proxies of the courts which had true semichah, and that courts which would accept non-observant converts would lose their ability to be proxies of those older courts.
In a third responsum, R’ Shternbuch refused to grant an aliyah to a sincere, observant convert, because he had converted previously in a court which accepted converts who did not accept mitzvot. He wrote that the man is a נכרי by letter of the law.
R’ Shternbuch did write that perhaps we could accept him, if we were stuck, until he could immerse before proper judges, if we could argue that the judges thought they were doing a mitzvah.
R’ Attiyeh then brought further, similar material from the Teshuvot Migdal Tzofim.
As far as the possible acceptance of the judges because they think they are doing a mitzvah, this would likely not be relevant in our case. The source for that principle is the acceptance of witnesses who bury people on the first day of Yom Tov, a sin which does not relate directly to functioning in court. Here, the transgression relates directly to their function as judges. It’s like disqualification for taking a bribe.
To be continued in Part II here.
Saturday, May 10, 2008
Teaching our children the positives of Judaism
First: After Shabbos, with all of its various strains and drains, I really need to read something like this: Top ten reasons to get punched in the face.
Second:
Tzipporah the Midianite has an interesting analysis here of a perceived difference between liberal and conservative approaches to Judaism and its mitzvot. She observes that liberal Judaism tends to emphasize extra מצוות עשה (active commandments) and traditional Judaism tends to emphasize and expand מצוות לא תעשה (prohibitions). Tzipporah contends (if I understand her correctly) that the more traditional approaches take a יראה approach of awe and respect, and the more liberal approach emphasis אהבה, love of Gd.
I would agree that Orthodoxy emphasizes מצוות לא תעשה - although we don’t see it as creating anything. Rather, we are fulfilling the biblical mandate of ושמרו את משמרתי, guarding HaShem’s “preserve,” the Torah, with a no-fly zone around its prohibitions.
I would also agree that Orthodoxy does not encourage creation of מצוות עשה - we don’t generally create blessings, let alone rituals - but I’m not sure I’d agree with her reasoning. Off-hand (and it’s motzaei shabbat, when you won’t get anything other than “off-hand” from me), I see three reasons why Orthodoxy has trouble with the idea of creative Torah:
• On a technical level, Orthodoxy will have to oppose ritual-creation because of בל תוסיף, the prohibition against adding to the Torah.
• On a historical level, Orthodoxy must oppose ritual-creation because we believe that Torah is Divine in origin; how, then, could we add new rituals (other than through the classic, Torah-sanctioned methods)?
• On a philosophical level, Orthodoxy finds ritual-creation problematic because Torah in itself is supposed to offer relevant ritual for all of us, through the generations. If I can’t find meaning in the Torah’s mitzvot, I view that as a lacking in me, not in the Torah.
I am not bothered by this lack of creativity; we have plenty of creativity in other ways, such as in our minhagim. But I am troubled by the way this often impacts our children’s education. In my opinion, too many parents spend time inculcating children in the negatives, which are relatively easy to implement and enforce, and miss out on teaching them the more challenging positives.
Example: Parents who teach their young children all about muktzeh prohibitions, but don’t sit down to learn the meaning and significance of kiddush and havdalah with them.
Example: Parents who teach their children the prohibitions of kashrut, but don’t review with them the more complex positives of eating, such as the meaning and message of berachot.
This is understandable, but troublesome. Our children need to see the positives and understand the “Do” aspects of Judaism, from a very young age. Without the positives, Judaism is a very restraining, constraining religion. The positives will help them grow as Jews, and find themselves in the Torah.
Second:
Tzipporah the Midianite has an interesting analysis here of a perceived difference between liberal and conservative approaches to Judaism and its mitzvot. She observes that liberal Judaism tends to emphasize extra מצוות עשה (active commandments) and traditional Judaism tends to emphasize and expand מצוות לא תעשה (prohibitions). Tzipporah contends (if I understand her correctly) that the more traditional approaches take a יראה approach of awe and respect, and the more liberal approach emphasis אהבה, love of Gd.
I would agree that Orthodoxy emphasizes מצוות לא תעשה - although we don’t see it as creating anything. Rather, we are fulfilling the biblical mandate of ושמרו את משמרתי, guarding HaShem’s “preserve,” the Torah, with a no-fly zone around its prohibitions.
I would also agree that Orthodoxy does not encourage creation of מצוות עשה - we don’t generally create blessings, let alone rituals - but I’m not sure I’d agree with her reasoning. Off-hand (and it’s motzaei shabbat, when you won’t get anything other than “off-hand” from me), I see three reasons why Orthodoxy has trouble with the idea of creative Torah:
• On a technical level, Orthodoxy will have to oppose ritual-creation because of בל תוסיף, the prohibition against adding to the Torah.
• On a historical level, Orthodoxy must oppose ritual-creation because we believe that Torah is Divine in origin; how, then, could we add new rituals (other than through the classic, Torah-sanctioned methods)?
• On a philosophical level, Orthodoxy finds ritual-creation problematic because Torah in itself is supposed to offer relevant ritual for all of us, through the generations. If I can’t find meaning in the Torah’s mitzvot, I view that as a lacking in me, not in the Torah.
I am not bothered by this lack of creativity; we have plenty of creativity in other ways, such as in our minhagim. But I am troubled by the way this often impacts our children’s education. In my opinion, too many parents spend time inculcating children in the negatives, which are relatively easy to implement and enforce, and miss out on teaching them the more challenging positives.
Example: Parents who teach their young children all about muktzeh prohibitions, but don’t sit down to learn the meaning and significance of kiddush and havdalah with them.
Example: Parents who teach their children the prohibitions of kashrut, but don’t review with them the more complex positives of eating, such as the meaning and message of berachot.
This is understandable, but troublesome. Our children need to see the positives and understand the “Do” aspects of Judaism, from a very young age. Without the positives, Judaism is a very restraining, constraining religion. The positives will help them grow as Jews, and find themselves in the Torah.
Thursday, May 8, 2008
Derashah Emor 5768: I am TOO a Zionist!
[Go see the Israel at 60 Blog Carnival here!]
I spent several years, through college and graduate school, expecting to make aliyah. I picked my graduate program in computer science specifically to help me make aliyah. I chose ultimately to stay in America because of the good I felt I had to do here, but my heart is still in Israel. It’s all I can really focus on in the news. It’s where a good amount of my tzedakah goes. It’s the only place I travel; I can’t bring myself to go anywhere else for a vacation - if I’m going anywhere, it’s Israel.
Which is why I’m always surprised at this time of year when someone inevitably questions my Religious Zionism, based on the fact that I don’t unequivocally declare the State of Israel to be ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו, the first flowering of our redemption, or based on the fact that I only say Hallel on Yom haAtzmaut without a berachah. Apparently, to some people, one is not a Religious Zionist unless he believes that Mashiach has already arrived.
As I see it, Religious Zionism has come in many forms, over the years - but it’s never been about what we say; rather, it’s been about what we do.
One form of Religious Zionism, that which is promoted in the gemara, is the ideal of having Jews live in Israel. Owning land, not owning land, having a state, not having a state, is irrelevant; just live there. As the gemara puts it, a Jew acquires merit just by walking four אמות in Israel, and even by being buried in Israel.
The Sifri goes even further, dismissing Jewish life outside of Israel, saying that HaShem told the Jews when He exiled us, “Even though I am exiling you from the land to live outside of the land, הוו מצויינים במצוות, be marked in mitzvot, so that when you return to the land they will not be new to you.” In other words, mitzvot performed outside of Israel are, more or less, practice for life in Israel.
This is one form of Religious Zionism - a drive to live in Israel.
A second form of Religious Zionism, promoted by Ramban and others, is centered on acquiring land in Israel. Per Ramban, the goal of ציונות דתית, of Religious Zionism, is to resume our ancestors’ presence in the land. We were instructed, “והורשתם את הארץ וישבתם בה, You shall conquer the land and you shall dwell in it,” and so that is our mitzvah.
R’ Yehudah Alkalai, in the 19th century, saw this mitzvah in the actions of Yaakov Avinu, back in Bereishis. Yaakov camped outside the city of Shechem, and he purchased a field. R’ Alkalai asked: Yaakov never intended to remain in Shechem long-term, he was on his way home to see his father! Why did he purchase a field?
R’ Alkalai explained that this was a case of מעשה אבות סימן לבנים, our ancestors acting out a lesson for us. Yaakov purchased the field in order to teach us about a second form of Religious Zionism: a drive to acquire Israel.
And then there is a third, stronger form of Religious Zionism, which was powerfully promoted by R’ Yehudah Alkalai in the 19th century and R’ Yissachar Techtel in the Warsaw Ghetto during the Holocaust. In this view, Religious Zionism is about laying the groundwork for Mashiach in Israel, by bringing large numbers of Jews to the land.
R’ Yehudah Alkalai argued that this vision of bringing Mashiach by creating communities in Israel is only logical. After all, as he put it, we daven every day ותחזינה עינינו בשובך לציון ברחמים, HaShem, may we see You return mercifully to Tzion, but if Tzion is only rocks and ruins, upon what should HaShem return? We must settle it first!
The Vilna Gaon seemed to hint to this in the 18th century, when he wrote in קול התור that if 600,000 Jews would return to Israel, that would have a major effect on our redemption.
This is a third view of Religious Zionism - a drive to settle Israel en masse as a means of preparing for Mashiach.
All three of these Religious Zionist visions have one theme in common: Action.
These visions are not about slogans, they are about substance.
These visions are not about labelling a Geulah, they are about earning a Geulah.
These visions are not about saying a berachah on Hallel, they are about making the next Hallel possible.
Zecharyah carried this message to the Jews of his day, some 2400 years ago. It was during construction of the 2nd Beis haMikdash, and the Jews asked Zecharyah, “האבכה, Shall we continue to fast for the Babylonian destruction of the First Beis haMikdash? Or has our period of mourning ended?”
