[This week's Toronto Torah is here!]
I’ve spent quite a bit of time this year reading Rav Kook’s comments on the Haggadah. I have come to believe that Rav Kook saw the Seder as a performance centered on the food, and the Maggid, the re-telling of our experience of suffering and redemption, as a complement to the food.
In particular, Rav Kook’s views of Koreich are fascinating; he presents two dichotomies to explain the Matzah/Marror sandwich. Here are excerpts explaining the two views:
1. Matzah = Freedom, Marror = Servitude, and we need to develop a unity of the two to be true servants of Gd
We must understand these two forces, that of servitude and that of freedom, not as separate forces which operate independently, each with its own role, but as two joined, complementary forces…
The overall goal will be realized only with the knowledge and recognition that these two forces are not contradictory, but are joined in creating the world’s ultimate Freedom, the honor and the powerful desirability of which is not revealed unless it is crowned by exalted Servitude, servitude before the King of Glory, which is also the ultimate freedom.
Therefore, the perfect form of Freedom comes when it is bound together with Servitude, such that a person will find within himself the total control which is suitable for a truly free person, who reigns as well upon the greatest of forces, which is the force of freedom itself.
2. Matzah = Realized Redemption, Marror = Preparation for Redemption, and we see Yetziat Mitzrayim as both extant redemption and preparation for future exile and then future redemption
(Rav Kook makes this observation on the passage of Maggid about reciting the story of our departure from Egypt during the day and at night.)
Matzah is parallel to the goal of accepting the yoke of Divine monarchy… Marror is bceause they embittered the lives of our ancestors, which is the preparation for the revelation of HaShem upon us in the future…
Therefore we say, ‘Because of this [Gd acted for me when I left Egypt],’ and not ‘Because of these,’ plural, to demonstrate the unity of the preparation and the goal, the unity of day and night.
Showing posts with label Judaism: Slavery. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judaism: Slavery. Show all posts
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Daf: Gittin 41-44 – Procreation, Shady outreach methods, Pleonasm, Freeing an עבד to enable mitzvah observance
Still catching up on old notes… for those who are interested, bear with me while I catch up. For those who are not interested, well, I guess it doesn’t matter whether I am caught up or not, right? Skip down the page to hear about evertything that’s wrong with rabbinic speeches.
Gittin 41b
The gemara here cites, as proof that an עבד should be allowed to marry, the pasuk of לא תהו בראה לשבת יצרה, “Gd did not create the world to be empty; Gd formed it for settlement.” They do not bring the classic פרו ורבו “Bear fruit and multiply.” Tosafot לא explains why.
Here we talk about forcing a person to violate biblical law, having him free his עבד, in order to enable the עבד to fulfill a mitzvah of procreation; this is odd, given that Shabbat 4a says we do not tell a person to sin in order to benefit others!
Tosafot כופין offers two approaches: 1) In the case in Shabbat 4a we are dealing with a sinner who did something wrong (putting dough in an oven right before Shabbat) to enter that position; here, the עבד did nothing wrong. 2) Procreation is a mitzvah which helps the community.
Both of these approaches open major questions regarding sinning to benefit someone else, and regarding Outreach methods. What would you think of a Jew who broke a Jewish law in order to become close with someone who was sinning, arguing that he was justified by Tosafot’s argument here – since he would be helping this person, who might then turn out to help others? Or what would you think of a Jew who lied to someone for the sake of “outreach,” making that same argument?
An important point of methodology: Why do we use logic here against a pleonasm (גזירה שוה)? This pleonasm is מופנה, utilizing textual anomalies on either side – so it should not be open to challenge! Tosafot מה suggests that even with a strong pleonasm, logic can challenge it, and result in us using different methods of analyzing those textual anomalies.
Gittin 42b
Tosafot הואיל explains that we need a גט שחרור (document freeing an עבד) in a case in which people might suspect that the עבד was not really freed. This bothers me; the gemara sounds as though the עבד is not free without this document, but in this case the document is really just supposed to be, per Tosafot, an extra protection for the freed עבד’s sake!
Gittin 43b
Note that the gemara here brings the imperative of פרו ורבו, Bear fruit and multiply, for an עבד – which it did not do back on 41b. See Tosafot back on 41b, and the Maharsha on that Tosafot.