Mefarshim explain that this question was born of frustration with the slow pace of redemption from the Babylonian Exile, גלות בבל. The Persian King Cyrus had permitted us to return to Israel and build the Beis haMikdash anew, but the process had been hampered by Samaritan antagonism as well as Jewish poverty. Those who remembered the glory of the first Beis haMikdash were antsy. They wanted to know: Is this what redemption looks like? Is our suffering truly over, or are we simply in another phase of גלות? Have we, yet, arrived at ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו?
And Zecharyah replied: Stop thinking about labels, and whether this is Geulah or not. Instead, he said, work on correcting the aveiros which preceded the destruction of the first Beis haMikdash, remember the exhortations of my predecessors: “Judge truthfully, and act with generosity and mercy toward each other. Do not cheat the widow, the orphan and the stranger, and do not plot evil against your brother in your hearts.”
Action, not labels of גאולה or non-גאולה.
Fast-forward to our own day, and May 2008, as we celebrate Israel’s sixtieth anniversary of modern statehood. When this new incarnation of a Jewish country was first established, just a few years after the Holocaust, many of us looked upon its birth as a Divine nod of approval, the first sproutings of Messianic redemption. We established Yom haAtzmaut, complete with הלל והודאה, special prayers of thanks and great celebrations.
Over the past sixty years, Israel has succeeded in fulfilling a great deal of its messianic promise. Millions of Jews have been saved from persecution in other countries, such as France, Argentina, Yemen, Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union. Torah is studied there in dozens if not hundreds of institutions. Sites barred to Jews by generations of Arab rulers are now open for all to access. A thriving economy, great universities, a society with civil rights for all of its citizens, a democratically elected government and a free press, all of these have been introduced for the first time in many centuries to a land which had been governed by one despot or another for almost two thousand years, since we were evicted by the Roman empire. In many ways, the past sixty years have seen a great, even messianic, Jewish renaissance in Israel.
But, at the same time, the question of Zecharyah’s era resonates with us. We look at constant warfare, internecine squabbles like the major conversion fight of this past week, political corruption and significant poverty among children and the elderly, and we ask the question of our ancestors: “Shall we continue to fast for the destruction of the Beis haMikdash? Or has our period of mourning ended?” Can we now say ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו?
And I, following the path of great Zionists like Rav Aharon Soloveitchik, would like to forget about the labels. To be a Zionist is to work to live in Israel. To be a Zionist is to work to acquire Israel. To be a Zionist is to work to bring Mashiach by preparing communities in Israel for his arrival. All the rest is semantic puffery.
The gemara records the story of a man who was walking through Yerushalayim wearing clothes of mourning, during the period after the destruction of the Beis haMikdash. Jewish police picked him up and arrested him, releasing him only when they found out he was a leading Talmid Chacham.
Rav Chaim Yaakov Goldvicht, my rosh yeshiva, a great Zionist and winner of the Israel Prize for his role in founding and leading the Hesder Yeshivot, explained the story. He said that wearing clothes of mourning is a show; it doesn’t mean we are doing anything to bring back the Beis haMikdash, to bring Mashiach. To broadcast slogans without substance is empty, and unworthy, and the Jews of the period had no patience for it. It was only when they found out the man was a leader, a Talmid Chacham, someone who was doing something to earn the Beis haMikdash back, that they released him.
May we always make sure that our Zionism is more than just a verbal declaration, a tefillah to say after the Haftorah on Shabbos. Whether we take the gemara’s Zionist view of Jews living in Israel, or Ramban’s view of acquiring Israel, or Rav Alkalai’s view of Jews laying the groundwork for Mashiach by creating communities in Israel, may we always make certain that our Zionism is not semantics, but substance, and so usher in ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו, the first flowering of our redemption.
-
Note 1: The Sifri I cited is Sifri Devarim 43. It is echoed in Ramban in several places, such as the end of Sefer Vayyikra.
Note 2: Yes, I know this derashah is very long. But I liked it.
I spent several years, through college and graduate school, expecting to make aliyah. I picked my graduate program in computer science specifically to help me make aliyah. I chose ultimately to stay in America because of the good I felt I had to do here, but my heart is still in Israel. It’s all I can really focus on in the news. It’s where a good amount of my tzedakah goes. It’s the only place I travel; I can’t bring myself to go anywhere else for a vacation - if I’m going anywhere, it’s Israel.
Which is why I’m always surprised at this time of year when someone inevitably questions my Religious Zionism, based on the fact that I don’t unequivocally declare the State of Israel to be ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו, the first flowering of our redemption, or based on the fact that I only say Hallel on Yom haAtzmaut without a berachah. Apparently, to some people, one is not a Religious Zionist unless he believes that Mashiach has already arrived.
As I see it, Religious Zionism has come in many forms, over the years - but it’s never been about what we say; rather, it’s been about what we do.
One form of Religious Zionism, that which is promoted in the gemara, is the ideal of having Jews live in Israel. Owning land, not owning land, having a state, not having a state, is irrelevant; just live there. As the gemara puts it, a Jew acquires merit just by walking four אמות in Israel, and even by being buried in Israel.
The Sifri goes even further, dismissing Jewish life outside of Israel, saying that HaShem told the Jews when He exiled us, “Even though I am exiling you from the land to live outside of the land, הוו מצויינים במצוות, be marked in mitzvot, so that when you return to the land they will not be new to you.” In other words, mitzvot performed outside of Israel are, more or less, practice for life in Israel.
This is one form of Religious Zionism - a drive to live in Israel.
A second form of Religious Zionism, promoted by Ramban and others, is centered on acquiring land in Israel. Per Ramban, the goal of ציונות דתית, of Religious Zionism, is to resume our ancestors’ presence in the land. We were instructed, “והורשתם את הארץ וישבתם בה, You shall conquer the land and you shall dwell in it,” and so that is our mitzvah.
R’ Yehudah Alkalai, in the 19th century, saw this mitzvah in the actions of Yaakov Avinu, back in Bereishis. Yaakov camped outside the city of Shechem, and he purchased a field. R’ Alkalai asked: Yaakov never intended to remain in Shechem long-term, he was on his way home to see his father! Why did he purchase a field?
R’ Alkalai explained that this was a case of מעשה אבות סימן לבנים, our ancestors acting out a lesson for us. Yaakov purchased the field in order to teach us about a second form of Religious Zionism: a drive to acquire Israel.
And then there is a third, stronger form of Religious Zionism, which was powerfully promoted by R’ Yehudah Alkalai in the 19th century and R’ Yissachar Techtel in the Warsaw Ghetto during the Holocaust. In this view, Religious Zionism is about laying the groundwork for Mashiach in Israel, by bringing large numbers of Jews to the land.
R’ Yehudah Alkalai argued that this vision of bringing Mashiach by creating communities in Israel is only logical. After all, as he put it, we daven every day ותחזינה עינינו בשובך לציון ברחמים, HaShem, may we see You return mercifully to Tzion, but if Tzion is only rocks and ruins, upon what should HaShem return? We must settle it first!
The Vilna Gaon seemed to hint to this in the 18th century, when he wrote in קול התור that if 600,000 Jews would return to Israel, that would have a major effect on our redemption.
This is a third view of Religious Zionism - a drive to settle Israel en masse as a means of preparing for Mashiach.
All three of these Religious Zionist visions have one theme in common: Action.
These visions are not about slogans, they are about substance.
These visions are not about labelling a Geulah, they are about earning a Geulah.
These visions are not about saying a berachah on Hallel, they are about making the next Hallel possible.
Zecharyah carried this message to the Jews of his day, some 2400 years ago. It was during construction of the 2nd Beis haMikdash, and the Jews asked Zecharyah, “האבכה, Shall we continue to fast for the Babylonian destruction of the First Beis haMikdash? Or has our period of mourning ended?”
Mefarshim explain that this question was born of frustration with the slow pace of redemption from the Babylonian Exile, גלות בבל. The Persian King Cyrus had permitted us to return to Israel and build the Beis haMikdash anew, but the process had been hampered by Samaritan antagonism as well as Jewish poverty. Those who remembered the glory of the first Beis haMikdash were antsy. They wanted to know: Is this what redemption looks like? Is our suffering truly over, or are we simply in another phase of גלות? Have we, yet, arrived at ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו?
And Zecharyah replied: Stop thinking about labels, and whether this is Geulah or not. Instead, he said, work on correcting the aveiros which preceded the destruction of the first Beis haMikdash, remember the exhortations of my predecessors: “Judge truthfully, and act with generosity and mercy toward each other. Do not cheat the widow, the orphan and the stranger, and do not plot evil against your brother in your hearts.”
Action, not labels of גאולה or non-גאולה.
Fast-forward to our own day, and May 2008, as we celebrate Israel’s sixtieth anniversary of modern statehood. When this new incarnation of a Jewish country was first established, just a few years after the Holocaust, many of us looked upon its birth as a Divine nod of approval, the first sproutings of Messianic redemption. We established Yom haAtzmaut, complete with הלל והודאה, special prayers of thanks and great celebrations.
Over the past sixty years, Israel has succeeded in fulfilling a great deal of its messianic promise. Millions of Jews have been saved from persecution in other countries, such as France, Argentina, Yemen, Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union. Torah is studied there in dozens if not hundreds of institutions. Sites barred to Jews by generations of Arab rulers are now open for all to access. A thriving economy, great universities, a society with civil rights for all of its citizens, a democratically elected government and a free press, all of these have been introduced for the first time in many centuries to a land which had been governed by one despot or another for almost two thousand years, since we were evicted by the Roman empire. In many ways, the past sixty years have seen a great, even messianic, Jewish renaissance in Israel.
But, at the same time, the question of Zecharyah’s era resonates with us. We look at constant warfare, internecine squabbles like the major conversion fight of this past week, political corruption and significant poverty among children and the elderly, and we ask the question of our ancestors: “Shall we continue to fast for the destruction of the Beis haMikdash? Or has our period of mourning ended?” Can we now say ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו?
And I, following the path of great Zionists like Rav Aharon Soloveitchik, would like to forget about the labels. To be a Zionist is to work to live in Israel. To be a Zionist is to work to acquire Israel. To be a Zionist is to work to bring Mashiach by preparing communities in Israel for his arrival. All the rest is semantic puffery.
The gemara records the story of a man who was walking through Yerushalayim wearing clothes of mourning, during the period after the destruction of the Beis haMikdash. Jewish police picked him up and arrested him, releasing him only when they found out he was a leading Talmid Chacham.
Rav Chaim Yaakov Goldvicht, my rosh yeshiva, a great Zionist and winner of the Israel Prize for his role in founding and leading the Hesder Yeshivot, explained the story. He said that wearing clothes of mourning is a show; it doesn’t mean we are doing anything to bring back the Beis haMikdash, to bring Mashiach. To broadcast slogans without substance is empty, and unworthy, and the Jews of the period had no patience for it. It was only when they found out the man was a leader, a Talmid Chacham, someone who was doing something to earn the Beis haMikdash back, that they released him.
May we always make sure that our Zionism is more than just a verbal declaration, a tefillah to say after the Haftorah on Shabbos. Whether we take the gemara’s Zionist view of Jews living in Israel, or Ramban’s view of acquiring Israel, or Rav Alkalai’s view of Jews laying the groundwork for Mashiach by creating communities in Israel, may we always make certain that our Zionism is not semantics, but substance, and so usher in ראשית צמיחת גאולתנו, the first flowering of our redemption.
-
Note 1: The Sifri I cited is Sifri Devarim 43. It is echoed in Ramban in several places, such as the end of Sefer Vayyikra.
Note 2: Yes, I know this derashah is very long. But I liked it.
Sickened by the R' Shirman-R' Druckman Conversion Scandal
I am torn by the conversion mess going on in Israel. I’m split in two; I don’t like what has happened on either side. I’m sure people here in town want me to speak about it from the pulpit, but I don’t know that I could say anything coherent, I have such distaste for what has happened in both camps.
Aargh.
1) R’ Shirman’s screed disqualifying R’ Druckman’s conversions is one problem.
The decision itself, with its logic, doesn’t strike me as particularly compelling, certainly not as a justification of such a radical move. Disqualifying a judge because in converting people inappropriately he creates a stumbling block… there are numerous halachic objections to this logic, and to the other arguments summoned in the decision. (And who, exactly, is the שו"ת בית פלוני? I have to look that up.)
2) The language used in R' Shirman's decision is disgusting, entirely inappropriate; scandalous chillul HaShem, to call it for what it is.
3) On the other hand, I have real problems with some of the justifications for the practices of R’ Druckman’s office:
3a) First, I don’t understand the justification for signing conversion certificates when you were not at the conversion. Even if the document is purely adminisrative and not part of the ritual of גירות, why sign the paper at all? (You can find R' Druckman's justification for one case here.)
3b) Second, I can’t understand how so many thousands of גרים were processed so quickly. Did they even have time to inform the גרים of the “light and severe mitzvot,” of which they are supposed to be informed? I have heard conflicting first-hand reports (!) on this.
3c) Third, I have a problem with a system that manufactures so many Jews who do not observe mitzvot. Yes, I agree that a גר is a גר, a convert is a convert, so long as (s)he accepted the legitimacy and binding character of Torah at the term of conversion, regardless of subsequent behavior. But how do you put in place a system which will mass-produce Jews who will not practice? Even if your rate of “success” is higher than those of others, I still don’t understand it.
3d) Fourth, I don’t agree with the idea that converting people is some meta-mitzvah of strengthening the Jewish nation, even if it’s the alternative to mass-yichus confusion in Israeli society. I didn’t like this meta-mitzvah when Rabbi Angel proposed it in Choosing to be Jewish, suggesting that Orthodoxy must go seek converts lest they go to other denominations, and I don’t like it now when it is proposed as a solution for yichus confusion. In my view, each case must be handled on its own merits, in terms of the knowledge, intentions and desires of the actual person who comes to convert.
4) And then I have a fourth general issue with the debate that has gone on: Loyalty to the old boy network.
Even as many condemn the Lithuanian “old boy network” in which certain people are automatically in and certain people are automatically out, the same “old boy network,” on the other side, demanded condemnation of R’ Shirman’s decision even before people had read it, to know what it said.
R’ Druckman is a huge, huge talmid chacham and leader. Nonetheless, I still don’t understand supporting him pro forma, without even knowing the issues. If someone were to level a charge against me, I would hope that people would ask questions before automatically coming to my defense.
I suppose that if I must pick a side, I’ll go with R’ Druckman, simply because I am not impressed by the decision by R’ Shirman, and because of R’ Druckman’s stellar reputation. But I can’t sit in the same camp with the automatic supporters who rubber stamped their public proclamations without understanding the issue.
Aargh.
1) R’ Shirman’s screed disqualifying R’ Druckman’s conversions is one problem.
The decision itself, with its logic, doesn’t strike me as particularly compelling, certainly not as a justification of such a radical move. Disqualifying a judge because in converting people inappropriately he creates a stumbling block… there are numerous halachic objections to this logic, and to the other arguments summoned in the decision. (And who, exactly, is the שו"ת בית פלוני? I have to look that up.)
2) The language used in R' Shirman's decision is disgusting, entirely inappropriate; scandalous chillul HaShem, to call it for what it is.
3) On the other hand, I have real problems with some of the justifications for the practices of R’ Druckman’s office:
3a) First, I don’t understand the justification for signing conversion certificates when you were not at the conversion. Even if the document is purely adminisrative and not part of the ritual of גירות, why sign the paper at all? (You can find R' Druckman's justification for one case here.)
3b) Second, I can’t understand how so many thousands of גרים were processed so quickly. Did they even have time to inform the גרים of the “light and severe mitzvot,” of which they are supposed to be informed? I have heard conflicting first-hand reports (!) on this.
3c) Third, I have a problem with a system that manufactures so many Jews who do not observe mitzvot. Yes, I agree that a גר is a גר, a convert is a convert, so long as (s)he accepted the legitimacy and binding character of Torah at the term of conversion, regardless of subsequent behavior. But how do you put in place a system which will mass-produce Jews who will not practice? Even if your rate of “success” is higher than those of others, I still don’t understand it.
3d) Fourth, I don’t agree with the idea that converting people is some meta-mitzvah of strengthening the Jewish nation, even if it’s the alternative to mass-yichus confusion in Israeli society. I didn’t like this meta-mitzvah when Rabbi Angel proposed it in Choosing to be Jewish, suggesting that Orthodoxy must go seek converts lest they go to other denominations, and I don’t like it now when it is proposed as a solution for yichus confusion. In my view, each case must be handled on its own merits, in terms of the knowledge, intentions and desires of the actual person who comes to convert.
4) And then I have a fourth general issue with the debate that has gone on: Loyalty to the old boy network.
Even as many condemn the Lithuanian “old boy network” in which certain people are automatically in and certain people are automatically out, the same “old boy network,” on the other side, demanded condemnation of R’ Shirman’s decision even before people had read it, to know what it said.
R’ Druckman is a huge, huge talmid chacham and leader. Nonetheless, I still don’t understand supporting him pro forma, without even knowing the issues. If someone were to level a charge against me, I would hope that people would ask questions before automatically coming to my defense.
I suppose that if I must pick a side, I’ll go with R’ Druckman, simply because I am not impressed by the decision by R’ Shirman, and because of R’ Druckman’s stellar reputation. But I can’t sit in the same camp with the automatic supporters who rubber stamped their public proclamations without understanding the issue.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Israel celebrates 60... but remember Zecharyah's message
Sixty!
Sixty, in the Torah, is a measure of completion:
Sixty, in the Torah, is a measure of completion:
- The sages refer to the number of Jews who left Egypt as "60 myriads" (Talmud, Megilah 29a)
- Large gatherings in general are defined as gatherings of "60 myriads" (Talmud, Berachot 58a).
- The Temple in Jerusalem was 60 cubits long (Kings I 6:2).
- Sixty warriors surround the bed of King Solomon, a full complement of defenders (Song of Songs 3:7).
- Sixty myriads of angels crowned the Jews at Mount Sinai when we accepted the Torah (Talmud, Shabbat 88a).
There is an element of completion, then, in reaching the age of 60, however battered and broken we may feel at times; mazal tov!
I submitted the following column to the Allentown Morning Call's Religion section, in honor of the occasion:
A Lesson from Zechariah, on Israel's 60th Birthday
Some 2400 years ago, as the Jews were slowly building the Second Temple in Jerusalem, they asked the prophet Zechariah (Zechariah 7), “Shall we continue to fast for the Babylonian destruction of the First Temple? Or has our period of mourning ended?”
Commentators explain that this question was born of frustration with the slow pace of Jewish redemption from their exile to Babylon. Persian King Cyrus had permitted the Jews to return to Israel and build their Temple anew, but the process had been hampered by Samaritan antagonism as well as Jewish poverty. Those who remembered the glory of the First Temple were unimpressed by the diminished beauty of the second. Only a small percentage of the nation had even returned from exile at this stage of the building process. And so the nation wanted to know: Is this what redemption looks like? Is our suffering truly over, or are we simply in another phase of our exile?
Fast-forward to our own day, and May 2008, as Israel celebrates its sixtieth anniversary of modern statehood. When this new incarnation of a Jewish country was first established, just a few years after the Holocaust, many Jews looked upon its birth as a Divine nod of approval, the first sproutings of Messianic redemption. A holiday, Yom ha’Atzmaut (Israel Independence Day) was established, complete with special prayers of thanks and great celebrations.
Over the past sixty years, Israel has succeeded in fulfilling much of that messianic promise. Millions of Jews have been saved from persecution in other countries, such as France, Argentina, Yemen, Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union. The Torah is studied there in dozens if not hundreds of institutions. Sites barred to Jews by generations of Arab rulers are now open for all to access. A thriving economy, great universities, a society with civil rights for all of its citizens, a democratically elected government and a free press, all of these have been introduced for the first time in many centuries into a land which had been governed by one despot or another for almost two thousand years, since the eviction of the Jews by the Roman empire. In many ways, the past sixty years have seen a great, even messianic, Jewish renaissance in Israel.