Gittin 44a
The gemara at the bottom of this page is fascinating. Ordinarily we say מילתא דלא שכיחא לא גזרו ביה רבנן, that the sages did not make decrees for unusual cases. Here, though, they did make the decree – just not to be too harsh.
The gemara here discusses freeing an עבד in order to enable him to perform mitzvot, since his master has put him in a position where he will otherwise be unable to perform mitzvot. That sounds like it should be an automatic requirement – but we see in this gemara that the עבד has the right to say, “No, I’d rather remain an עבד even though that means I will not be able to perform mitzvot.”
Gittin 41b
The gemara here cites, as proof that an עבד should be allowed to marry, the pasuk of לא תהו בראה לשבת יצרה, “Gd did not create the world to be empty; Gd formed it for settlement.” They do not bring the classic פרו ורבו “Bear fruit and multiply.” Tosafot לא explains why.
Here we talk about forcing a person to violate biblical law, having him free his עבד, in order to enable the עבד to fulfill a mitzvah of procreation; this is odd, given that Shabbat 4a says we do not tell a person to sin in order to benefit others!
Tosafot כופין offers two approaches: 1) In the case in Shabbat 4a we are dealing with a sinner who did something wrong (putting dough in an oven right before Shabbat) to enter that position; here, the עבד did nothing wrong. 2) Procreation is a mitzvah which helps the community.
Both of these approaches open major questions regarding sinning to benefit someone else, and regarding Outreach methods. What would you think of a Jew who broke a Jewish law in order to become close with someone who was sinning, arguing that he was justified by Tosafot’s argument here – since he would be helping this person, who might then turn out to help others? Or what would you think of a Jew who lied to someone for the sake of “outreach,” making that same argument?
An important point of methodology: Why do we use logic here against a pleonasm (גזירה שוה)? This pleonasm is מופנה, utilizing textual anomalies on either side – so it should not be open to challenge! Tosafot מה suggests that even with a strong pleonasm, logic can challenge it, and result in us using different methods of analyzing those textual anomalies.
Gittin 42b
Tosafot הואיל explains that we need a גט שחרור (document freeing an עבד) in a case in which people might suspect that the עבד was not really freed. This bothers me; the gemara sounds as though the עבד is not free without this document, but in this case the document is really just supposed to be, per Tosafot, an extra protection for the freed עבד’s sake!
Gittin 43b
Note that the gemara here brings the imperative of פרו ורבו, Bear fruit and multiply, for an עבד – which it did not do back on 41b. See Tosafot back on 41b, and the Maharsha on that Tosafot.
Gittin 44a
The gemara at the bottom of this page is fascinating. Ordinarily we say מילתא דלא שכיחא לא גזרו ביה רבנן, that the sages did not make decrees for unusual cases. Here, though, they did make the decree – just not to be too harsh.
The gemara here discusses freeing an עבד in order to enable him to perform mitzvot, since his master has put him in a position where he will otherwise be unable to perform mitzvot. That sounds like it should be an automatic requirement – but we see in this gemara that the עבד has the right to say, “No, I’d rather remain an עבד even though that means I will not be able to perform mitzvot.”
Friday, July 25, 2008
Gittin 7-9 Accidental sin, helping an eved marry, and illiterate witnesses
As always, read with a gemara in front of you. Or, you could just skip it, of course.
7a
The gemara’s contention that Gd protects the righteous from accidental sin has its roots in various sources, such as the promise that HaShem will protect a Sanhedrin from accidentally killing an innocent victim. This is problematic, though, for we find cases of rabbinic error; whole segments of gemara deal, for example, with judicial error. Tosafot השתא tackles the problem by distinguishing between eating non-kosher and other sins; see his comments there.
דום may be taken as “be silent” or as “hope for.” But see Rosh haShanah 16b, as well as teshuvah #6 of the Tzemach Tzedek (the first, not the Lubavitcher Tzemach Tzedek), on the issue of liability for the causing the downfall of others.
Note that our gemara mis-cites Hosheia 9:1; the word there is כעמים, not בעמים. This may be a typo, but it may also be an אל תקרי approach, since the adjusted meaning of the sentence more closely fits our gemara’s point.
See Tosafot זמרא on the permissibility of listening to music in our own day. Ashkenazi poskim, like Tosafot, seem to be more lenient than Sephardic poskim in this issue.