But, at the same time, the question of Zechariah’s era resonates with Jews of today’s generation. For thousands of years, Jewish sages have taught that a messianic time would mean peace with the nations around us, a return to Jewish religion by all Jews, and a Temple on the Temple Mount. It is for this that Jews have prayed, “And may our eyes behold Your merciful return to Zion,” three times each day, for millenia. And so Jews today look at constant warfare, internecine squabbles, political corruption and significant poverty among children and the elderly, and ask the question of their ancestors: “Shall we continue to fast for the destruction of the First Temple? Or has our period of mourning ended?”
To this question, Zechariah’s answer is as relevant today as it was in his day. The prophet reminded the populace of the sins which had preceded the First Temple’s destruction, as well as the exhortations of his predecessors: “Judge truthfully, and act with generosity and mercy toward each other. Do not cheat the widow, the orphan and the stranger, and do not plot evil against your brother in your hearts.”
In other words: Dithering about whether deliverance has arrived, or not, is a waste of time. Better to focus on righting wrongs and building a proper society, and ensuring that we earn whatever redemption God has in store.
This is a timeless message, for Jews and for all humanity’s eschatology-oriented religions: Divine Redemption will come, whatever its form, when it is Divinely decreed. Our responsibility is not to attach a label to this salvation, but to work to make it a reality.
You might also see my derashah here.
Tuesday, May 6, 2008
Yom haZikaron: The Value of Memory without Action
They shouldn’t have died. They shouldn’t have been murdered.
Infants, children, mothers, young men and women, elderly, handicapped…
They should be here with us today, enjoying the sunshine on their faces.
So whom can we blame?
-Ourselves, for wanting to live in the land of our ancestors, the land of the Torah and the land of mitzvos, the land taken from us by force, the land promised to us by Gd? We are seeking that which we have always sought, that which we need for our survival, both physical and spiritual.
-Jews around the world, for becoming a latter-day Babylonian Jewry, sitting at home comfortably under their grapevines and fig trees, occasionally popping in for a visit or writing a check or engaging in “political action” while their surrogates bleed? Yom haZikaron is the worst day of the year for me, questioning for the nth time what I am doing outside of Israel.
-Gd, for arranging a no-win situation in which we would be expected to return to our land, but without clear Divine “air support” for that return?
-The Arab world, for acting greedily as human beings always act upon losing something they believe is theirs, for not believing the Torah’s account of our right to Israel, for their bloodthirsty embrace of death?
-The world’s nations, those United Nations, for their realpolitik self-interest, the way they kowtow to Arab oil and petrodollars, the way they always seem to find ways to beat down the scapegoat Jews even as they insist there is no Anti-Semitism?
We can always find reasons to blame, particularly when there is blood everywhere. Our fingers are flexible; we can point in every direction, and we do. But it brings no satisfaction.
At the end of the day, all the blame in the universe doesn’t bring a single soldier, a single bombing or stabbing or shooting or stoning or lynching victim, back to life. All of the petitions and protests, all of the anger and angst and Never Again, may have some impact on the future, but no human hand can reverse the past.
Which, I suppose, is why it’s important to have a Yom haZikaron, a day not to blame, but to remember.
A day not to politicize and criticize and pontificate and castigate, but to look at photographs of faces, to say tehillim and recall the long, long list of names, to cry for men and women, young and old, to remember them not so much for how they died but who they were, how they lived, whom they loved, what potential they never had a chance to express.
It’s hard to remember without following up with retaliatory or compensatory action; it seems so depressingly pointless. This lack of bombast does not satisfy any need for revenge, does not serve any eschatological drive for redemption. But I think there is a point: To ensure that what is past does not become distant past, that in our drive to move forward we do not lose the souls of those who cannot be with us. To recall the merit of those whose lives were cut short.
Memory, we are taught, is the sum of our identity. It sums up what we have experienced and how we have acted, where we have been, what we have thought and believed. It is, in a sense, the most powerful, certainly the most encompassing, force in our lives.
And in devoting this most encompassing force to those who have been taken from us, we guarantee that their souls are צרורות בצרור החיים, bound up in the bond of life, in the most literal meaning of Avigayil words.
יהי זכרם ברוך, their memory is blessed, and is a blessing.
Infants, children, mothers, young men and women, elderly, handicapped…
They should be here with us today, enjoying the sunshine on their faces.
So whom can we blame?
-Ourselves, for wanting to live in the land of our ancestors, the land of the Torah and the land of mitzvos, the land taken from us by force, the land promised to us by Gd? We are seeking that which we have always sought, that which we need for our survival, both physical and spiritual.
-Jews around the world, for becoming a latter-day Babylonian Jewry, sitting at home comfortably under their grapevines and fig trees, occasionally popping in for a visit or writing a check or engaging in “political action” while their surrogates bleed? Yom haZikaron is the worst day of the year for me, questioning for the nth time what I am doing outside of Israel.
-Gd, for arranging a no-win situation in which we would be expected to return to our land, but without clear Divine “air support” for that return?
-The Arab world, for acting greedily as human beings always act upon losing something they believe is theirs, for not believing the Torah’s account of our right to Israel, for their bloodthirsty embrace of death?
-The world’s nations, those United Nations, for their realpolitik self-interest, the way they kowtow to Arab oil and petrodollars, the way they always seem to find ways to beat down the scapegoat Jews even as they insist there is no Anti-Semitism?
We can always find reasons to blame, particularly when there is blood everywhere. Our fingers are flexible; we can point in every direction, and we do. But it brings no satisfaction.
At the end of the day, all the blame in the universe doesn’t bring a single soldier, a single bombing or stabbing or shooting or stoning or lynching victim, back to life. All of the petitions and protests, all of the anger and angst and Never Again, may have some impact on the future, but no human hand can reverse the past.
Which, I suppose, is why it’s important to have a Yom haZikaron, a day not to blame, but to remember.
A day not to politicize and criticize and pontificate and castigate, but to look at photographs of faces, to say tehillim and recall the long, long list of names, to cry for men and women, young and old, to remember them not so much for how they died but who they were, how they lived, whom they loved, what potential they never had a chance to express.
It’s hard to remember without following up with retaliatory or compensatory action; it seems so depressingly pointless. This lack of bombast does not satisfy any need for revenge, does not serve any eschatological drive for redemption. But I think there is a point: To ensure that what is past does not become distant past, that in our drive to move forward we do not lose the souls of those who cannot be with us. To recall the merit of those whose lives were cut short.
Memory, we are taught, is the sum of our identity. It sums up what we have experienced and how we have acted, where we have been, what we have thought and believed. It is, in a sense, the most powerful, certainly the most encompassing, force in our lives.
And in devoting this most encompassing force to those who have been taken from us, we guarantee that their souls are צרורות בצרור החיים, bound up in the bond of life, in the most literal meaning of Avigayil words.
יהי זכרם ברוך, their memory is blessed, and is a blessing.
Daf: Nazir 54-57
Once again, most of the notes I have on this series are technical and really need to be read in front of a gemara. Of particular interest: The question of tumah for the graves at Me'arat haMachpelah (54a) and Rav Ada's harsh statement to Rav Huna regarding the way Rav Huna's wife, Chovah, shaved her children's heads.
54a
Reish Lakish indicates that pre-Sinai graves do not communicate tumat ohel, which leads to the question of why Rabbi Bena’ah marked the graves of our ancestors in Me’arat haMachpelah (Bava Batra 58a). Marking is only for graves that communicate tumat ohel! Tosafot and the Rosh explain why the ancestors buried in Me’arat haMachpelah have unique status.
Tosafot הגולל records a debate about what constitute גולל and דופק. It’s particularly interesting to note that the debate is only relevant if actual coffins are in use.
The mishnah’s language is tricky here, because it’s out of order: ימי ספרו refers to the end of tzaraat, the seven days after the metzora’s first shave. ימי גמרו actually refers to the middle phase, when he has been declared a מצורע מוחלט (full metzora) and is pre-purification. (And the first stage is ימי הסגרו, the period of quarantine before he is declared a full metzora.)
So the order for a metzora is this: ימי הסגרו, then ימי גמרו, then ימי ספרו.
54b
The Rosh explains the reason for a decree creating tumah for land outside Israel: It was a means of discouraging people from leaving Israel.
55a
Once we discuss a moving ohel, we must ask about the status of a boat. The Rosh mentions it.
The Rosh seems to have an edition that varies from ours, on the question of R’ Yosi b”r Yehudah.
55b
The 120-day case is fascinating. Rosh gives a thorough explanation; you’ll also see it spelled out on 60a. It reminds me of my rebbetzin’s law school hypotheticals; as the gemara says, it’s לחדודי, a complex case brought to sharpen the mind of the student.
56a
The word דין here simply means “logic”. Ditto for אין עונשין מן הדין and דנתי לפני חכמים.
57b
On the odd story of Rav Ada’s response to the whole-head buzz cuts of the children of Rav Huna and his wife Chovah: (And why would anyone name a child Chovah, anyway?! reminiscent of Machlon and Kilyon!)
We find two approaches, which seem to be based in a difference of edition – לדידך vs ודידך:
Pseudo-Rashi has לדידך and says that Rav Ada is saying, “According to you, Chovah shouldn’t cut her kids’ hair that way!”
Tosafos has ודידך and says that Rav Ada is saying, “Chovah shouldn’t cut your kids’ hair that way!”
54a
Reish Lakish indicates that pre-Sinai graves do not communicate tumat ohel, which leads to the question of why Rabbi Bena’ah marked the graves of our ancestors in Me’arat haMachpelah (Bava Batra 58a). Marking is only for graves that communicate tumat ohel! Tosafot and the Rosh explain why the ancestors buried in Me’arat haMachpelah have unique status.
Tosafot הגולל records a debate about what constitute גולל and דופק. It’s particularly interesting to note that the debate is only relevant if actual coffins are in use.
The mishnah’s language is tricky here, because it’s out of order: ימי ספרו refers to the end of tzaraat, the seven days after the metzora’s first shave. ימי גמרו actually refers to the middle phase, when he has been declared a מצורע מוחלט (full metzora) and is pre-purification. (And the first stage is ימי הסגרו, the period of quarantine before he is declared a full metzora.)
So the order for a metzora is this: ימי הסגרו, then ימי גמרו, then ימי ספרו.
54b
The Rosh explains the reason for a decree creating tumah for land outside Israel: It was a means of discouraging people from leaving Israel.
55a
Once we discuss a moving ohel, we must ask about the status of a boat. The Rosh mentions it.
The Rosh seems to have an edition that varies from ours, on the question of R’ Yosi b”r Yehudah.
55b
The 120-day case is fascinating. Rosh gives a thorough explanation; you’ll also see it spelled out on 60a. It reminds me of my rebbetzin’s law school hypotheticals; as the gemara says, it’s לחדודי, a complex case brought to sharpen the mind of the student.
56a
The word דין here simply means “logic”. Ditto for אין עונשין מן הדין and דנתי לפני חכמים.
57b
On the odd story of Rav Ada’s response to the whole-head buzz cuts of the children of Rav Huna and his wife Chovah: (And why would anyone name a child Chovah, anyway?! reminiscent of Machlon and Kilyon!)
We find two approaches, which seem to be based in a difference of edition – לדידך vs ודידך:
Pseudo-Rashi has לדידך and says that Rav Ada is saying, “According to you, Chovah shouldn’t cut her kids’ hair that way!”
Tosafos has ודידך and says that Rav Ada is saying, “Chovah shouldn’t cut your kids’ hair that way!”
Sunday, May 4, 2008
Rashi's Daughters: Joheved - Myths and Facts, Part II
Part I is here - please read it first.
Here is a non-comprehensive list of errors I found in Rashi's Daughters, Book I: Joheved. It is not comprehensive because there were many items I felt were probably incorrect, but I lacked the time or resources to fact-check. I have only included those items I was able to verify as errors. The parentheses include the page number in Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved. The brackets include notes as well as the sources showing the errors.
Frankly, the specific items listed here don't bother me much; I am including them only because I did the research and want something to show for several hours of work. The more troubling items are the ones I included in Part I.
Unfounded practices
• Emphasis on demonology doesn’t fit the fact that Rashi doesn’t discuss it much in Responsa or in Vitry
• Use of translations during Torah reading (pg. 11, 79) [Tosafot Megilah 23b says they didn’t use translators]
• Reciting Shehechiyanu at the birth of a child (pg. 17, 347)
• Reading Sefer Chashmonaim [Book of Maccabees] in shul on Shabbat Chanukah (pg. 95)
• Tzidduk haDin every day of Shivah (pg. 167)
• No meat/wine during Shivah (pg. 168)
• No Shivah for a death which occurs during Yom Tov (pg. 178) [shivah simply begins after Yom Tov is over]
• Not visiting the same grave twice in one day (pg. 185)
• Gambling, cardplaying (pg. 190) [doesn’t show up in Jewish European life until the 15th century]
• Making noise for Haman in the Megilah (pg 190) [first found in 14th century sources]
Explanations of Jewish practices which don’t match Rashi’s own explanations
• Refraining from work while the menorah is lit (pg. 94) is not because of women’s role in the miracle, but rather to highlight that one may not use the candles to illuminate work
• Using nice shrouds (pg. 166, 295) is not out of concern for embarrassment in the next world; Berachot 18a only says that the soul there cannot leave the grave because the body was buried in a reed mat.
• Sniffing earth, tearing grass at a funeral (pg. 167) is not to permit the soul to leave, but to echo verses about a person being as grass and dust, per Rashi in Vitry 279-280
• The idea that Adam and Eve were driven from the Garden because of Adam’s ingratitude for Eve (pg 321) doesn’t match Bereishit, or Rashi there
Practices which are contradicted by clear sources
• Not starting new ventures on certain days of the week (pg. 27, 39) [Rashi Vayyikra 19:26]
• Rashi wears tefillin his right hand, but also lifts his right hand to hit, indicating he is a righty (pg. 41)
• Wearing a red ribbon to deflect the evil eye (pg. 70 and later) [Tosefta Shabbat 7:11]
• Eating squash/beet/leek on Rosh haShanah (pg. 71) [Machzor Vitry 323 specifies other foods: red apples, white grapes, white figs and lamb heads]
• Trying to find a hive and get honey on Shabbat (pg. 121) [Shabbat 95a]
• Collecting Ketubah before yibbum (pg. 127) [Yevamot 87b]
• Eved Ivri in Rashi’s day (pg. 130) [Erchin 29a]
• Holding a Purim celebration in a house of mourning (pg. 186)
• Holding a feast on Purim night before Megilah reading (pg. 189) [Tosefta Shabbat 1:7]
• Reading the Ketubah aloud during a wedding (pg 221) [Vitry 476]
• Leaving the Chuppah for Sheva Berachot (pg 221) [Vitry 476]
• Gathering shards from the broken glass after a Chuppah (pg 221) [Vitry 476]
• Permitting a couple to each other after their initial marital act (pg 229-230) [Vitry 466]
• Abortion for non-Jews (pg 314) [Sanhedrin 91]
• Laxity in men-women interactions (such as pg. 210) [Shabbat 64b, Vitry 528]
• Cheating taxes [Bava Kama 113a]
• Teaching Torah to the Abbot [Sanhedrin 59a]
• Students go to prostitutes [Likkutei haPardes meiRashi 3b]
• Raunchy singing and general loose speech re: sexuality (pg. 195, 224) [Ketuvot 8b]
• “Euphemisms for sexual acts are for children” (pg. 214) [Yevamot 103a]
• Publicly identifying who is using the mikvah on a particular night (pg. 215) [Eruvin 55b]
• Daylight cohabitation (pg. 288) [Shabbat 86a]
• Watching animals mate (pg. 290) [Avodah Zarah 20b]
Non-Rashi sources are put into Rashi’s mouth
• The institution of having families give the money from Kapparot to families, instead of the birds, as well as the complaint against having the needy people receive birds “filled with sins” (pg. 72) - Actually from Maharil Erev Yom Tov #2
• Women’s exemption from time-bound mitzvot are “because their time belongs to their husbands” (pg. 136) - That’s R’ Yaakov Anatoli in his Melamed haTalmidim
• Rashi is listed as cutting his nails in a particular order (pg. 179) which actually appears first in Avudraham
• Rashi says he can’t study Kabbalah until he is 40 years old (pg. 260) but that doesn't show up until the Shach to Yoreh Deah 246:6 - some 500 years later
• Rashi is quoted as saying that the prohibition against teaching one’s daughter applies uniquely to secrets of Torah (pg. 340) This is a direct quote from Sefer Chasidim 313, which wasn’t written until 100 years after Rashi’s time, in Germany
• Rashi is quoted as adding that if women’s hearts draw them to learn, they should be taught (pg 341), in a direct quote from the 16th century Maayan Ganim of R’ Shemuel Arkevolty
Misunderstandings
• Labelling “Original Sin” part of the mystical tradition of “Maaseh Bereishit” (pg 183) [Chagigah 11-13]
• “Rabbis in Tractate Megillah complain about licentiousness at Purim time” (pg. 199) [not found in Tractate Megillah]
• Confuses "Erusin" with betrothal (pg. 199); "Erusin" happens with the presentation of a ring at the wedding (pg. 221)
• Identifying “Honor your parents” as the fourth commandment (pg 208)
• Saying that Arayot may not be studied with less than 2 students (pg 213) [Chagigah 11b]
• Considering Arayot to be about “How-To” (pg. 213) [Chagigah 11b]
• Advanced students haven’t heard of Masechet Kallah (pg. 215, 257) [Shabbat 114a]
• Fourteen days of niddah after miscarriage of a baby girl (pg. 253)
• Rashi refuses to learn Kabbalah (pg. 259-260) [Vitry 291]
• Considering rice to be new to the area then (pg 300) [Responsa 110, all over Talmud]
• The berachah on Shabbat candles is considered new and controversial (pg. 308) [Responsum of Rav Natronai Gaon]
• Infants under 30 days have no soul yet (pg. 325) [Sanhedrin 91]
• It is claimed that Rashi complained about his wife throwing keys at him when she was a Niddah. (pg. 353) The only similar account is simply a record, in Machzor Vitry 499 and Tosafot Ketuvot 61a, that Rashi was careful not to pass keys hand-to-hand when his wife was a niddah.
Here is a non-comprehensive list of errors I found in Rashi's Daughters, Book I: Joheved. It is not comprehensive because there were many items I felt were probably incorrect, but I lacked the time or resources to fact-check. I have only included those items I was able to verify as errors. The parentheses include the page number in Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved. The brackets include notes as well as the sources showing the errors.
Frankly, the specific items listed here don't bother me much; I am including them only because I did the research and want something to show for several hours of work. The more troubling items are the ones I included in Part I.
Unfounded practices
• Emphasis on demonology doesn’t fit the fact that Rashi doesn’t discuss it much in Responsa or in Vitry
• Use of translations during Torah reading (pg. 11, 79) [Tosafot Megilah 23b says they didn’t use translators]
• Reciting Shehechiyanu at the birth of a child (pg. 17, 347)
• Reading Sefer Chashmonaim [Book of Maccabees] in shul on Shabbat Chanukah (pg. 95)
• Tzidduk haDin every day of Shivah (pg. 167)
• No meat/wine during Shivah (pg. 168)
• No Shivah for a death which occurs during Yom Tov (pg. 178) [shivah simply begins after Yom Tov is over]
• Not visiting the same grave twice in one day (pg. 185)
• Gambling, cardplaying (pg. 190) [doesn’t show up in Jewish European life until the 15th century]
• Making noise for Haman in the Megilah (pg 190) [first found in 14th century sources]
Explanations of Jewish practices which don’t match Rashi’s own explanations
• Refraining from work while the menorah is lit (pg. 94) is not because of women’s role in the miracle, but rather to highlight that one may not use the candles to illuminate work
• Using nice shrouds (pg. 166, 295) is not out of concern for embarrassment in the next world; Berachot 18a only says that the soul there cannot leave the grave because the body was buried in a reed mat.