8b
See Tosafot אף על גב on the point that settling Israel justifies אמירה לעכו"מ, but other mitzvot do not.
See Tosafot הדר.
9a
Tosafot שוו raises a very interesting question: We want to aid proper verification of a get in order to help a woman re-marry, but where is our incentive to make it easier to verify a document freeing an עבד? In the Torah’s version of עבדות, which is primarily long-term economic commitment, where is the harm? If he cannot marry a בת חורין, he can marry a שפחה - and the gemara later, on 13a, will contend that he prefers this! Tosafot offers a suggestion which runs counter to 13a, and an additional suggestion that the עבד wishes to fulfill mitzvot. Ramban and Ritva, though, will say that the עבד who is in limbo can marry no one, and so our expedited verification will help him a great deal.
9b
Rashi חוץ מגיטי נשים takes the view of the Chachmei Provence (2:48) that the reason secular governments have judicial authority recognized by Jewish law (dina d’malchuta dina) is because Gd instructed them to carry out such laws, in the mitzvot of Bnei Noach. For more on this see my post here.
Rashi בגיטי נשים does not seem to recognize any עיגון situation for an eved - contrary to the remarks of Tosafot שוו on 9a.
If we are to etch in signatures for illiterate witnesses and have them fill the signatures with ink, or if we will use stencils (per Rabbeinu Chananel cited in Tosafot here), how will we recognize their signatures as their own?! Some fifteen years ago, my friend Tzvi Hebel suggested that we don’t have to recognize their signatures at all, just that the delivery agent has to see them “sign” the document, and this is indeed fulfilled.
7a
The gemara’s contention that Gd protects the righteous from accidental sin has its roots in various sources, such as the promise that HaShem will protect a Sanhedrin from accidentally killing an innocent victim. This is problematic, though, for we find cases of rabbinic error; whole segments of gemara deal, for example, with judicial error. Tosafot השתא tackles the problem by distinguishing between eating non-kosher and other sins; see his comments there.
דום may be taken as “be silent” or as “hope for.” But see Rosh haShanah 16b, as well as teshuvah #6 of the Tzemach Tzedek (the first, not the Lubavitcher Tzemach Tzedek), on the issue of liability for the causing the downfall of others.
Note that our gemara mis-cites Hosheia 9:1; the word there is כעמים, not בעמים. This may be a typo, but it may also be an אל תקרי approach, since the adjusted meaning of the sentence more closely fits our gemara’s point.
See Tosafot זמרא on the permissibility of listening to music in our own day. Ashkenazi poskim, like Tosafot, seem to be more lenient than Sephardic poskim in this issue.
8b
See Tosafot אף על גב on the point that settling Israel justifies אמירה לעכו"מ, but other mitzvot do not.
See Tosafot הדר.
9a
Tosafot שוו raises a very interesting question: We want to aid proper verification of a get in order to help a woman re-marry, but where is our incentive to make it easier to verify a document freeing an עבד? In the Torah’s version of עבדות, which is primarily long-term economic commitment, where is the harm? If he cannot marry a בת חורין, he can marry a שפחה - and the gemara later, on 13a, will contend that he prefers this! Tosafot offers a suggestion which runs counter to 13a, and an additional suggestion that the עבד wishes to fulfill mitzvot. Ramban and Ritva, though, will say that the עבד who is in limbo can marry no one, and so our expedited verification will help him a great deal.
9b
Rashi חוץ מגיטי נשים takes the view of the Chachmei Provence (2:48) that the reason secular governments have judicial authority recognized by Jewish law (dina d’malchuta dina) is because Gd instructed them to carry out such laws, in the mitzvot of Bnei Noach. For more on this see my post here.
Rashi בגיטי נשים does not seem to recognize any עיגון situation for an eved - contrary to the remarks of Tosafot שוו on 9a.
If we are to etch in signatures for illiterate witnesses and have them fill the signatures with ink, or if we will use stencils (per Rabbeinu Chananel cited in Tosafot here), how will we recognize their signatures as their own?! Some fifteen years ago, my friend Tzvi Hebel suggested that we don’t have to recognize their signatures at all, just that the delivery agent has to see them “sign” the document, and this is indeed fulfilled.
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