• Sniffing earth, tearing grass at a funeral (pg. 167) is not to permit the soul to leave, but to echo verses about a person being as grass and dust, per Rashi in Vitry 279-280
• The idea that Adam and Eve were driven from the Garden because of Adam’s ingratitude for Eve (pg 321) doesn’t match Bereishit, or Rashi there
Practices which are contradicted by clear sources
• Not starting new ventures on certain days of the week (pg. 27, 39) [Rashi Vayyikra 19:26]
• Rashi wears tefillin his right hand, but also lifts his right hand to hit, indicating he is a righty (pg. 41)
• Wearing a red ribbon to deflect the evil eye (pg. 70 and later) [Tosefta Shabbat 7:11]
• Eating squash/beet/leek on Rosh haShanah (pg. 71) [Machzor Vitry 323 specifies other foods: red apples, white grapes, white figs and lamb heads]
• Trying to find a hive and get honey on Shabbat (pg. 121) [Shabbat 95a]
• Collecting Ketubah before yibbum (pg. 127) [Yevamot 87b]
• Eved Ivri in Rashi’s day (pg. 130) [Erchin 29a]
• Holding a Purim celebration in a house of mourning (pg. 186)
• Holding a feast on Purim night before Megilah reading (pg. 189) [Tosefta Shabbat 1:7]
• Reading the Ketubah aloud during a wedding (pg 221) [Vitry 476]
• Leaving the Chuppah for Sheva Berachot (pg 221) [Vitry 476]
• Gathering shards from the broken glass after a Chuppah (pg 221) [Vitry 476]
• Permitting a couple to each other after their initial marital act (pg 229-230) [Vitry 466]
• Abortion for non-Jews (pg 314) [Sanhedrin 91]
• Laxity in men-women interactions (such as pg. 210) [Shabbat 64b, Vitry 528]
• Cheating taxes [Bava Kama 113a]
• Teaching Torah to the Abbot [Sanhedrin 59a]
• Students go to prostitutes [Likkutei haPardes meiRashi 3b]
• Raunchy singing and general loose speech re: sexuality (pg. 195, 224) [Ketuvot 8b]
• “Euphemisms for sexual acts are for children” (pg. 214) [Yevamot 103a]
• Publicly identifying who is using the mikvah on a particular night (pg. 215) [Eruvin 55b]
• Daylight cohabitation (pg. 288) [Shabbat 86a]
• Watching animals mate (pg. 290) [Avodah Zarah 20b]
Non-Rashi sources are put into Rashi’s mouth
• The institution of having families give the money from Kapparot to families, instead of the birds, as well as the complaint against having the needy people receive birds “filled with sins” (pg. 72) - Actually from Maharil Erev Yom Tov #2
• Women’s exemption from time-bound mitzvot are “because their time belongs to their husbands” (pg. 136) - That’s R’ Yaakov Anatoli in his Melamed haTalmidim
• Rashi is listed as cutting his nails in a particular order (pg. 179) which actually appears first in Avudraham
• Rashi says he can’t study Kabbalah until he is 40 years old (pg. 260) but that doesn't show up until the Shach to Yoreh Deah 246:6 - some 500 years later
• Rashi is quoted as saying that the prohibition against teaching one’s daughter applies uniquely to secrets of Torah (pg. 340) This is a direct quote from Sefer Chasidim 313, which wasn’t written until 100 years after Rashi’s time, in Germany
• Rashi is quoted as adding that if women’s hearts draw them to learn, they should be taught (pg 341), in a direct quote from the 16th century Maayan Ganim of R’ Shemuel Arkevolty
Misunderstandings
• Labelling “Original Sin” part of the mystical tradition of “Maaseh Bereishit” (pg 183) [Chagigah 11-13]
• “Rabbis in Tractate Megillah complain about licentiousness at Purim time” (pg. 199) [not found in Tractate Megillah]
• Confuses "Erusin" with betrothal (pg. 199); "Erusin" happens with the presentation of a ring at the wedding (pg. 221)
• Identifying “Honor your parents” as the fourth commandment (pg 208)
• Saying that Arayot may not be studied with less than 2 students (pg 213) [Chagigah 11b]
• Considering Arayot to be about “How-To” (pg. 213) [Chagigah 11b]
• Advanced students haven’t heard of Masechet Kallah (pg. 215, 257) [Shabbat 114a]
• Fourteen days of niddah after miscarriage of a baby girl (pg. 253)
• Rashi refuses to learn Kabbalah (pg. 259-260) [Vitry 291]
• Considering rice to be new to the area then (pg 300) [Responsa 110, all over Talmud]
• The berachah on Shabbat candles is considered new and controversial (pg. 308) [Responsum of Rav Natronai Gaon]
• Infants under 30 days have no soul yet (pg. 325) [Sanhedrin 91]
• It is claimed that Rashi complained about his wife throwing keys at him when she was a Niddah. (pg. 353) The only similar account is simply a record, in Machzor Vitry 499 and Tosafot Ketuvot 61a, that Rashi was careful not to pass keys hand-to-hand when his wife was a niddah.
Rashi's Daughters: Joheved - Myths and Facts, Part I
[Note: Haveil Havalim is out here!]
Prologue: A great Rashi joke I found here:
Rashi and his wife were getting ready to go out.
Rashi's wife comes into the room, and Rashi sees her and says, "I think you might want to try the blue dress -- it might look a bit nicer."
His wife answers, "Do you have to comment on everything!?"
(Did you know there were Rashi jokes? I know two of them now!)
And now to business:
I first learned of Ms. Maggie Anton in 2006, when a congregant showed me an article she had written, labelling the practice of lighting Shabbat candles/lamps a non-mitzvah until the time of Rashi’s grandchildren. She wrote that there had been great controversy until then. She even declared that it was only during those last generations that a blessing on Shabbat lights was instituted, copying the Talmudic blessing of the Chanukah lights.
I was surprised to hear this, knowing the serious view of the sages on the priority of candle lighting over the centuries. I did some research and found Gaonic responsa from centuries before Rashi (Rav Natronai Gaon), simply declaring that of course one should recite the blessing on Shabbat candles. There was discussion about the practice as חובה or מצוה, obligation vs commandment, but it was clear that this was important, and that it warranted a berachah. Further, Machzor Vitry, the premier record of Rashi’s practices and policies, quotes that responsum of Rav Natronai Gaon verbatim.
Rav Natronai Gaon’s responsum is #66, and it reads:
One who lights the lamp of Shabbat must recite a blessing. Why? For it is obligatory, as we say (Shabbat 25b), “Lighting lamps for Shabbat is obligatory, for Rav Yehudah said citing Shemuel, Lighting lamps etc.” And we have seen that where it is not possible, other mitzvot are overridden before it, as Rabbah said (Shabbat 23b), “It is obvious that in balancing the lamp of the home and the Chanukah lamp, the lamp of the home is greater.” One must bless, “To kindle the lamp of Shabbat.”
And if you will ask, “Where did He instruct us,” it is from Rav Avya and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (Shabbat 23a).
I exchanged some emails with Ms. Anton, and came away from the exchange respecting the seriousness of her efforts, even if I felt she had erred.
Fast-forward two years, and I was asked to teach a class about Ms. Anton’s Rashi’s Daughters series. I agreed to critique Book I: Joheved, and set about reading the book.
First, I found some good work here.
The historical notes about the brief positive era for French Jewry are both accurate and interesting; the French interlude in the Italy-Germany-France heyday of pre-Crusades Jewry certainly was fruitful.
Ms. Anton also brought up some interesting notes inter alia, such as about Rashi’s view of Song of Songs as a consolation for future exiled Jewry, and the lack of the 5-day, pre-7 day Niddah period in Rashi’s day. (The first appearance I have found of that 5-day period is the Or Zarua, who lived a century after Rashi. Vitry 499 discusses niddah practices and does not mention it.)
I enjoyed her Talmudic cites. Granted that the study sessions she portrayed were simplistic, I couldn’t really expect more in a work of fiction.
But I also ran into trouble with this book; I really found myself taking offense at the way Rashi and his family were treated. It seems to me that their lives were stretched this way and that in order to form a compelling story or promote a specific idea regarding women's lives.
Part of this is probably the fact that after studying Rashi's works at various levels for 30 years, I feel some connection. And part of it is probably a result of my own status as a public figure in my community; I would not want someone to do to me what appears to have been done to Rashi here.
And then there was another problem, maybe my biggest problem: Ms. Anton's presentation of Judaism's greatest teacher as a not-so-closeted liberal felt to me like a challenge: You think you know what Judaism is about? Nah; you're basing your Judaism on a misunderstanding, some ahistorical, overly pious idea of what Judaism is supposed to be. Here's the real thing; I read 250 books, and this is what happened in Rashi's day. Rashi wasn't as hung up on religion as you guys are.
This implicit charge is inherently offensive, moreso when it turns out to be based on errors and fiction, and so I took to the task of finding the book's errors and fiction.
I found four basic types of inaccuracies: Errors, Perception, Fictionalization and Misrepresentation. The last was the worst in terms of my own feeling, but here is the collection:
1. Straightforward Errors
There were many simple errors - in moving earlier practices into Rashi’s day, or moving latter-day practices back into Rashi’s day, or borrowing French cultural practices and putting them into Rashi’s family, or just inventing Jewish practices altogether. The list is very, very long, and I will reserve it for a second post, linked at the end of this piece.
2. A matter of perception
I have problems with the way Ms. Anton plays Rashi. Rashi is portrayed as an intellectual, a professor who could just as easily be obsessed with algebra as with Talmud, and with little religious depth or moral authority. He rarely, if ever, seems to reflect on Gd, other than regarding personal suffering or celebration.
In particular, Rashi is depicted as violating his own religious precepts on sexuality, grabbing hold of a woman’s arm, allowing his students to visit brothels, winking at his daughter’s trysts with her betrothed, violating many Talmudic passages (Ketuvot 8b, to start) as well as Rashi’s own lessons recorded in Vitry 528 and Likkutei haPardes meiRashi 3b.
To me, this is the equivalent of a National Enquirer writer penning a piece about some celebrity doing drugs, when in truth the celebrity is on an anti-drug crusade. Why do it? Where is the justification in doing this to a human being, dead 900 years or not?
3. Liberties of Fictionalization
And I had a third problem: The question of what, exactly, counts as legitimate Historical Fiction. I am confused by Maggie Anton’s own words from Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved -
Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved, Preface
At the beginning of most novels, you come across a statement that says smething like, “All characters in this book are fictional and any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental. In Rashi’s Daughters, however, most of the characters are actual persons, and I’ve made every effort to ensure that their fictional lives resemble reality as accurately as possible.
vs.
Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved, Afterword
In any case, because I am writing fiction, I can draw whatever conclusion I like.
Which is it?
Certainly, many historians believe Rashi ran a vineyard - but after that the story is on ice thinner than a sheet of Catherina’s parchment. Rashi is portrayed as having a bad temper, as being unable to satisfy his wife, as teaching the Abbot of Montier-la-Celle, all of which has no basis in any historical source. (Yes, there is such an abbey near Troyes. But what of it? See Sanhedrin 59a on the prohibition against teaching him - and see Rashi’s own comments there!)
4. Misrepresentations
Of course, none of the above is criminal. People make mistakes, and if they are looser than I would prefer in labelling it “historical,” c’est la vie. But now I come to something that really troubles me, especially coming from a writer I respect: Misrepresentations of historical accounts, apparently to further an agenda.
I can only conclude that either I am entirely missing certain sources, or Ms. Anton was misled by her mentors.
Example 1: The candle-lighting controversy
Ms. Anton writes in her Afterword:
At this time there was a great controversy over whether a woman should say a blessing over the Sabbath lights, which was settled only after Rashi’s death when one of his granddaughters wrote responsa explaining how the ritual was performed in her mother’s home.
The Responsum in question was written by Rabbeinu Tam, Rashi’s grandson (Sefer haYashar Teshuvah 45), and it simply says to recite the blessing:
I have also heard that they have uprooted the blessing on the Shabbat lamp and desecrated the sacred and the love of the mitzvah. Many obligations require blessings. This is not like mayim acharonim…
There is no mention of any controversy, or even debate.
Example 2: Rashi and his wife
In her afterword Ms. Anton writes of Rashi:
He refers to his wife only twice, once in his kuntres, complaining how she threw the keys at him when she was niddah, and the other time in a responsum, when she interrupted him at afternoon services because a non-Jew was bringing them a gift of bread and cake before the end of Passover.
This is a big deal, to me. Rashi's wife throwing keys at him, Rashi whining about it in his commentary?
Turns out, the latter account is imprecise, but largely correct - see Rashi Responsum 114 for the whole story. But the former account is simply untrue. The “story of the keys” is actually one line in Tosafot, citing from Machzor Vitry 499:
In Machzor Vitry, Rav Shemaya explained that Rashi was careful not even to pass a key from his hand to hers.
That’s it. No complaint. No airborne keys. Only a sick feeling at seeing Rashi described this way.
Example 3: Rashi’s daughter writing a responsum on how candle-lighting was done in her home
The responsum is noted above in Example 1. It was written by Rabbeinu Tam rather than a granddaughter, and it included no reminiscences about how lighting was done at home.
Example 4: Rashi’s daughter writing a responsum for him
Ms. Anton writes in her Afterword:
Besides the Shabbat lights responsa, there is another one, written late in Rashi’s life, that begins by stating that the reader will not recognize his handwriting because, due to his incapacity, it is being written by his daughter. Thus at least one daughter was learned enough to compose legal responsa in erudite Hebrew, and probably the others were too.
Aside from the fact that taking dictation is not composing responsa, and that “probably the others were too” is less than scientific, let’s look at the text itself:
Ms. Anton is referring to Responsum 73 - but there is no daughter involved. Herewith the text:
My strength is weak and my mouth is mute, to tell the troubles which are passing over me, wave after wave. Therefore my hand is weak from being able to write a response to my relative R’ Azriel and to my beloved and my friend R’ Yosef for his words, in my own handwriting. I am dictating from my mouth to one of my brothers, and he is writing.
Example 5: Rabbeinu Tam saying that women wore tefillin and recited a berachah on them
Here are Ms. Anton’s words, from her Afterword:
In the Tosefot to Tractate Rosh haShanah 33a. Rabbeinu Tam mentions that Michal, King Saul’s daughter, wore tefillin. He then states that in his time, women not only performed these time-bound mitzvot, but when they did so, they said the blessing. But tefillin were not worn outside the home, so Jacob could know only that women said the blessing over them from watching his mother, Joheved, or perhaps his older sisters. In any case, because I am writing fiction, I can draw whatever conclusion I like.
Let us first note that in Rashi’s day tefillin generally were worn all day. Even 350 years later, in the days of the Shulchan Aruch, they were largely worn all day, although some people had already stopped doing so by then.
But aside from that, let’s read the actual words of Tosafot:
The law follows Rabbi Yosi, for his reason is with him, and the practical deed is also great [as testimony], for in Eruvin 96a we learn that Michal, daughter of Shaul, would put on tefillin, and Yonah’s wife went to the Beit haMikdash for the regel, and Chagigah 16b mentions a case in which they brought a korban to the women’s area and the women leaned on it, in order to satisfy them. And they may recite berachot on time-bound active mitzvot, even though they are exempt from the mitzvah itself and are simply engaging in it, like Michal daughter of the Cushite, who also recited blessings.
No mention of any women in his day wearing tefillin.
Example 6: Rashi’s daughter, Leah
Ms. Anton writes in her Afterword, regarding the third daughter, Leah, presented in the book:
Rashi’s students wrote of their surprise when he ignored tradition and mourned for a little girl during a festival, causing some historians to speculate that she was his daughter.
The problem is that this account is in writing in both Vitry 275-276 and Responsa of Rashi 189, and the text is clear that Rashi was not related to the girl:
And at the time of the burial some there protested that we should not recite Tzidduk haDin because of the festival, and not Kaddish, for Kaddish is only recited because of the passages of Tzidduk haDin. And our master rose and recited Tzidduk haDin and then kaddish, saying this is not eulogy and a desecration of the festival, but rather acknowledgement and acceptance of Divine judgment. And when he returned from there, he entered the house of the mourner to comfort him and to speak to his heart… (continues to describe what he said to the mourner)
If Rashi was the mourner, how did he go to comfort the mourner?
Example 7: Rashi's views on women's Torah education
At the end of this book Rashi is quoted as presenting a very liberal view on women's Torah education. I might read these passages and think Rashi was a forerunner of the Bais Yaakov movement.
The problem is that the words put in Rashi's mouth are direct quotes from later writers - one from Sefer Chasidim 313 (a century later, in Germany), and the other from Maayan Ganim (16th century Italy).
These last 7 cases are the ones that trouble me most, because there really is no way to get from the evidence to the conclusions drawn in Rashi’s Daughters. It just seems like Rashi and his family are being used to make a point.
Please note: I am emailing this post to Ms. Anton for her reply; I will print any and all explanations/rebuttals she wishes to send me.
In my next post, Gd-willing, I will provide a non-comprehensive list of errors in the book.
Prologue: A great Rashi joke I found here:
Rashi and his wife were getting ready to go out.
Rashi's wife comes into the room, and Rashi sees her and says, "I think you might want to try the blue dress -- it might look a bit nicer."
His wife answers, "Do you have to comment on everything!?"
(Did you know there were Rashi jokes? I know two of them now!)
And now to business:
I first learned of Ms. Maggie Anton in 2006, when a congregant showed me an article she had written, labelling the practice of lighting Shabbat candles/lamps a non-mitzvah until the time of Rashi’s grandchildren. She wrote that there had been great controversy until then. She even declared that it was only during those last generations that a blessing on Shabbat lights was instituted, copying the Talmudic blessing of the Chanukah lights.
I was surprised to hear this, knowing the serious view of the sages on the priority of candle lighting over the centuries. I did some research and found Gaonic responsa from centuries before Rashi (Rav Natronai Gaon), simply declaring that of course one should recite the blessing on Shabbat candles. There was discussion about the practice as חובה or מצוה, obligation vs commandment, but it was clear that this was important, and that it warranted a berachah. Further, Machzor Vitry, the premier record of Rashi’s practices and policies, quotes that responsum of Rav Natronai Gaon verbatim.
Rav Natronai Gaon’s responsum is #66, and it reads:
One who lights the lamp of Shabbat must recite a blessing. Why? For it is obligatory, as we say (Shabbat 25b), “Lighting lamps for Shabbat is obligatory, for Rav Yehudah said citing Shemuel, Lighting lamps etc.” And we have seen that where it is not possible, other mitzvot are overridden before it, as Rabbah said (Shabbat 23b), “It is obvious that in balancing the lamp of the home and the Chanukah lamp, the lamp of the home is greater.” One must bless, “To kindle the lamp of Shabbat.”
And if you will ask, “Where did He instruct us,” it is from Rav Avya and Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (Shabbat 23a).
I exchanged some emails with Ms. Anton, and came away from the exchange respecting the seriousness of her efforts, even if I felt she had erred.
Fast-forward two years, and I was asked to teach a class about Ms. Anton’s Rashi’s Daughters series. I agreed to critique Book I: Joheved, and set about reading the book.
First, I found some good work here.
The historical notes about the brief positive era for French Jewry are both accurate and interesting; the French interlude in the Italy-Germany-France heyday of pre-Crusades Jewry certainly was fruitful.
Ms. Anton also brought up some interesting notes inter alia, such as about Rashi’s view of Song of Songs as a consolation for future exiled Jewry, and the lack of the 5-day, pre-7 day Niddah period in Rashi’s day. (The first appearance I have found of that 5-day period is the Or Zarua, who lived a century after Rashi. Vitry 499 discusses niddah practices and does not mention it.)
I enjoyed her Talmudic cites. Granted that the study sessions she portrayed were simplistic, I couldn’t really expect more in a work of fiction.
But I also ran into trouble with this book; I really found myself taking offense at the way Rashi and his family were treated. It seems to me that their lives were stretched this way and that in order to form a compelling story or promote a specific idea regarding women's lives.
Part of this is probably the fact that after studying Rashi's works at various levels for 30 years, I feel some connection. And part of it is probably a result of my own status as a public figure in my community; I would not want someone to do to me what appears to have been done to Rashi here.
And then there was another problem, maybe my biggest problem: Ms. Anton's presentation of Judaism's greatest teacher as a not-so-closeted liberal felt to me like a challenge: You think you know what Judaism is about? Nah; you're basing your Judaism on a misunderstanding, some ahistorical, overly pious idea of what Judaism is supposed to be. Here's the real thing; I read 250 books, and this is what happened in Rashi's day. Rashi wasn't as hung up on religion as you guys are.
This implicit charge is inherently offensive, moreso when it turns out to be based on errors and fiction, and so I took to the task of finding the book's errors and fiction.
I found four basic types of inaccuracies: Errors, Perception, Fictionalization and Misrepresentation. The last was the worst in terms of my own feeling, but here is the collection:
1. Straightforward Errors
There were many simple errors - in moving earlier practices into Rashi’s day, or moving latter-day practices back into Rashi’s day, or borrowing French cultural practices and putting them into Rashi’s family, or just inventing Jewish practices altogether. The list is very, very long, and I will reserve it for a second post, linked at the end of this piece.
2. A matter of perception
I have problems with the way Ms. Anton plays Rashi. Rashi is portrayed as an intellectual, a professor who could just as easily be obsessed with algebra as with Talmud, and with little religious depth or moral authority. He rarely, if ever, seems to reflect on Gd, other than regarding personal suffering or celebration.
In particular, Rashi is depicted as violating his own religious precepts on sexuality, grabbing hold of a woman’s arm, allowing his students to visit brothels, winking at his daughter’s trysts with her betrothed, violating many Talmudic passages (Ketuvot 8b, to start) as well as Rashi’s own lessons recorded in Vitry 528 and Likkutei haPardes meiRashi 3b.
To me, this is the equivalent of a National Enquirer writer penning a piece about some celebrity doing drugs, when in truth the celebrity is on an anti-drug crusade. Why do it? Where is the justification in doing this to a human being, dead 900 years or not?
3. Liberties of Fictionalization
And I had a third problem: The question of what, exactly, counts as legitimate Historical Fiction. I am confused by Maggie Anton’s own words from Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved -
Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved, Preface
At the beginning of most novels, you come across a statement that says smething like, “All characters in this book are fictional and any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental. In Rashi’s Daughters, however, most of the characters are actual persons, and I’ve made every effort to ensure that their fictional lives resemble reality as accurately as possible.
vs.
Rashi’s Daughters Book I: Joheved, Afterword
In any case, because I am writing fiction, I can draw whatever conclusion I like.
Which is it?
Certainly, many historians believe Rashi ran a vineyard - but after that the story is on ice thinner than a sheet of Catherina’s parchment. Rashi is portrayed as having a bad temper, as being unable to satisfy his wife, as teaching the Abbot of Montier-la-Celle, all of which has no basis in any historical source. (Yes, there is such an abbey near Troyes. But what of it? See Sanhedrin 59a on the prohibition against teaching him - and see Rashi’s own comments there!)
4. Misrepresentations
Of course, none of the above is criminal. People make mistakes, and if they are looser than I would prefer in labelling it “historical,” c’est la vie. But now I come to something that really troubles me, especially coming from a writer I respect: Misrepresentations of historical accounts, apparently to further an agenda.
I can only conclude that either I am entirely missing certain sources, or Ms. Anton was misled by her mentors.
Example 1: The candle-lighting controversy
Ms. Anton writes in her Afterword:
At this time there was a great controversy over whether a woman should say a blessing over the Sabbath lights, which was settled only after Rashi’s death when one of his granddaughters wrote responsa explaining how the ritual was performed in her mother’s home.
The Responsum in question was written by Rabbeinu Tam, Rashi’s grandson (Sefer haYashar Teshuvah 45), and it simply says to recite the blessing:
I have also heard that they have uprooted the blessing on the Shabbat lamp and desecrated the sacred and the love of the mitzvah. Many obligations require blessings. This is not like mayim acharonim…
There is no mention of any controversy, or even debate.
Example 2: Rashi and his wife
In her afterword Ms. Anton writes of Rashi:
He refers to his wife only twice, once in his kuntres, complaining how she threw the keys at him when she was niddah, and the other time in a responsum, when she interrupted him at afternoon services because a non-Jew was bringing them a gift of bread and cake before the end of Passover.
This is a big deal, to me. Rashi's wife throwing keys at him, Rashi whining about it in his commentary?
Turns out, the latter account is imprecise, but largely correct - see Rashi Responsum 114 for the whole story. But the former account is simply untrue. The “story of the keys” is actually one line in Tosafot, citing from Machzor Vitry 499:
In Machzor Vitry, Rav Shemaya explained that Rashi was careful not even to pass a key from his hand to hers.
That’s it. No complaint. No airborne keys. Only a sick feeling at seeing Rashi described this way.
Example 3: Rashi’s daughter writing a responsum on how candle-lighting was done in her home
The responsum is noted above in Example 1. It was written by Rabbeinu Tam rather than a granddaughter, and it included no reminiscences about how lighting was done at home.
Example 4: Rashi’s daughter writing a responsum for him
Ms. Anton writes in her Afterword:
Besides the Shabbat lights responsa, there is another one, written late in Rashi’s life, that begins by stating that the reader will not recognize his handwriting because, due to his incapacity, it is being written by his daughter. Thus at least one daughter was learned enough to compose legal responsa in erudite Hebrew, and probably the others were too.
Aside from the fact that taking dictation is not composing responsa, and that “probably the others were too” is less than scientific, let’s look at the text itself:
Ms. Anton is referring to Responsum 73 - but there is no daughter involved. Herewith the text:
My strength is weak and my mouth is mute, to tell the troubles which are passing over me, wave after wave. Therefore my hand is weak from being able to write a response to my relative R’ Azriel and to my beloved and my friend R’ Yosef for his words, in my own handwriting. I am dictating from my mouth to one of my brothers, and he is writing.
Example 5: Rabbeinu Tam saying that women wore tefillin and recited a berachah on them
Here are Ms. Anton’s words, from her Afterword:
In the Tosefot to Tractate Rosh haShanah 33a. Rabbeinu Tam mentions that Michal, King Saul’s daughter, wore tefillin. He then states that in his time, women not only performed these time-bound mitzvot, but when they did so, they said the blessing. But tefillin were not worn outside the home, so Jacob could know only that women said the blessing over them from watching his mother, Joheved, or perhaps his older sisters. In any case, because I am writing fiction, I can draw whatever conclusion I like.
Let us first note that in Rashi’s day tefillin generally were worn all day. Even 350 years later, in the days of the Shulchan Aruch, they were largely worn all day, although some people had already stopped doing so by then.
But aside from that, let’s read the actual words of Tosafot:
The law follows Rabbi Yosi, for his reason is with him, and the practical deed is also great [as testimony], for in Eruvin 96a we learn that Michal, daughter of Shaul, would put on tefillin, and Yonah’s wife went to the Beit haMikdash for the regel, and Chagigah 16b mentions a case in which they brought a korban to the women’s area and the women leaned on it, in order to satisfy them. And they may recite berachot on time-bound active mitzvot, even though they are exempt from the mitzvah itself and are simply engaging in it, like Michal daughter of the Cushite, who also recited blessings.
No mention of any women in his day wearing tefillin.
Example 6: Rashi’s daughter, Leah
Ms. Anton writes in her Afterword, regarding the third daughter, Leah, presented in the book:
Rashi’s students wrote of their surprise when he ignored tradition and mourned for a little girl during a festival, causing some historians to speculate that she was his daughter.
The problem is that this account is in writing in both Vitry 275-276 and Responsa of Rashi 189, and the text is clear that Rashi was not related to the girl:
And at the time of the burial some there protested that we should not recite Tzidduk haDin because of the festival, and not Kaddish, for Kaddish is only recited because of the passages of Tzidduk haDin. And our master rose and recited Tzidduk haDin and then kaddish, saying this is not eulogy and a desecration of the festival, but rather acknowledgement and acceptance of Divine judgment. And when he returned from there, he entered the house of the mourner to comfort him and to speak to his heart… (continues to describe what he said to the mourner)
If Rashi was the mourner, how did he go to comfort the mourner?
Example 7: Rashi's views on women's Torah education
At the end of this book Rashi is quoted as presenting a very liberal view on women's Torah education. I might read these passages and think Rashi was a forerunner of the Bais Yaakov movement.
The problem is that the words put in Rashi's mouth are direct quotes from later writers - one from Sefer Chasidim 313 (a century later, in Germany), and the other from Maayan Ganim (16th century Italy).
These last 7 cases are the ones that trouble me most, because there really is no way to get from the evidence to the conclusions drawn in Rashi’s Daughters. It just seems like Rashi and his family are being used to make a point.
Please note: I am emailing this post to Ms. Anton for her reply; I will print any and all explanations/rebuttals she wishes to send me.
In my next post, Gd-willing, I will provide a non-comprehensive list of errors in the book.
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